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Abstract 
Can the brain register the emotional valence of brief exposures of 
complex natural stimuli under conditions of forward and backward 
masking, and under conditions of attentional competition between foveal 
and peripheral stimuli?  To address this question, three experiments were 
conducted.  The first, a behavioural experiment, measured subjective 
valence of response (pleasant vs unpleasant) to test the perception of the 
valence of natural images in brief, masked exposures in a forward and 
backward masking paradigm. Images were chosen from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS) series. After correction for response bias, 
responses to the majority of target stimuli were concordant with the IAPS 
ratings at better than chance, even when the presence of the target was 
undetected.  Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), the 
effects of IAPS valence and stimulus category were objectively measured 
on nine regions of interest (ROIs) using the same strict temporal 
restrictions in a similar masking design.  Evidence of affective processing 
close to or below conscious threshold was apparent in some of the ROIs.  
To further this line of enquiry, a second fMRI experiment mapping the 
same ROIs and using the same stimuli were presented in a foveal 
(‘attended’) peripheral (‘to-be-ignored’) paradigm (small image 
superimposed in the centre of a large image of the same category, but 
opposite valence) to investigate spatial parameters and limitations of 
attention.  Results are interpreted as showing both valence and category 
specific effects of ‘to-be-ignored’ images in the periphery.  These results 
are discussed in light of theories of the limitations of attentional capacity 
and the speed in which we process natural images, providing new 
evidence of the breadth of variety in the types of affective visual stimuli 
we are able to process close to the threshold of conscious perception.    
 
Keywords:  Amygdala; Anterior Cingulate Cortex; medial Prefrontal Cortex; 
Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex; Orbitofrontal Cortex; Parahippocampus; 
Fusiform Gyrus; Insula; Superior Temporal Gyrus; consciousness; attention; 
masking; fMRI.     
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Glossary of Working Definitions 
 
Attended condition – instructed to voluntarily attend to a small image 
presented in the fovea superimposed on a large image of the same category, 
but opposite valence (Section 5:2). 
Awareness – perception allowing identification of content, and accompanied 
by a distinctive sensory impression.  
Backward masking – method to reduce detectability of a target stimulus by 
presenting a second stimulus (mask) immediately after the target. 
Concordant – participant’s impression of the stimuli in agreement with IAPS 
ratings. 
Coni – abbr. valence impression confidence.  In chapter 3 participants rated 
how confident they were in their overall judgement of valence for each trial as 
a whole. 
Cons – abbr. seen confidence.  In chapter 3 the participants recorded how 
confident they were in their answer to how many pictures they saw.  This 
measure is termed ‘seen confidence’. 
Consciousness – in this thesis, the term consciousness is used in the sense of 
Damasio’s ‘core consciousness’ to refer  to perception with awareness in the 
awake state (Damasio, 1999).  
Detection threshold – operationally defined as identical to the subjective 
threshold. 
Discordant – participant’s impression of the stimuli not in agreement with 
IAPS ratings. 
Discrimination threshold – operationally defined as identical with the 
objective threshold. 
Dual image – compound image consisting of the attended condition 
superimposed on the ‘to-be-ignored’ condition of opposite valence (Section 
5:1). 
Explicit perception – perception with awareness allowing self-report and 
further cognitive operations including discrimination naming and description 
of stimuli. 
 
 
 xi
Feelings – subjective private mental portrait, composite perceptions of the 
physiological reactions of emotions. 
Forward masking – detectability of target stimulus is reduced when 
following a longer duration stimulus (mask). 
Gist – a very sparse, coarse impression. 
Implicit perception – perception without awareness: input influences 
cognitive operations but is not available to self-report. 
Perception of emotion – objective response, chemically and neurologically 
produced by the brain when presented with the appropriate stimuli. 
Subliminal processing – defined in the behavioural experiment as below 
detection threshold, but above discrimination threshold.   
Supraliminal – above the threshold of conscious awareness. 
To-be-ignored condition – instructed to ignore large image, surrounding 
foveal image of the same category, but opposite valence (Section 5:1). 
Unconsciousness perception – perception without awareness. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
1:1  Backgound  
 
It has been argued that our perception of natural images is not limited by the 
capacity of visual attention as severely as is the perception of artificial, simpler 
visual stimuli.  Li and colleagues used natural images of animals and vehicles 
and concluded that “some visual tasks associated with ‘high-level’ cortical 
areas may proceed in the near absence of attention” (Li et al., 2002, p 9596), 
challenging previous theories of visual limitations of attention (Li et al., 2002).  
 The use of artificial stimuli such as simple geometric shapes or actors’ 
faces has formed the bulk of the evidential basis for theories of visual 
processing below conscious threshold.  This has happened for a good reason, as 
valid experiments need to be controlled for all possible variables, so controlling 
for colour, orientation, luminance and salience enable quantification of those 
visual properties that determine detection and discrimination.  However, these 
stimuli are not ecologically valid.  Employing natural images moves some way 
towards ecological validity, but it is more difficult to achieve tight 
experimental control of all the variables in such complex stimuli.  
 With this in mind, however, there are noteworthy contributors 
investigating the brain mechanisms behind the rapid visual processing of 
everyday images, demonstrating that certain natural objects can be detected 
within natural scenes remarkably quickly (Rousselet et al., 2002, Thorpe et al., 
2001b, Thorpe et al., 2006) .  Thorpe and colleagues, for instance, continue to 
consider rapid categorisation/detections tasks using response timings (RTs) and 
event-related potentials (ERPs) and have concluded that animal and face 
detection in everyday images happen in as little as 150ms (Fabre-Thorpe et al., 
2001, Thorpe et al., 1996).  Note that these detections are not ‘perception 
without awareness’ since conscious categorisation of the images is possible.  
 In contrast with these demonstrations of the ability to categorise visual 
stimuli from brief presentations, evidence from change blindness and 
inattentional blindness studies demonstrates the poverty of information that can 
be recovered from visual stimuli in the absence of conscious perception and 
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attention.  These compelling phenomena show that (provided the local motion 
signals that cue image changes are masked), large changes in an image or the 
presence of unexpected stimuli are rendered invisible, because the gist of the 
picture is unchanged (Beck et al., 2001, Mack and Rock, 1998). 
 This raises the question of how we process the emotional content of 
scenes and pictures. Is emotional valence a simple category (like ‘animal’, 
‘face’ or ‘building’) that we can immediately categorise in a brief visual 
presentation, or does it depend (in complex scenes) upon conscious processing 
– ‘beyond the gist’? Or is there, indeed, a special mechanism for identifying 
emotional content that does not require conscious awareness? 
 It has been argued that responses to visual emotional stimuli are 
automatic and can be processed without conscious awareness.  The 
functionality of affective significance is one of survival in the detection of 
threat, or opportunity for procreation and sustenance, and early automatic 
processing is arguably of an evolutionary advantage.  Research on emotional 
processing has supported this theoretical premise.  Detection of threat-related 
faces, in one experiment, was faster than those of neutral expressions (Öhman 
et al., 2001b), as was the detection of animals compared with neutral images 
(Öhman et al., 2001a).  Emotional scenes have also shown more rapid 
discrimination than neutral scenes (Cuthbert et al., 2000). 
 Rapid emotional processing has been demonstrated using skin 
conductance response (SCR) (Lane and Nadel, 2000), and 
electroencephalogram (EEG) (Schupp et al., 2000).  Moreover, brain imaging 
research has revealed more detailed information on the brain structures 
mediating early processing. For instance, positron emission technology (PET) 
directly identifies activity in neurotransmitter systems by introducing positron-
emitting radiolabelled tracers injected into healthy participants (Huettal et al., 
2004).  Some researchers favour the chemical specificity of PET when 
investigating emotional expressions and experience (e.g. Damasio et al., 2000), 
whilst others prefer the more accurate spatial resolution and better temporal 
resolution of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).  These include 
experiments investigating conscious awareness of affect, with either natural 
images presented supraliminally, as in an expectancy and perception 
experiment reflecting dissociable emotion and cognitive networks (Bermpohl 
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et al., 2006), or subliminally presented images that are less complex such as 
pictures of faces  (Etkin et al., 2004, Pessoa et al., 2005a).  However, to date 
relatively few experiments have systematically used fMRI to analyse cortical 
activity in relation to a wide range of natural everyday images whilst presented 
below the level of conscious awareness.   
 
1:2  Historical Context 
 
1:2:1  Consciousness 
 
Consciousness is a seductive conundrum.  It has tantalised and perplexed some 
of the greatest minds in history.  
 For instance, “cogito ergo sum”, famously translated as “I think 
therefore I am” (Je pense, donc je suis) is the best-known aphorism from the 
influential 17th Century philosopher Rene Descartes, illustrating the primacy of 
our own mental states as the foundation for what we can know (Descartes, 
1637/1909).  But how do our mental states relate to the matter of which we, 
and the rest of the universe, are composed?  In a further attempt to understand 
the res extensa (extended substance, matter) and the res cogitans (thinking 
substance), constituting his dualistic theory of two separate substances, 
Descartes subsequently conceded that they were closely connected and indeed 
intertwined (Damasio, 1994).  Whilst not producing definitive answers, the 
clarity of his analysis has challenged and stimulated many critics and thus 
shaped our entire thinking about consciousness and its relation to the body.   
 In 1890, William James published what is considered to be the most 
influential summary of nineteenth century psychology, The Principles of 
Psychology (James, 1890/1950).  Exploring the biological function and 
physical basis of consciousness, which he called the scientific study of mind, 
this work covered aspects of psychology that included brain function, the self, 
attention, memory, perception and the ‘stream of consciousness’, which he 
believed was ‘thought’ that continuously changes and is never exactly 
repeated.  ‘Thought’ involves attention in that it attends to certain objects 
whilst omitting others, which also involves short term memory (James, 
1890/1950).  His prolific contributions remain relevant and influential today as 
 
 
 4
evidenced by his ideas on fringe consciousness, “to designate the influence of a 
faint brain process upon our thought, as it makes it aware of relations and 
objects but dimly perceived”  (James, 1890/1950, p 258).  This has more 
recently been described as gist perception, a representation of a scene that may 
be outside of focal attention or without awareness of detail (Koch, 2004).  
James also deliberated upon the works of Dr Mosso, who discovered that 
changes in cerebral blood flow accompanied cerebral activation (James, 
1890/1950).  This work constituted the starting point for haemodynamics of 
brain imaging techniques such as MRI and PET (Baars and Gage, 2007).   
 Beginning his medical career in neurology, Freud anticipated the 
hypothesis that a neural network generates conscious experience by 
introducing the concept of three classes of neurons.  According to Freud, φ 
neurons are responsible for perception, ψ neurons mediate memory expediated 
by contact barriers (Freud, 1895/2001), which were not discovered until 2 
years later by Sherrington, whereby he adopted the name synapse which is 
Greek for clasp (Sherrington, 1897).  Thirdly, ω neurons mediate 
consciousness including the subjective aspect of qualia (Freud, 1895/2001).  
This work was far ahead of neuroscience at that time and it is for this reason 
that it is speculated that Freud abandoned neurology and turned to developing 
psychoanalytic theories, although this supposition is challenged  (Pribram, 
1998, Solms, 1998).   
 As the turn of the 20th century began, consciousness studies started to 
lose momentum, partly because of the scientific impracticality of its 
indeterminate subjective nature, and partly because of the difficulty in 
validating experiments by repetition based on the experience of others. 
Therefore, psychology moved away from mental study and towards 
experiments that measured behaviour using stimulus and response techniques.  
Enter the behaviourist movement, and consciousness took a back seat in the 
scientific world and remained with religious scholars and philosophers (Crick, 
1994). 
 In the late 1950s and 1960s, however, the behaviourist movement was 
running out of steam because many psychologists began to realise that the 
study of behaviour had become oversimplified.  Computer science was gaining 
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momentum and human cognitive processes were soon looked upon in the light 
of computer programming and so the emergence of cognitive psychology once 
again legitimised the study of mental processes such as attention, perception, 
emotion, memory and language (Crick, 1994). 
 In fact, Crick (1994), in his book ‘The Astonishing Hypothesis’ gave a 
rallying-cry for a new science of consciousness, building on what we might 
call the standard history of consciousness studies (outlined above).  According 
to Crick, in order to study consciousness we should only study the relationships 
between brain and behaviour scientifically through the application of 
neuroscience with one clear-cut question in mind – what are the neural 
correlates of consciousness (NCCs)?  In collaboration with Koch, they chose to 
study the difference between conscious and nonconscious visual experiences, 
as research had already progressed extensively our knowledge of the visual 
system.  They believed that aiming to understand NCCs by comparing 
conscious and non-conscious processing would lead the way to causal 
explanations.  An example of the evidence they have offered so far is of an 
alliance of neurons responsible for perception which compete for awareness via 
saliency or selective attention through feedback mechanisms from the higher 
cortex (Koch, 2004). 
 Although this scientific programme has been criticised for extreme 
reductionism (Blackmore, 2003), it has contributed to enticing scientists to 
consider subjective experience as part of the experimental scientific 
mainstream.  However, this whole new environment for consciousness studies 
has not been without its problems, for even defining consciousness is a 
challenge.  Consciousness can exist in different states, as in dreaming 
compared with the waking state. Consciousness may be held to refer 
specifically to attention and perception, to self-consciousness, to the qualitative 
content of experience or most generally, to the possession of any mental state. 
‘Unconsciousness’ can refer to inattention, implicit processing, repression, 
sleep, anaesthesia or death, but also may be due to brain damage.  A useful 
distinction has been made by Damasio (1999) between core consciousness 
(immediate awareness) and extended consciousness (the integrated structure of 
knowledge of the external world and the self). Specific knowledge, including 
the capacity for language, is thus part of extended consciousness (Damasio, 
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1999).  For the purposes of this thesis, however, the definition of consciousness 
is close to Damasio’s concept of core consciousness: consciousness is being 
aware whilst in the awake state. 
 In an attempt to understand consciousness, vision studies have proven 
invaluable.  There are several reasons for this.  Firstly, one can study several 
brain structures that are dedicated to visual processing, underlining the 
importance of seeing; there is a wealth of information in images and it is 
possible to easily manipulate various aspects of stimuli using various computer 
graphics packages.  Equally, visual illusions are abundant in variety and 
ambiguity (Koch, 2004), such as the Ames distorted room, whereby one corner 
of the rear wall is further away from the viewpoint than the other, and by 
applying learnt knowledge of a three dimensional figure, the two dimensional 
figure is misinterpreted (Eysenck and Keane, 2005).  Lastly, animal studies 
using visual perception have contributed enormously to our knowledge of 
vision and attention (Koch, 2004).  To add to the diversity of the efficacy of 
using visual stimuli, lesion studies have provided a wealth of information for 
consciousness studies, especially those that impair visual awareness.  Cortical 
blindness, or blindsight, is a case in point whereby patients deny any visual 
sensation of a stimulus, but are able to point to it or guess basic visual 
properties such as orientation or colour (Baars and Gage, 2007). 
 All of these advantages render visual percepts ideal for measuring 
neuronal representations of conscious and unconscious visual processing.  This 
leads to the question as to what is the difference between conscious and 
unconscious representations in the brain?  Perhaps there is a difference 
between the two different processes?  Or perhaps there is an additional quality 
to the same representation that renders a percept conscious?  Quantity as in size 
or strength may determine if a representation becomes conscious or not.  Or 
maybe the ‘forty-hertz’ hypothesis is correct, whereby cortical cells fire in 
synchrony at a 40 times per second oscillation for a visual conscious 
experience, which suggests that conscious experience arises from temporal 
rather than spatial aspects of neural processing (Gray and Singer, 1989).  
Equally, conscious processing may be a matter of degree rather than a sharp 
contrast of conscious processing occurring completely or not at all (Rose, 
2006).  These ideas will be further expanded upon as this discourse unfolds.   
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 Working with one modality (vision) to measure unconscious processing 
enables further insight into a second aspect of unconscious processing, which is 
that of emotion, which will now be addressed.   
  
1:2:2  Emotion and the Brain 
 
Since the late nineteenth century, the role of biology and the brain in emotion 
has been contemplated.  In The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals 
(1872/1999) Charles Darwin argued that the existence of complex behaviours, 
including the expression of emotion, depends on natural selection (animal or 
human).  Emotionally expressive behaviours develop from responses to stimuli 
and acquire additional survival value through their communicative functions. 
For example, an expression of emotion becomes habitual if it is serviceable, 
and develops out of associated reflexive responses (e.g. the action of 
withdrawing rapidly from danger due to the warning of pain), or voluntary 
behaviours.  Other expressions of emotion have evolved from pre-emptive 
behaviour patterns, such as a low growl a dog makes as a warning which can 
be equated to a human voice lowering in tone and becoming a deliberate 
threatening signal.  Darwin’s ideas were supported by the observational notes 
he made on his children.  He noted that from the moment they were born, their 
emotional outbursts and expressions were fully recognisable; therefore because 
they were evident so early in life, they could not have been learnt so must be 
innate.  As such, according to Darwin, evolution has determined our emotional 
expressions and behaviour (Darwin, 1872/1999).   
 Consistent with this, in 1884 William James and Carl Lange proposed 
related ideas on the theory of emotion (James, 1884, Lange, 1885).  The James-
Lange theory, as it later became known, postulates that emotion is a response 
to perceived physiological changes, (e.g. one sees a spider and starts to 
tremble).  The emotion or interpretation of the physical manifestation 
(trembling) takes place in the cerebral cortex, which is fed back to infer that if 
one is trembling then one must be afraid. However, the implication here may 
be that in the absence of awareness of physiological signs, one will not feel 
emotion.  Nevertheless, there is a correlation between strong emotions and 
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certain physiological manifestations, but a causal relationship is not obvious 
(Cannon, 1927, Cannon, 1931). 
 When Walter Cannon and Philip Bard studied animals and humans after 
trans-section of the spinal cord, it was noted that even though body sensations 
were eliminated below the cut, signs of emotions were still exhibited and felt, 
thus the elimination of sensation in the body did not eliminate emotions, as the 
James-Lange theory predicted.  The Cannon-Bard theory asserts that the 
experience of emotion is simultaneously influenced by a) physiological 
changes and b) processing of information in the cerebral cortex, (e.g. the 
sensory input is received by the cerebral cortex, which activates the skeletal 
muscles and autonomic nervous system and results in physiological changes in 
the body).  When a particular pattern of signals reaches the thalamus, the type 
of emotion is determined resulting in physiological change (e.g. sweating for 
fear) (Bard, 1934, Cannon, 1927, Cannon, 1931).   
 One of the earliest contributors to propose a model of cerebral anatomic 
connections with the emotional system was Paul Broca (Broca, 1878), whose 
extensive work on the structure of the brain led him to rename the visceral 
brain the limbic system.  Limbic means edge, which Broca used to describe the 
rim of the medial cortex.  In 1937 Papez advanced a circuitry pathway (the 
Papez Circuit Theory, as it later became known) mediating the flow of 
emotional information involving the hypothalamus, the medial cortex – 
anterior thalamus, amygdala cortex and hippocampus – and back to the 
hypothalamus (Papez, 1937).   
 Considerable research into the architecture of the emotional system 
continued and in 1970 MacLean proposed the Triune Brain.  Adding the 
structure of Broca’s limbic system with Papez circuit theory, this functional 
model proposed three evolutionary hierarchical layered brains in one: the 
reptilian brain (brain stem and cerebellum); the paleomammalian or limbic 
brain; and the neomammalian or neocortex.  Each phylogenetic area, according 
to MacLean, was autonomous but because of their high connectivity, one could 
dominate the other, (e.g. the limbic system underlying the emotion system can 
overrule the higher cognitive functions of the neocortex).  His limbic system 
theory included regions such as the amygdala, prefrontal cortex (PFC) and 
septum (MacLean, 1970).   
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 The evolutionary concept of the Triune Brain is still popular.  However, 
Maclean’s single unified limbic system theory, responsible for all our 
emotions, has been strongly challenged.  In fact, it is now believed that there 
may be many different smaller emotional systems subserving different 
emotions, but this does not mean that certain areas in Maclean’s model are not 
considered relevant to emotional processing (LeDoux, 1998). 
 LeDoux (1998), for instance, famously associates the amygdala and 
neocortex with fear conditioning (LeDoux, 1998).  His quest in the 
neurobiology of emotions and animal experimentation has led him to assert 
that there are two sensory input pathways for processing strong emotions.  The 
first is a subcortical short route (‘low road’) that rapidly sends sensory 
information from the thalamus directly to the amygdala: this facilitates an 
automatic emotional response, which is based on a rough coding of the stimuli.  
The second is a cortical route (‘high road’) which is longer and slower, 
whereby information is sent from the thalamus to the cortex and hippocampus 
and then projected onto the amygdala, thus involving cognitive evaluation.  
LeDoux used the analogy of a slender shape on a pathway that could be a 
snake. The information is sent to the thalamus and the amygdala via the 
subcortical route immediately alerting us into appropriate avoidance.  
Meanwhile, the cortex calculates that the shape is a curved stick and corrects 
one’s behaviour (LeDoux, 2002). 
 Another major researcher in the study of the emotional brain is 
neurologist Antonio Damasio.  Part of his work has involved studying patients 
with frontal lobe damage.  Patient Elliot was one such study, who had a tumour 
removed, causing prefrontal lesions. The result was that Elliot lacked normal 
emotional responses and was unable to make decisions, especially those that 
were in the personal and social domain.  It was evident that emotion disrupts 
reasoning, which was later confirmed by further studies by Damasio.  
However, different areas of cortical lesions also led to similar failures in 
judgement, which correlated with impairment in the same processes of 
reasoning, decision making, feelings and emotion which Damasio took as a 
further indication of an interaction between these systems (Damasio, 1994). 
 It is important to make the distinction between the neural correlates of 
sensory perception of emotional stimuli, and affective states  (Damasio et al., 
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2000, LeDoux, 2000).  For instance, Damasio’s interpretation of this 
distinction is that emotion is a response chemically and neurologically 
produced by the brain when presented with the appropriate stimuli, whilst 
feelings are the private mental portrait, the composite perceptions of the 
physiological reactions of emotions (Damasio, 2001).  The distinction between 
cognition and feelings needs to be made clear, for this current research 
concentrates on perception of valence advanced by the invaluable availability 
of fMRI and not affective feelings.   
 Emotion and brain organisation has also been considered in terms of 
cerebral asymmetry.  Lesion studies and patient studies with psychiatric 
disorders have been interpreted by some investigators as supporting a theory 
that the right hemisphere (RH) mediates all basic emotions (Tucker, 1981).  A 
contrary hypothesis states that the brain is organised in terms of valence, and 
postulates that the RH mediates negative emotions and the left hemisphere 
(LH) positive emotions.  This idea was developed from reports of patients with 
pathological emotion disorders, including gelastic epilepsy (a form of epilepsy 
where laughter is part of the seizure pattern) and from 19 patients following a 
hemispherectomy (Sackheim et al., 1982).   
Using EEG recordings and observations of facial behaviour, a third 
model of hemispheric specialisation has been advanced.  In the context of 
approach emotions (happy) and motor responses, activity was lateralised in the 
LH in the anterior temporal area, and in the case of withdrawal emotions 
(disgust), activity was lateralised in the RH in the frontal and anterior temporal 
regions  (Davidson et al., 1990).  The latter model discusses affective states in 
terms of their associated approach and withdrawal responses.  These are the 
basic features of two motivational systems of emotional organisation: 
appetitive (reproduction, pleasure) and defensive (survival, unpleasant) (Lang, 
2000).  These systems are part of our evolutionary inheritance, and are 
associated with specific deep cortical and subcortical mechanisms; as 
evidenced by the association of the amygdala with our defensive motivational 
system, and of subcortical and deep cortical structures with appetitive 
motivation (i.e. limbic-striatal-pallidal circuitry) (Lang, 2000).  These systems 
will be further discussed in context with the findings of the present research. 
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 It should be noted at this point that it is now widely accepted that 
people can reliably discriminate between six different classes of facial 
expression: happy, sad, angry, surprised, afraid and disgusted.  This ability is 
said to transcend cultural or linguistic barriers, therefore these facial 
expressions are not culturally specific, even when taking into account the 
differing social norms of emotional responses (Ekman, 1993).  This supports 
the idea of the intrinsic phylogenetic, biological importance of facial 
expressions in human beings.  The inherent ability in recognising and 
distinguishing different emotional expressions is necessary to read the 
emotional states of others and for effective social interaction (Darwin, 
1872/1999).  It has also been suggested that there may be an innate response in 
many species, including humans, to the typical visual forms, sounds and smells 
of certain biological hazards (e.g. predators, poisonous animals).  Panksepp 
(1998) for instance, describes a basic ‘hard-wired’ network in the brain that has 
evolved in all mammals to facilitate primal situations.  The labels Panksepp 
uses to correspond with innate emotional responses are: seeking – appetitive 
goals such as food, shelter and water; rage – a vigorous reaction arising from 
anger or frustration; fear – avoidance of threat or destruction through fight or 
flight; panic – reaction to separation from caregiver; lust – pursuit of sex; play 
– the need for social interaction through joy; and nurturance – the urge to care 
for infants (Panksepp, 1998, p 50).  According to Panksepp, these behavioural 
measures would typically respond to motivational stimuli such as appetitive 
resources (sustenance, reproduction) or avoidance (odours, sounds, sightings of 
predators or aggressors) and each emotional response would map onto a neural 
system (e.g. a “fear circuit that courses between the central amygdala and the 
periaqueductal gray of the midbrain”) (Panksepp, 1998, p 206).  Although 
Panksepp’s work is based on solid evidence from extensive animal research, 
there are nevertheless contenders to these ideas.  One such criticism is that 
attributing affective states onto animal behaviours is inconclusive, as overt 
behavioural changes in animals may not correspond to apparent associated 
feelings (Posner et al., 2005).  An alternative approach is the circumplex model 
of affect.  This model proposes a two dimensional method with two orthogonal 
axes; the vertical axis arousal and the horizontal axis valence.  Points around 
the circle illustrate a varying synthesis of valence and arousal.  Therefore, 
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rather than considering discrete and independent neural circuits of affect, the 
circumplex model asserts that all affective states can be considered in terms of 
two (valence and arousal) neurophysiological systems (Russell, 1980).   
 In contrast to responses to human and animal faces and bodies, an 
emotional response to scenes or inanimate objects is not likely to be universal 
throughout our evolutionary history, and those reactions are likely to have been 
learned through experience or social teachings (Darwin, 1872/1999).   
 Two outcomes have derived from these ideas to inform the design of 
experiments described in this thesis.  The first is that because of the 
uncontrollable complexities of natural images, investigating several distinct 
categories of emotion would have introduced too many variables to be tenable.  
Therefore, following the circumplex model, the stimuli used were IAPS 
pictures (International Affective Picture System) (Center for the Study of 
Emotion and Attention [CSEA-NIMH], 2001), which are calibrated 
dimensionally for high and low valence and for intensity (arousal).  Secondly, 
the evolutionary significance of facial expressions and the apparent weaker 
significance of learnt emotional stimuli such as scenes were relevant when 
choosing the four a priori categories of stimuli for the present experiments – 
animals, faces, scenes and inanimate objects.  Several authors have used 
subsets of visual emotional stimuli before (e.g.Gorno-Tempini and Price, 2001, 
Hariri et al., 2003, Kreiman et al., 2000, VanRullen and Thorpe, 2001a) and 
will be discussed further in sections 1:7:4 and 1:7:5.  
 
1:2:3  Relationship between Consciousness and Emotion 
 
How has the study of emotion contributed to the study of consciousness?  
According to neurological theorist Damasio “consciousness buys an enlarged 
protection policy” (Damasio, 1994, p 133).  To illustrate, if a person knows 
that something causes fear, there are two ways of behaving.  The first is a 
reaction that is out of our conscious control, it is innate.  The innate feeling, 
Damasio argues, is a reactive primary emotion that depends on prime systems 
such as the amygdala and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC).  As evidence, he 
cites a patient with bilateral damage to the amygdala (a major component of 
the limbic system) who became personally and socially inadequate, displaying 
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inappropriate emotions.  The second way is to avoid the situation based on past 
experience.  These reflective secondary emotions respond to thoughts 
controlled by the frontal cortices, which signals the limbic system to generate 
an emotional response, thus secondary emotions utilise the mechanisms of 
primary emotion.  (Damasio, 1994).  
 In his view, the experience of emotion begins with conscious 
considerations that a person holds about someone or something.  A cognitive 
evaluation takes place involving various sensory cortices.  For secondary 
emotions and at a conscious level, automatic responses are activated from the 
retrieval of previously acquired representations (not innate), which involves 
areas in the PFC.  This is then signalled to the amygdala, beginning the 
coordination of appropriate psychophysiological reactions. (Damasio, 1994). 
 Therefore, emotional processing in patients with prefrontal lesions is of 
the secondary type, as they cannot generate emotions or ‘feelings’ relative to 
images of a situation or stimuli.  However, they can have primary emotion.   
 In the context of these observations, Damasio proffered the somatic 
marker hypothesis.  Whether consciously or unconsciously, somatic markers 
are thought to be stored in the PFC and act as links between cognitive 
evaluation based on past experience and a ‘feeling’ based on emotional signals 
from the visceral regions, (e.g. amygdala and bodily states) which leads to 
appropriate decision making (Damasio, 1994).  Damasio’s work demonstrates 
how studies of emotion may be closely identified with studies of 
consciousness. 
 Consciousness and emotion are considered to be closely connected by 
many other contributors.  There has been a profusion of evidence, for instance, 
demonstrating that emotional priming is preconscious (Kern et al., 2005) and 
mediates attention, as evidenced by rapidly presented emotionally arousing 
stimuli being detected more efficiently than less emotionally arousing stimuli 
(Phelps et al., 2006).   
 Bias of processing affective stimuli is said to be adaptive, reflecting the 
motivational significance of such stimuli.   In this context, it is proposed that 
the evaluation of affective significance is automatic, preattentive and without 
awareness, to facilitate a rapid response and adaptive function.  Studies briefly 
presenting visual affective images have supported theories of emotional stimuli 
 
 
 14
being processed quicker than neutral stimuli at a preconscious threshold 
(Cuthbert et al., 2000, Lang et al., 1997, Schupp et al., 2000, Vuilleumier et al., 
2003a).   
 However, other researchers believe that effective emotional processing 
does need sufficient resources of attention and argue that any unconscious 
processing of affect is limited (Pessoa, 2005, Pessoa et al., 2002a).  This debate 
will be further addressed later in this discourse.   
 Emotion is indeed central to human life and intimately connected to the 
experience of consciousness.  After all, most of our experiences have an 
affective content.  Is there any evidence that all of our experiences have an 
affective content?  If asked to fill in a PANAS1 self report, people report all 
sorts of moods and emotions, and even if they are doing nothing they are either 
contented, complacent, bored or slightly anxious.  If none of Panksepp’s 
motivational systems (Panksepp, 1998) are active, then it follows that people 
are either deeply unconscious or dead.   The study of the neural correlates of 
emotion, therefore, affords important insights into the neural correlates of 
consciousness.   
 This project will follow the tenet that emotions are mental states with 
distinct neural correlates and further evaluate the relationship between 
consciousness and emotional response.   
 
1:3  Cognition and Emotion   
 
Animal and human studies have demonstrated interactions between neural 
circuits underlying cognition and emotion, and studies of these interactions are 
continually advancing our understanding of mental representations and human 
behaviour (Phelps, 2006).  
 Brain regions identified with emotional processing, such as the 
amygdala, show extensive connections with areas identified with cognition, 
(e.g. the PFC).  The widely-researched amygdala was the focus of  a recent 
review by Phelps (2006) in which different domains were highlighted as 
                                                 
1  The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule is a self report measuring positive and negative 
affect.  Twenty items, 10 positive and 10 negative are scored in a range of 1very slightly to 5 
extremely.  Developed by Watson, Clark and Tellegen (Watson et al., 1988).  
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examples of the interaction between cognition and emotion: emotional learning 
and memory; emotional effect on memory; the influence of emotion on 
perception and attention; and emotional processing in the context of social 
behaviour and emotional adjustment (Phelps, 2006). In context of the review 
by Phelps and in accord with the subject of the present thesis, emotional 
influence on perception and attention will now be addressed briefly. 
 By limiting attentional resources, studies show that emotion-laden 
stimuli will reach conscious awareness more effectively than neutral stimuli 
(Vuilleumier, 2002).  In order to examine the effects of voluntary attention on 
auditory stimuli, Sander et al. (2005) conducted an fMRI dichotic listening task 
using meaningless words and an angry voice.  They found significant amygdala 
response to anger regardless of whether the instruction was ‘to-be-attended’ or 
‘to-be-ignored’ (Sander et al., 2005).  Equally, Anderson and Phelps (2001) 
considered the role of the amygdala on the verbal perception of affect.  Gaining 
evidence from a patient with bilateral damage to the amygdala revealed that, 
when presented with verbal aversive stimuli, there was a distinct absence of 
enhanced perception even though the patient understood the meaning of the 
words (Anderson and Phelps, 2001).  These two examples serve to demonstrate 
the relationship of cognition with emotion and the pivotal role of the amygdala. 
 It is also hypothesised that the amygdala determines the significance of 
emotional input.  This is achieved either automatically during direct encoding 
of input or in influencing the PFC which in turn modulates response by 
temporary inhibitory feedback (Baars and Gage, 2007).   
 Other workers have analysed the many afferent and efferent 
associations and the direct and indirect pathways involving projections from 
the early stages in sensory processing to the prefrontal cortices, suggesting 
feedforward and feedback mechanisms linking cognitive and emotional 
processes (Barbas, 2000).  
 The reciprocal effects of cognition and emotion discussed thus far, 
might seem to imply that different brain regions are associated with one or the 
other.  However, there is a strong argument that these systems in terms of 
function cannot be separated as there is a dynamic integration of cognition and 
emotion that ultimately shapes behaviour.  One example given by Pessoa 
(2008), is that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is now associated with emotion 
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but once it was not, thus highlighting the difficulties in defining the emotional 
brain.  Equally, as previously mentioned, the amygdala appears to determine 
what stimuli should be attended to, dependent upon significance.  This role is 
juxtaposed with the role of the visual cortex in attentional effects (Pessoa, 
2008). 
 One other aspect of the cognitive-emotion relationship needs to be 
addressed.  The results from an fMRI experiment by Hariri et al. (2003) using 
natural and artificial fear-inducing visual stimuli, found that by introducing a 
cognitive evaluation task they witnessed attenuation of amygdala activations 
whilst at the same time there was an increase in activations in the right PFC 
(Hariri et al., 2003).  Reciprocal modulation supports the hypothesis of a 
functional neural network between cognitive and emotional processing.  
Similar findings were also found by Taylor and colleagues (2003).  Again 
using IAPS stimuli they found that when comparing passive viewing with 
active viewing employing a simple ratings task, there were correlated 
reductions as well as increases in activations, (e.g. less activation in the insula 
and right amygdala during the cognitive task correlated with greater activations 
in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and ACC) (Taylor et al., 2003).  
This again is consistent with another study reporting an inhibitory effect on 
amygdala response when activations increase in the DLPFC and OFC (Öhman, 
2005).   
 Considering all of this, one cannot deny that there are strong 
interactions between cognition and emotion.   
  
1:4  Attention, Awareness and Perception 
 
We are brought up to believe that it is common sense to ‘pay attention’ to 
something for it to ‘enter’ our conscious experience, as James famously said  
 “My experience is what I agree to attend to” (James, 1890/1950, p 402). 
This follows the assumption that attention causes (or selects) a conscious 
experience.  However, it can also be argued that attention is the effect of a 
conscious experience, for instance, an unexpected loud noise (unattended) 
makes us turn to see where it came from (conscious perception) (Koch, 2004).   
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 It is hypothesised that there are two aspects of attention that can 
influence awareness.  The first is location or salience of an object, the second is 
one of direction, we either voluntarily decide to attend to an object or our 
attention is involuntarily directed from an unexpected source (Kentridge et al., 
1999). 
  Knowledge of object location, for instance, arises from attending to a 
spatial location, but this process does not necessarily entail awareness. The 
spatial characteristics of attention correlate with topographic activation in the 
visual and parietal cortex.  Attention for the purposes of object identification, 
on the other hand, leads to awareness and perception of an object, which 
involves the primary visual cortex and inferior temporal cortex (Milner and 
Goodale, 2006).   
 A relationship between awareness (or lack of awareness) and attention 
is evidenced from lesion studies.  For instance, hemineglect is a spatial disorder 
defined as a lack of awareness for stimuli located contralateral to the site of 
cerebral damage, which is invariably associated with the RH (Bisiach and 
Luzzatti, 1978).  A related phenomenon is extinction, whereby isolated objects 
in the affected visual field can be seen, but when objects are presented 
simultaneously in both visual fields, only the stimulus in the opposite 
unaffected hemifield can be seen.  The problem is not due to visual field 
defects, but to higher order attentional difficulty (Posner, 1994).  A case in 
point was patient GK with right posterior inferior parietal damage.  Using 
fearful or neutral faces and houses presented in either the left or right visual 
field or bilaterally, it was evident that emotional stimuli activated the amygdala 
and OFC regardless of neglect or extinction, indicating processing without 
conscious awareness  (Vuilleumier et al., 2002). 
 Influential studies by Libet and colleagues have investigated the 
temporal distinction between conscious and unconscious processing.  Libet et 
al. (1983) ran an EEG experiment recording activation in the primary motor 
cortex.  The participants were asked to push a button ‘whenever they felt the 
urge to’, the timing of which was recorded from an electrical signal from the 
button press action, and to report when they wished to move.  At around 350ms 
before the participants reported ‘an urge’, EEG activity (readiness potential) 
started, which was 550ms before their actual response.  This led to the 
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supposition that an unconscious commitment for a voluntary action was made 
before intention became conscious (Libet et al., 1983). The controversy 
surrounding the interpretation of these experiments has been reviewed by 
Dennett (1991) who claims that Libet is confusing the time that a 
representation occurs (i.e. when a conscious or unconscious event happens), 
and the representation in consciousness of the timing of an event. Dennett’s 
view is that there is no “fact of the matter about exactly when (in absolute time, 
as Libet would put it) a conscious experience happens” (Dennett, 1991, p 162) 
– there is simply a draft or narrative we construct about the sequence of events.  
Contrariwise, Libet’s explanation, however paradoxical it seems, does make 
sense if we expect there to be a causal connection between neural events and 
behavioural or subjective correlates of those events.  
 Later, using electrodes implanted for treatment of pain, Libet and 
colleagues (1991) induced stimulation at various intervals to participants via 
the thalamus.  The instruction to the participants was to indicate when the 
stimulus occurred via one of two button presses. The result suggested a linear 
progression from unconscious to conscious neuronal functions by 
demonstrating that detection occurred in the absence of awareness, and to reach 
a vague impression of awareness, a longer duration was needed.  Thus by 
increasing duration (‘time-on’) of the same inputs, unconscious functions 
become conscious. Therefore, according to Libet et al., adequate neuronal 
activation is needed for unconscious processing to reach conscious processing, 
intimating that once a ‘noise’ happens, there is unconscious processing before 
the ‘noise’ becomes conscious (Libet et al., 1991). 
 Is there a difference between perception without attention and 
perception without awareness?  Several investigators have made operational 
distinctions between these concepts.  
 One definition of studies of perception without awareness, involves 
stimuli that were unnoticed (i.e. not seen) and could not be identified, because 
the content was degraded, whereas perception without attention is perception 
of stimuli that are unnoticed because they are presented outside attention, (e.g. 
through masking or priming) (Merikle and Joordens, 1997).  Both paradigms 
test implicit (also referred to as unconscious) perception.  Blindsight is an 
excellent example of perception without ‘seeing’, (i.e. without visual 
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awareness).  For instance, patient DB could perform visual tasks accurately 
although he could not ‘see’ (Weiskrantz et al., 1974).  Table 1.1 briefly 
attempts to classify perceptual and behavioural aspects of visual awareness in 
various clinical (or experimental) conditions.   
 
 Can stimulus be 
seen?  (i.e. is the 
person aware that 
there is a stimulus 
present?) 
Can stimulus be 
perceived? (e.g. 
identified)  
Can stimulus 
control 
behaviour? 
Blindsight 
(Weiskrantz et 
al., 1974) 
No To some extent Yes 
Neglect 
(Driver, 1996) 
If no extinction No To some extent 
Visual object 
agnosia 
(Milner and 
Goodale, 2006) 
Yes No Yes 
Optic ataxia 
(Milner and 
Goodale, 2006) 
Yes Yes No 
Subliminal 
perception 
(Enns, 2004) 
No To some extent To some extent 
Table 1.1  Summary of visual impairment  
 It is clear that there are careful distinctions to be made between 
attention, awareness and perception, and to discuss attention thoroughly and in 
context of this thesis, a separate section is now dedicated. 
 
1:4:1  Attention 
 
There is a profusion of stimuli competing for attentional resources at any one 
time and the selective processing of the emotional significance of stimuli is 
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said to have an evolutionary advantage (Pessoa et al., 2002a), in that positive 
and negative affect modulates appetitive and defensive behaviour, ultimately 
leading to reproduction and survival.  As such, only a fleeting glimpse of an 
emotionally relevant cue is sufficient to reach awareness and perception  (Lang 
et al., 1997).  In addition, when the attentional resources directed to a stimulus 
are severely limited over time, as in experiments that render neutral target 
stimuli invisible by using visual masking paradigms, emotional stimuli are still 
detected, especially fear-related stimuli (Dolan, 2002).  Therefore, perception 
of emotion can take place automatically in the absence of attention 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2001).  This view is supported from studies investigating 
the rapid responses of the amygdala for fast detection of emotional stimuli 
without attention or reported conscious awareness.  For example, during an 
emotional learning task two angry faces were presented either as a pair or one 
face paired with an unconditioned stimulus.  The faces were then re-presented 
in a backward masked or unmasked paradigm whereby participants indicated 
the presence of an angry face by means of a button press.  Using PET, it was 
found that a lateralised amygdala response was dependent upon level of 
awareness, in that the unmasked stimuli enhanced the left amygdala and the 
masked stimuli enhanced the right amygdala  (Morris et al., 1998b).  Another 
masking experiment using fMRI demonstrated greater activation in the 
amygdala in response to nonconscious processing of fearful faces as compared 
to happy faces (Whalen et al., 1998b).  
 However, Pessoa et al. (2002b) has argued that even emotion-laden 
faces need some level of attention.  Using fearful, happy and neutral faces in an 
fMRI experiment, it was made evident that processing of emotional stimuli in 
the amygdala, fusiform gyrus, insula, ACC, superior temporal sulcus (STS) and 
prefrontal cortices would only occur when sufficient attentional resources were 
available.  Examination of these results led Pessoa and colleagues to argue that 
previous experiments claiming unconscious processing of emotion did not fully 
engage attention by a competing task.  As an example, Pessoa discusses an 
experiment conducted by Vuilleumier et al. (Vuilleumier et al., 2001), and 
argues that any indication of automatic processing of affect was evident 
because a less attentionally taxing paradigm was employed whilst measuring 
attention and valence.  Therefore, Pessoa et al. concluded that emotion-laden 
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facial expressions are not automatically processed, but are under top-down 
control (Pessoa et al., 2002b).   
 In light of these divergent points of view concerning the role of 
attention in processing emotional stimuli, some main theories of attention will 
now be reviewed. 
 To prevent information overload from the immeasurable onslaught of 
sensory information, our brain has limited capacity to attend to every detail.  In 
fact, if only two tasks that require attention are carried out simultaneously, one 
will interfere with the other (Koch, 2004).  Change blindness (Grimes, 1996, 
Simons and Levin, 1997) is a powerful demonstration of the failure to detect 
what can sometimes be an enormous change between two previously 
indistinguishable scenes because attention was not on the specific point of 
detection, or the saliency of the target was not strong enough to draw attention 
to it (Beck et al., 2001, Wright, 2005).  Correspondingly, by fixating on a cross 
and deciding which arm was longer, participants failed to detect an 
unannounced introduction of a small coloured geometric shape.  This 
phenomenon is known as inattentional blindness (Mack and Rock, 1998), and 
is another example of needing attention to see (Noe and O'Regan, 2000).   
 The main purpose of attentional processing therefore, is to choose 
selected information for further processing and in so doing ignore other 
information.  This has led to theories of competition between neuronal 
representations such as the biased competition model, that favours a bias 
towards relevant information for behaviour and motor responses (Desimone 
and Duncan, 1995).   
 To explain the selection process of attention, the majority of historically 
important theories have followed the ‘pipeline’ model.  The original proposal 
for a pipeline model (Broadbent, 1958), and a revised version (Zeman, 2001) 
both state that preconscious sensory filters act as an ‘attentional bottleneck’ as 
if, metaphorically, on guard duty as to what may pass ‘into’ conscious 
processing (Broadbent, 1958, Zeman, 2001).   
 The Filter Theory originally proposed by Broadbent (1958) was based 
on experiments on selective listening, as inspired by the ‘cocktail party 
problem’ (Cherry, 1953) whereby many conversations are being conducted in 
parallel, but individuals are able to listen and understand only one. 
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Distinctiveness in the physical features of the different speech streams makes 
them easier to separate. In an early selection model two stages of processing 
occur.  First, all incoming information would be filtered for physical properties 
(e.g. loudness, pitch of voice, ear of origin) and second, higher level 
psychological data would be processed (e.g. meaning).  The cognitive 
processes involved in this higher level analysis would have limited capacity 
due to the possible multiple meanings available.  Hence, the emergence of the 
hypothesis of a selective filter guarding against overload, meaning that 
unattended  information would not filter through a ‘bottle neck’ (Broadbent, 
1958).   
 As in the early selection model, late selection theory also proposes two 
levels of perceptual processing.  The first unconscious level identifies and 
rejects non target stimuli in parallel.  Non target stimuli, however, are 
identified and rejected on the basis of meaning, whereas the early selection 
model extracts simple characteristics only, such as colour.  In order to preserve 
the most relevant information, the output passes into a limited capacity system 
into awareness. (Deutsch and Deutsch, 1963, Norman, 1969)   
 Research investigating visual attention has often used a visual search 
task whereby a target, such as a letter T, is detected amongst a number of 
distractors, such as a letter L.  The success of detection is facilitated by the 
level of difference between the target and distractors in terms of colour, form, 
location and size of movement.  According to feature integration theory, 
several object features such as orientation and colour are coded with separate 
feature maps.  These are then integrated in parallel into a saliency map.  If the 
target does not share the same features as the distractors, it ‘pops-out’.  A 
feature search for simple targets that are defined by elementary features is 
performed rapidly and pre-attentively, whereas a conjunction search combining 
these elementary features takes attentional resources that are needed to evaluate 
and bind the object features correctly.  This takes longer when the numbers of 
targets increase in an array of distractors, because the ‘search light’ has to 
attend to each object in turn.  The main premise of feature integration theory, 
therefore, is that attention binds primitive features into objects (Treisman and 
Gelade, 1980).  One of the criticisms of feature integration theory is that it 
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requires that primitive features are processed preattentively, as in an early 
selection model. 
 The early vs late selection debate is still argued, but one contributor has 
tried to resolve this issue.  Whilst reviewing previous research, Lavie found a 
basic inconsistency in comparative methodologies.  Experiments espousing late 
selection typically based their findings on low perceptual load, whereas 
supporters of early selection favoured paradigms employing higher perceptual 
load (Lavie and Tsal, 1994).  Consistent with perceptual capacity limitations of 
early selection and assumed automatic late perception, the load theory of 
attention asserts that if task-relevant (targets) of high perceptual load (e.g. 
multiple stimuli) ‘take up’ full capacity there is no capacity left to process task-
irrelevant (distractors) stimuli.  However, in situations where the target is of 
low perceptual load (e.g. one target, one distractor), capacity is not taken up 
and what is left will process the distractors (Lavie, 2005).   
 Another major contributor to limited capacity theories of visual 
attention is Posner.  Posner et al. (1980) conducted an experiment whereby a 
cued and non-cued light was randomly flashed up on a screen in one of four 
locations.  Participants were instructed to push a button immediately they saw 
the light.  Reaction times were faster for the cued stimuli than the non-cued, 
thus suggesting that detection is more efficient when highlighted by a location 
in space, hence the spotlight metaphor used to describe focal attention (Posner 
et al., 1980). However, the spotlight metaphor has been criticised for its 
incomplete analogy.  For instance, a spotlight scans localities, whereas 
attention disengages and relocates (Cave and Bichot, 1999).  A more 
comprehensive metaphor was introduced to illustrate the on/off analogy, that of 
a stage light which illuminates various actors/stimuli in turn (Sperling and 
Weichselgartner, 1995).   
 Focal attention (spatial search), feature-based attention (feature search) 
and selected attention (look for one feature in a whole object and receive 
further object information) are all examples of top-down, goal-directed 
processing which is generated from outside the visual cortex; and evidence 
from many studies points to the involvement of a fronto-parietal network, 
reviewed by Corbetta (Corbetta, 1998).  A criterion not yet discussed that is 
relevant for visual attention is saliency, i.e. a stimulus that is conspicuous 
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relative to its surroundings.  Independent of focal attention, a salient object is 
stimulus driven, faster, more potent and is relevant for selection purposes and 
automatically attracts bottom-up attention.  Saliency makes feature selection 
easy and conjunction selection more difficult.  A flying insect on a still summer 
afternoon or a lone bluebell in a field of sunflowers are blatantly obvious in 
relation to their surroundings (Koch, 2004).  This conspicuous selection is 
managed by the neurons in a saliency map, thought to be in the visual cortex 
(Treue, 2003), that are encoded for prominence.  The most prominent input 
will have the maximum neuronal firing rate to secure attention via a gating 
procedure.  Neurons excite and suppress one another and a ‘winner takes all’ 
mechanism continues in a searchlight manner for a short time and inhibition of 
return automatically causes a move onto the next salient location (Koch and 
Ullman, 1985).   
 According to an influential theory (Koch, 2004), visual attention is 
gained within a hierarchy of visual areas processing competitive interactions 
from signals from visual input.  Higher areas send bias signals modulating 
bottom-up saliency which focused attention responds to (Braun, 2003).  Hence, 
awareness occurs with the combination of both bottom-up and top-down 
feedback, combining an interactive model of entry and reentry connections 
(Koch, 2004). 
 Theories of attention and capacity limitations have considered both 
bottom-up and top-down processing hypothesising a serial visual search.  This 
principle, however, has been challenged with the work of Li et al. (2002) who 
used categorisation tasks within briefly flashed natural images and found that 
this rapid and fairly complicated visual search connected with high level 
cortical regions.  Their participants were able to identify animals and vehicles 
within natural scenes, which represent a level of processing beyond the 
extraction of simple features.  Moreover they were able to do this in peripheral 
vision while carrying out an attentionally demanding letter discrimination task 
at the fovea.  These findings challenged previous theories of attention by 
contesting preceding notions of capacity limitations (Li et al., 2002) (see also 
section 1:7:2).  
 To elaborate further, studies investigating attention with natural 
everyday images will now be discussed.  
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1:5  Vision and Natural Images 
 
The visual cortex has been described as a highly evolved connectionist system 
organised as feedforward networks in parallel processing layers (Thorpe and 
Imbert, 1989).  Thorpe and Imbert (1989) have shown on the basis of timing 
arguments that only a single forward pass is enough for a significant amount of 
visual analysis.  In a tight linear fashion, as each unit emits one spiking 
discharge, the next unit in a subsequent layer has to respond.  These electrical 
firing rates in themselves are not enough for efficient coding, but the addition 
of spikes (or action potentials) from different sources, (e.g. the enormous 
parallel processing indicative to visual system), enables precise coding of 
analog information.  Thorpe and Imbert (1989) also discuss the presence of 
feedback pathways, but postulate that normal visual processing does not have 
the time to take advantage of these except for taking into account other 
perspectives such as imagery, attention, context etc.  Equally, the advantages of 
extensive parallelism almost eradicate the need for iterative loops (Thorpe and 
Imbert, 1989).   
 Specific information is communicated rapidly between neurons (Koch, 
2004) and at only one spike per neuron at each processing stage, the most 
strongly activated neuron fires first with others firing at different times, and 
this firing order of units is called Rank Order Coding  (VanRullen et al., 1998).  
This is just one example of coding that considers the pattern of spikes and the 
order in which neurons fire.  Other coding schemes of the same ilk include: 
Count Code whereby the number of neurons are counted that have spiked; 
Binary Code which is a more efficient way of counting neurons that have 
spiked, but does lose its validity over relatively longer periods of time; and 
Codes using Synchrony to group neurons into possible phases in a small period 
of time.  The computational implications of different combinations of neurons 
afford far greater insight into the mechanisms to rapid visual processing of 
complex stimuli (Thorpe et al., 2001a).   
 This is by no means an exhaustive list, but these models do illustrate the 
possible efficacy and flexibility of different coding schemes that consider 
spiking neurons. 
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 These hypotheses run counter to traditional coding models, whereby a 
firing rate code is calculated by the mean of a continuous value of a sequence 
of spikes which transmit information carried by each neuron.  The advent of 
research into the visual processing of natural images has brought into question 
the efficiency of this conventional view, as it does not accommodate rapid 
visual processing of complex tasks such as animal detection in everyday 
images.  Such Ultra Rapid Visual Categorisation (URVC) was previously 
thought to be privy to certain categories only (e.g. faces) (Thorpe et al., 2001a). 
 To discuss the apparent features of URVC, a brief explanation is 
necessary.  From the retina, projections are sent to the thalamic relay station 
called the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), which in turn sends signals to the 
primary visual cortex (V1).  Contained in the LGN are two major classes of 
neurons.  The magnocellular neurons do not show differential wavelength 
responses from inputs from red, green and blue cones and are therefore 
considered colour blind (Livingstone and Hubel, 1987).  They are also transient 
with large receptive fields affording excellent contrast sensitivity and temporal 
resolution.  It has been proposed that they mediate information regarding 
motion and depth.  The parvocellular cells respond to colour and form, their 
receptive fields are smaller, and they prefer slower sustained input. It has been 
proposed that they mediate fine grained processing for high-acuity vision 
(Koch, 2004). 
 It has been argued that URVC relies on the faster magnocellular 
pathway as monochromatic images are processed more effectively than colour 
images (Delorme et al., 2000).  In an experiment presenting photographs for 
30ms in a categorisation task with animals or food as targets, it was found that 
coarse achromatic information was rapidly processed, indicative of the 
magnocellular pathway (Delorme et al., 1999).  A subsequent go/no-go study 
supported this view, suggesting that magnocellular (achromatic) information 
reaches V1 approximately 20ms before parvocellular (chromatic) (Nowak et 
al., 1995) information and as such may be enough for object recognition 
associated with the ventral stream (Mace et al., 2005).  However, functional 
interpretations of differences between the magnocellular and parvocellular 
systems are controversial.  The anatomical differences that indicate a 
distinction between colour sensitivities is not in question.  Other functional 
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differences, however, are difficult to evaluate as beyond the retina, the two 
magnocellular layers and four parvocellular layers in the LGN unite into the 
primary visual cortex (V1) pathway, which complicates investigation.  Critics 
also argue that ascribed functional differences derive from averaged data and 
reflect marginal differences in receptive field properties (Skottun and Skoyles, 
2006).   
 As already mentioned, URVC does not appear to be category specific.  
URVC for animals, food, novelty, as well as vehicles demonstrates that 
biological significance is not relevant (VanRullen and Thorpe, 2001c).  
Furthermore, animal detection in natural images with a brief exposure duration 
of 28ms flashed at unpredictable locations, provided evidence of highly 
efficient processing in peripheral vision (Thorpe et al., 2001b).  That said, 
recently it was found that ultra rapid face detection in natural images was even 
more efficient than animal detection.  Using a saccade task, accurate response 
to the face stimuli was less than 120ms.  With only time for a feedforward pass 
and one spike per neuron it was hypothesised that the familiarity of faces and 
their very frequent presentations ‘trains’ neurons to fire sooner at each 
exposure.  Thorpe explains that when visual input is unfamiliar, the afferents 
will not have sufficient strength in connections to initiate quick response for a 
neuron, therefore many afferents are necessary.  With repeated stimulation, 
however, some afferents are strengthened until a relatively small number are 
sufficient to spark the neuron more and more quickly.  Therefore, just a few 
combinations of visual features would be enough to process faces very rapidly 
indeed (Thorpe et al., 2006).  
 This premiss, however, contradicts an earlier categorisation study.  
Using novel images it was found that, even after a three week training period, 
speed of processing did not improve.  The inferences made were that complex 
novel stimuli were processed as efficiently as familiar stimuli, suggesting that 
context is not necessary and the speed of visual categorisation is a highly 
automatic feedforward procedure (Fabre-Thorpe et al., 2001).  
 There is no doubt that the evidence for the remarkable speed of visual 
processing of complex images will lead to some fascinating insights, new 
experiments, and much conjecture. Fast feedforward, one spike per neuron 
mechanisms have plausibly shown how complex natural images can be 
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processed rapidly, with neuroimaging and innovative paradigms proving to be 
efficient tools in this line of enquiry.  
 
1:6  fMRI Regions of Interest   
 
The cortical areas reviewed in this section have been functionally charted in 
previous fMRI research as having particular importance in affective or 
cognitive/affective processing.  The nine regions of interest (ROIs) discussed 
in this section are: amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), medial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC), parahippocampal gyrus, fusiform gyrus, insula, and superior 
temporal gyrus (STG).  A brief summary of each will now be discussed in 
relation to the variables of interest in this thesis.  It is prudent at this point to 
signpost the fact that neuroimaging studies have progressed at a fast pace and 
investigations have moved beyond functional localisation to analysis of 
distributed networks, most recently identifying remote but interconnected 
networks that are mutually influential in terms of affect (Vuilleumier and 
Driver, 2007).  As this is an investigation using a wide range of complex 
affective stimuli, however, it is wise to consider functional localisation for 
comparison purposes with previous findings using simpler affective stimuli 
relative to the nine selected ROIs.   
 
1. Amygdala   
 
A cluster of nuclei, the amygdala (from Greek ‘almond’) is an almond like 
shape situated in the medial temporal lobe at the tip of each hippocampus and 
is the core of one of the major limbic circuits (Figure 1.2, p 37).  As such, it is 
highly complex in its emotional functions and its projections to subcortical and 
cortical regions (Sah et al., 2003).  However, for the purposes of this discourse, 
the amygdala will be referred to and discussed as a single unit involved in 
various functions with emotional processing. 
 There is an abundance of literature associating the amygdala with fear-
related processing and fear-conditioning (Adolphs et al., 1995, LeDoux, 2003, 
Morris et al., 1998a, Whalen et al., 1998a).  However, there is also growing 
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evidence of the diversity of its functions.  For instance, the amygdala has been 
found to interact with systems associated with cognition and awareness.  This 
has supported the notion that there is an interaction between emotion and 
cognition.  Take, for instance, emotional regulation, which refers to cognitive 
reappraisal of a situation to ‘defuse’ an emotional response.  A study by 
Ochsner et al. (2002) found more activation in the amygdala when attending to 
images of emotional scenes than when reappraising the same category of 
images (Ochsner et al., 2002).  There is also evidence that the amygdala is 
involved in the enhancement of attentional processing, perhaps by altering 
perceptual processing.  As the amygdala is highly interconnected with 
reciprocal connections to the sensory cortex, it is able to provide a constant 
vigilance and reappraisal of emotional stimuli.  This monitoring of the 
significance of input is mediated by two pathways through which the amygdala 
receives information.  One is via a subcortical route that transmits fast, coarse 
visual information bypassing cortical processing, and the other is a slower, 
more complete sensory processing from the cortical sensory regions (LeDoux, 
1998).  Amygdala activation via this subcortical route (e.g. for fear perception) 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2003b) affords a response to stimuli presented below the 
threshold of conscious perception (e.g. a response to a fearful face even in the 
absence of awareness of the face) (Morris et al., 1998b, Whalen et al., 1998b).  
The amygdala response to significant but unattended stimuli appears to 
temporarily engage the cortical areas in conscious adaptive behaviours (Baars 
and Gage, 2007).   
 There is also evidence to suggest that the amygdala has a more 
generalised role in emotional processing, which includes the detection of 
stimulus salience (Liberzon et al., 2003) and the recognition of social emotions 
through facial expressions such as happiness (Adolphs et al., 2002, Breiter et 
al., 1996), sadness (Blair et al., 1999) and anger (Whalen et al., 2001).  It is 
apparent that the amygdala responds to valence in facial expressions, but it has 
also been found that the amygdala rapidly habituates to these stimuli (Breiter et 
al., 1996).   
 A recent synopsis collating evidence from animal and human studies 
summarised the functions of the amygdala as a set of cognition-emotion 
interactions: “implicit emotional learning and memory, emotional modulation 
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of memory, emotional influences on attention and perception, emotion and 
social behaviour, emotion inhibition and regulation” (Phelps and LeDoux, 
2005, p 175).   
 It is also interesting to note that the modulation of levels of affective 
arousal is associated with the amygdala.  For instance, a patient who underwent 
a right temporal lobectomy which included ablation of the right amygdala, was 
asked to rate a series of affective visual stimuli.  Measures of valence were 
concordant with the calibration of the stimuli, however, arousal scores differed 
significantly, with pleasant images rated high in arousal and unpleasant images 
low in arousal, equivalent with the arousal scores of neutral images (Morris et 
al., 1991).   
 
2. Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC)   
 
The ACC is a ‘collar’ partially surrounding the corpus callosum and situated in 
the mPFC and forming the uppermost part of the limbic lobe (Figure 1.2, p 37).  
Therefore it is anatomically linked to the PFC, and traditionally its function has 
been linked to emotion.  It has afferent and efferent connections with the 
hippocampus via cortical circuits, and it has numerous connections with other 
areas in the limbic system (Nolte, 2002). Recent studies have identified its role 
in monitoring the autonomic nervous system (ANS), such as heart rate and 
blood pressure (Matthews et al., 2004, Xiao and Barbas, 2004).   The 
importance of the ANS is in organising the bodily response to motivational and 
emotional states, and the perception of these states in signalling bodily states of 
arousal is integral to emotional and cognitive awareness and appraisal 
(Critchley et al., 2002).  The orbitofrontal and insular cortices are two areas 
anatomically and functionally connected to the ACC and which have also been 
linked with ANS stimulation (Oppenheimer et al., 1992).   
 The diversity of the functions ascribed to the ACC suggests that it is 
significant in emotional and cognitive processing and the monitoring of 
complex behaviours.  These functions include associations with working 
memory, attention and emotion (Bush et al., 2000, Damasio, 1994), emotional 
processing (Vuilleumier et al., 2001), the mediation and interaction of 
cognitive and emotional tasks (Reiman et al., 1997, Whalen et al., 1998a, Bush 
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et al., 2000), voluntary attention and divided attention as evidenced by 
conflictual tasks (Bush et al., 2000), reward (Breiter et al., 1997), anticipation 
of affective stimuli (Bermpohl et al., 2006) and pain and empathy (Becerra et 
al., 2001, Singer et al., 2004).  In fact, it has been suggested that the ACC may 
be the start point for urgent signals, such as pain, and redirects the information 
for further neural processing (Rose, 2006).  There is also evidence that the 
ACC responds to angry facial expressions (Blair et al., 1999) and that this 
region identifies emotional significance, then responds and regulates a reactive 
affective state (Phillips et al., 2003).   
 A connection between emotions, the amygdala and the ACC is long-
established in previous literature  (Papez, 1937, McLean, 1949).  The selection 
of the amygdala and ACC as ROIs for the present study was based on the work 
of Damasio (1994), who asserts that if a person knows that something causes 
fear there are two ways of behaving.  The first is a reaction out of our 
conscious control, it is innate.  The second way is to avoid the situation, based 
on past experience.  The innate feeling, Damasio argues, is a primary emotion 
that depends on prime systems such as the amygdala and ACC (Damasio, 
1994).  Further evidence of an interaction between these two regions comes 
from data mapping signals of valence responses from the amygdala to the 
ACC, which is activated when a cognitive task is required to process  
emotional stimuli (e.g. as in rating emotional stimuli) (Phan et al., 2002).   
 
3. Medial Prefrontal Cortex (mPFC).  
 
The PFC is associated with emotional and social behaviour and inhibitory 
control over emotion and consciousness (Solms and Turnbull, 2002).  The 
earliest and most famous case study of damage to the PFC was that of Phineas 
Gage who, whilst working with dynamite, became victim of a freak accident 
whereby a tamping rod was propelled through his cheek bone through the 
frontal lobe and out through his skull, the speed of which cauterised the wound 
and he survived without even losing consciousness (Harlow, 1848).  The 
selective damage included the mPFC and OFC (Damasio, 1994).  The 
consequences were a distinct change in personality, partly characterised by an 
inability to plan for the future and a complete disregard for social norms that he 
 
 
 32
previously adhered to, thus rendering his behaviour socially unacceptable 
(Harlow, 1868).  
  The mPFC (Figure 1.1, p 37) has also been associated with the OFC for 
emotional self-regulation and suppression of sadness in children (Levesque et 
al., 2004) and, as in the OFC, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex has been 
associated with reward and punishment (Bechara et al., 1999).   
 Experiments using film clips to elicit emotion, and studies employing 
the personal recall of happy and sad experiences, or the generation of disgust,  
have also reported activation in the mPFC (Lane et al., 1997b, Reiman et al., 
1997).   
 mPFC activations are evident both with and without cognitive demand, 
such as the rating of emotional stimuli (Phan et al., 2002).  Responsiveness to 
cognitive load would be expected from the proposal that the PFC is a top down 
modulator, (e.g. if an automatic task suddenly needs conscious control, the 
PFC is activated) (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001).  However, studies 
investigating the ventral mPFC (vMPFC) have shown significant activations 
when processing emotional tasks without associative cognitive processing 
(Grimm et al., 2006, Phan et al., 2002). 
 The connectivity of the vMPFC affords cross-modal involvement as it 
is afferent from all five sensory modalities (Barbas, 2000). 
 A study investigating the emotion surprise highlighted that the mPFC, 
which is known to be reciprocally connected to the amygdala, was activated 
during presentations of surprised facial expressions and not to fear-related 
stimuli (Kim et al., 2003).  
 It is hypothesised that the mPFC holds an attentional role in order to 
differentiate between conflicting inputs from other brain regions (Simpson et 
al., 2001a, Simpson et al., 2001b).  A study investigating anticipation of stimuli 
in terms of spatial location found significant activations in the mPFC for 
expected motivational affect, indicating a role for attention and motivation 
(Small et al., 2003).   
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4. Orbitofrontal Cortex (OFC)  
 
The OFC sits above the orbits of the eyes in the ventral prefrontal lobe (Figure 
1.1, p 37) and in part receives information from the inferior temporal visual 
cortex relaying information regarding the representation of objects.  Receiving 
afferents from the amygdala and projections to and from the ACC (to name but 
a few of its limbic connections), the OFC, once damaged, results in emotional 
changes such as irresponsibility, impulsiveness and immaturity (Rolls, 2005).   
 A recent fMRI study demonstrated activations in the lateral part of the 
OFC with punishment and the medial OFC for monetary rewards (O’Doherty 
et al., 2001).  Activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex has also been 
identified with reward and punishment (Bechara et al., 1999).  The right OFC 
has also been associated with voluntary suppression of sadness (Levesque et 
al., 2003).   There is also evidence that the OFC responds to facial expressions 
such as anger (Blair et al., 1999).   
 The medial OFC has been related to emotional processing whereas the 
lateral OFC is said to specialise in emotion-cognition synthesis (Drevets and 
Raichle, 1998).   
 
5. Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) 
 
DLPFC (Figure 1.1, p 37) is connected to the orbitofrontal cortex and is 
associated with working memory and executive functions. It has recently been 
of interest to those seeking neural correlates of consciousness (Lau and 
Passingham, 2006).  Again, a variety of functions has been ascribed to it.  
 This area is associated with processing spatial information to facilitate 
the ability to learn sequences of actions via cortical and subcortical regions 
(Robertson et al., 2001).   
 A recent study using IAPS stimuli comparing emotional perception and 
expectancy observed activations in the DLPFC for emotional perception 
(Bermpohl et al., 2006).  The DLPFC is also associated with emotional self-
regulation with the RH as part of a neural circuit in voluntary suppression of 
sadness (Levesque et al., 2003).   
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 Evidence suggests that the DLPFC continues developing until late 
adolescence.  It is not until this stage that cognitive control abilities are fully 
matured, as demonstrated in a go/no-go task investigating voluntary 
suppression and inhibition of response (Durston et al., 2002).   
 Recent studies are highlighting hemispheric lateralisation in the PFC, 
with the left DLPFC cited for the possible integration of emotion and memory, 
and encoding nonverbal material lateralised more to the right (Sergerie et al., 
2005).   
 The DLPFC has been shown to be involved in emotional evaluation and 
regulation, thus suggesting a more generalised role in emotional processing 
(Phan et al., 2002).  Lesion studies support this premise, for instance patients 
with damage to this region are said to be devoid of personality with a general 
indifference and flattening effect (Baars and Gage, 2007).   
 It is also hypothesised that the site of the selective control of attention 
location is in the DLPFC as part of the PFC (LaBerge et al., 2000).   
 
6. Parahippocampal Gyrus.   
 
Adjacent to the hippocampus (the core of another limbic circuit), the 
parahippocampal gyrus (Figure 1.3, p 38) receives afferent projections from 
multiple areas and is efferent to the hippocampus (Gupta, 1999, Nolte, 2002).   
 Within the parahippocampal gyrus is an area known as the 
parahippocampus place region (PPR) because it responds to scenes, landmarks 
and houses (Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998, Epstein et al., 1999, O'Craven and 
Kanwisher, 2000). 
 This region has also been associated with surprise and novelty detection 
(Schroeder et al., 2004), with weak responses found when processing bodies, 
faces and inanimate objects (Baars and Gage, 2007).   
 
7. Fusiform Gyrus  
 
The fusiform gyrus is a long gyrus that runs along the inferior surface of the 
cortex from the temporal lobe to the occipital lobe (Figure 1.3, p 38), hence it 
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is also known as the occipitotemporal gyrus.  It is also bound medially by the 
parahippocampal gyrus (Nolte, 2002).   
 Part of the fusiform gyrus has been especially identified for processing 
faces, this area is known as the fusiform face area (FFA) (O'Craven and 
Kanwisher, 2000, Schultz et al., 2003).  Damage to this area can result in 
prosopagnosia, an inability to recognise faces (Wada and Yamamoto, 2001).  
The FFA has also been associated with the processing of emotional facial 
expressions.  Ganel and colleagues (2005) found that the FFA showed higher 
activations when making judgements of facial expressions than when making 
judgements of facial identity (Ganel et al., 2005).   
 The FFA does not process faces exclusively as it is also activated when 
visually processing objects.  One theory is that, as there is evidence for both 
face and object processing by the FFA, this area may be specialised in the 
expertise of object recognition, the idea being that whilst people are all experts 
at face recognition if visually able, testing subject-matter-experts with 
representations of their expertise may also reveal activation of the FFA.  Car 
and bird experts were presented with faces, familiar objects, cars and birds.  
The results confirmed the ‘expertise hypothesis’ in that the RH did respond 
more favourably to the target stimuli for each group (Gauthier et al., 2000).   
 Although the FFA is very small, it is found that in the healthy, the FFA 
is larger in the RH than the LH (Koch, 2004). 
  
8. Insula.   
 
Situated at the floor of the lateral sulcus, the insula (its appearance is that of a 
separate island of cortex) is a large area of cortex which is concealed by the 
temporal, frontal and parietal lobes (Figure 1.1, p 37) and as a consequence of 
its hidden location is little understood (Solms and Turnbull, 2002).  However, 
it is known to receive afferents from autonomic regions, sending efferents to 
brain regions such as the amygdala, which play a critical role in the regulation 
of autonomic response (Davidson and Irwin, 1999).   
 The insula is well documented for processing the emotion disgust 
(Calder et al., 2001, Phillips et al., 1997, Phillips et al., 2004).  This may be 
because it is situated in an area known for gustatory processing, which is 
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associated with distaste (e.g. disliked food) and it is thought that distaste has 
evolved with increasing cognitive involvement into the emotion disgust (e.g. in 
avoidance of contaminated food) (Rozin et al., 1994).  This account runs in 
parallel with the notion of a role of the insula in interoception, (e.g. gut 
feelings, feelings of inner organs) (Baars and Gage, 2007).  The primary 
function of the insula could be interpreted as assimilating bodily information 
into cognitive and emotional systems. In fact, asymmetry of the insula is 
evident for control of autonomic activity, (e.g. LH yields parasympathetic 
effects and RH sympathetic effects) (Craig, 2005).   
 Others have argued that the insula has more of a generalised role in 
emotional processing (Critchley et al., 2002) such as identifying emotional 
significance and automatically responding with an appropriate affect (Phillips 
et al., 2003).   
 
9. Superior Temporal Gyrus (STG).   
 
Close to the lateral sulcus, the STG sits at the top of the temporal lobe (Figure 
1.1, p 37).  The size and configuration is different in each hemisphere, with the 
left generally being the larger (Nolte, 2002).  Wernicke’s area, responsible for 
speech perception and production, is adjacent to the auditory cortex in the 
Sylvian fissure and STG (Baars and Gage, 2007).  The right STG has been 
linked to the processing of emotional vocalisations (Fecteau et al., 2007) and 
humour (Mobbs et al., 2005), but its functions are not limited to auditory and 
linguistic stimuli.   
 There is evidence that the STG responds to selective attention to 
emotional perceptions of faces (Narumoto et al., 2001).  Others using fMRI 
with picture and film stimuli found activation in the STG when viewing 
joy/amusement and sadness (Britton et al., 2006a), and another study 
presenting visual stimuli evoking sexual arousal also noted significant activity 
in the STG (Yang, 2004).   
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Figure 1.1 Lateral view of the brain showing selected brain regions – DLPFC; Insula; mPFC; 
OFC; and STG 
Modified from: 
http://basis.typepad.com/photos/uncategorized/2007/06/12/ashes2_21.jpg and 
http://www.medicine.uiowa.edu/CDD/Images/brainSM.jpg  
 
 
Figure 1.2  Medial view of the brain showing selected brain regions – ACC and Amygdala 
Modified from: 
http://thesituationist.files.wordpress.com/2007/06/amygdala.jpg  
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Figure 1.3  Medial view of the brain showing selected brain regions – Fusiform gyrus and 
Parahippocampus 
Modified from: 
http://www.psypress.com/zaidel/images/figures/figure3_3.jpg 
 
 All these regions continue to be the subject of lively debate as to their 
functions, and all nine target areas attract fervent research in both conscious 
and unconscious studies of emotion and are the framework for this discourse.   
 
1:7  Processing of Complex Affective Visual Images.  
 
1:7:1  Introduction   
 
An enormous amount of data has derived from lesion studies, animal studies, 
behavioural and neuroimaging studies using simple visual stimuli.  However, 
the volume of previous research using complex, natural, affective images is 
much more limited. The following section will therefore review studies that 
have used natural images to investigate early visual processing, studies using 
affective natural images including IAPS stimuli (focusing particularly on the 
issue of automatic emotional processing), and fMRI studies relevant to 
emotional valence discrimination in terms of the different levels of spatial scale 
available in natural images. This will highlight what is known, what has been 
tried, what has worked, what has been disputed, and what still needs to be 
Parahippocampus Fusiform gyrus  
(medial temporo-occipital gyrus) 
Frontal 
lobe 
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investigated.  The review will therefore point towards and provide a rationale 
for the main research questions to be addressed in this thesis.  
 
1:7:2  Natural Images 
 
Using natural images, the effect of rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) has 
been studied for nearly forty years.  Potter and Levy (1969), for instance, were 
concerned with understanding how perception of rapidly presented images was 
processed in a recognition memory study using 16 static colour photographs of 
various complex pictures presented in rapid succession.  The results of the 
subsequent recognition task led the authors to conclude that visual stimuli 
presented rapidly are not held in short-term memory, but are processed 
individually, dependent on viewing time (Potter and Levy, 1969).  Potter 
continued using this paradigm in further detection studies whereby 
identification of the presence of a target, (e.g. a car), or recognition of a correct 
picture sequence, revealed that it takes as little as 100ms to understand a 
picture and therefore be immune to visual masking (Potter, 1976).   
 A very extensive literature from Thorpe and colleagues has continued 
this line of enquiry, demonstrating, for example, ultra rapid processing of 
complex natural images (20ms exposure) using ERPs (Thorpe et al., 1996).  
Investigating how fast the human visual system can process naturalistic 
images, they employed a go/no-go categorisation task.  Their results indicated 
that less than 150ms of visual processing is needed to decide if an image 
contained an animal or not.  Their findings provided evidence that a minimum 
of coarse information was enough to correctly decide the presence or absence 
of an animal in a natural scene.  This level of rapid processing was previously 
thought to be associated with face processing only.  On the basis of the many 
known neural stages of processing in the visual pathways, and the rapidity of 
visual processing in behavioural experiments, the involvement of a 
feedforward mechanism was speculated (Thorpe et al., 1996).   
 Thorpe et al. (2001b) noted that very little data was available on visual 
perception of natural images presented in the periphery.  To investigate further, 
the same go/no go categorisation task was used with stimuli presented in the 
retinal periphery, in which unmasked natural images randomly appeared in one 
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of nine locations for 28ms.  This challenging method of presentation meant that 
attention needed to be widely distributed across the visual field without time 
for saccades.  Even under these conditions, a significant level of correct scores 
was recorded in the periphery.  This experiment demonstrated that high-level 
analysis on coarse visual information is possible, regardless of the orientation 
of spatial attention in a fusion of characteristics such as colour, shape and size 
(Thorpe et al., 2001b).   
 Contemporaries of Thorpe have reported similar results.  These include 
experiments using novel, compared to familiar, natural scenes in a go/no-go 
animal detection task (Fabre-Thorpe et al., 2001), faces compared to animals 
(Rousselet et al., 2003, Rousselet et al., 2004b), presenting one, two or four 
natural scenes in a peripheral paradigm (Rousselet et al., 2004c) and comparing 
‘natural’ animals with ‘artificial’ means of transport (VanRullen and Thorpe, 
2001a).   
 Together these findings support the concept of an automatic 
feedforward mechanism (i.e. bottom-up ascending wave of action potentials, 
non-iterative) and parallel processing, in that the processing of complex images 
does not necessarily need sequential focal attention, but can be rapidly 
accessed in parallel (Rousselet et al., 2002).   
 Thorpe and colleagues explain that if stimuli are presented for 10ms or 
less, there is only time for neurons to generate just one spike and the neuron to 
fire first is the most strongly activated one.  Thus, the order of this rapid 
feedforward influence can be observed and inferences can be made about the 
stimuli (Thorpe et al., 2006).    
 Since Thorpe first set the temporal parameters for single-fixation visual 
processing at 150ms (Thorpe et al., 1996), others have since shown that the 
minimum saccadic reaction time was as little as 120ms.  Using a forced-choice 
animal detection task, two complex images were flashed left and right of 
fixation.  A simple decision of left or right was made with the mean reaction 
times at 228ms and a mean accuracy of 90% (Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006).  As 
a result Kirchner and Thorpe reasoned that if saccades are made as quickly as 
110ms with a 20ms initiation time lapse, this is further evidence of only a 
feedforward pass.  To verify this explanation, Thorpe et al. (2006) carried out a 
version of Kirchner and Thorpe’s saccade-choice task.  Two images were 
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displayed for 400ms to the left and right of fixation; one contained a natural 
image of a human face and the other a natural scene.  An electrooculogram 
(EOG) recorded the direction of the initial saccade, classifying eye movements 
towards the face stimuli as correct and the scene images as incorrect.  The 
mean RT was 147ms with a mean accuracy of 94.4%, the highest level of 
accuracy was for the fastest RTs of 100-109ms stimulus onset asynchronies 
(SOAs) (Thorpe et al., 2006).  The ultra-rapid success of face detection was 
seen as support for feedforward processing on two counts.  Firstly, the work of 
VanRullen and Thorpe has shown that relatively large objects can be identified 
in complex images when <1% of ganglion cells in the retina have fired only 
one spike (VanRullen and Thorpe, 2001b).  Secondly, (as briefly mentioned in 
section 1:5) studies have shown that by repeating stimuli presentations, a 
neuron will fire faster and faster, some synapses are strengthened and then 
depressed.  If this process continues, the synapses become so strong that fewer 
are necessary to fire the neuron (Guyonneau et al., 2004).  Thorpe raises the 
question that, if training has such an effect, then perhaps the fact that human 
beings process faces so often throughout their lives may mean that selective 
face detection is possible on very little information, which would explain the 
incredible speed of the face detection results (Thorpe et al., 2006) (see also 
section 1.5). 
 It should be noted at this point that much of the work by Thorpe and 
colleagues uses response times (RTs).  RTs have the inherent disadvantage of 
including not only the time interval to process visual input, but also the time 
interval to initiate a motor response.  Considering this, however, these 
experiments do demonstrate the incredible speed of visual processing, but this 
does not necessarily indicate the timing of the onset of a visual conscious 
percept.  In fact, critics note that animal detection is achieved with virtually the 
same exposure duration with or without masking, even when participants have 
hardly consciously seen anything at all (Koch, 2004).       
 Equally, it is widely acknowledged that a single feedforward pass will 
not extract all necessary information about a complex image, therefore an 
animal detection task may also involve top-down influences (Fize et al., 2005), 
perhaps due to the involvement of the PFC for categorisation purposes even 
under ultra-rapid presentations (Masquelier and Thorpe, 2007).  Others have 
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proposed that the visual system needs both feedback and feedforward loops in 
multiple computational arrangements to process complex natural images (Lee 
et al., 1998).  For instance, Codispoti et al. (2006b), interested in the neural 
sources of selective attention, conducted a study using a forced-choice 
paradigm of whether an animal was present or not in a natural scene.  They 
found that early ERP activity (150ms) indicated top-down influences  
facilitating the rapid categorisation task (Codispoti et al., 2006b).  Hochstein 
and Ahissar (2002) also suggest that feed-forward processing can only extract a 
generalised interpretation of an image which they describe as “vision at a 
glance”, whereas top-down processes are needed for more detailed conscious 
visual perception, in their words “vision with scrutiny” (Hochstein and Ahissar, 
2002, p 791).   
 As mentioned in the introduction, other contributors, Li et al. (2002) 
compared simple visual stimuli – Ts and Ls – with natural scenes in 
attentionally demanding tasks.  They found that, when challenging attention 
capacity with rapid peripheral categorisation of a single or dual task, the 
natural images were far more robust in speed of processing than the simple 
geometric shapes (Li et al., 2002).  Even though Potter, Thorpe and 
contemporaries have continued to scrutinise the speed of visual processing of 
natural images, Li et al.’s experiment was considered pivotal because it 
demonstrated that observers could process the gist of a natural image outside 
the focus of attention more efficiently than simple shapes, thus challenging 
previous notions that only elementary features of an image such as orientation 
and brightness can be processed in the near absence of attention.  As such, this 
counteracts the erroneous belief that capacity limitations can be generalised 
from traditional geometric shapes to natural images (Braun, 2003).   
 These papers try to explain how complex natural images can be 
processed rapidly and, of course, this debate is still being developed.  By 
employing categorisation/detection tasks measuring RTs and/or ERP 
recordings, these contributions challenge traditional views of the necessity of 
serial focal attention for high level visual processing and elucidate the value 
and importance of using natural images.  However, the question posed in this 
thesis is whether or not the affective content of natural images can be extracted 
in rapid, parallel fashion as is employed in the detection of animals, faces, or 
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means of transport.  To continue this review, studies using affective natural 
images will now be discussed.  This relevant but separate literature examines 
what happens when rapidly processed emotional stimuli are introduced, 
whereby affective evaluation takes place automatically, below conscious 
threshold for everyday images.   
 
1:7:3 Affect and Natural Images including IAPS  
 
Appetitive and aversive images evoke strong motivational, affective responses 
that rapidly modulate attention (Lang et al., 1997).  Emotionally evocative 
images are used to induce positive (high valence) and negative (low valence) 
emotions with moderate to high levels of arousal, the highest levels of arousal 
being induced by erotica and threat, which are of primary biological relevance 
(Bradley et al., 2001a).  Subjective reports, physiological events such as SCRs 
and bioelectric events have been used as measures of the temporal 
characteristics of emotional response (Lane and Nadel, 2000).   
 Using an oddball paradigm with mostly high arousal IAPS stimuli 
interspersed with unpleasant symbols and words, Schupp and colleagues 
(2000) showed that emotional pictures enhance late positive potentials (LPPs).  
A stimulus was displayed for 1.5s, followed by a categorisation task that took 
between 1.5s - 3s.  The participants initiated each sequence. EEG and EOG 
readings firstly demonstrated that the LPPs did not change with intermittent 
symbolic stimuli and secondly, that the LPPs were similar for pleasant and 
unpleasant stimuli, which were both greater than those to neutral pictures.  The 
authors concluded that affective stimuli sustain LPPs and LPP amplitudes 
increase with higher arousal and the motivational relevance of emotion-
inducing stimuli modulates late ERPs (Schupp et al., 2000).  Continued 
investigations support this conclusion.  By using briefly presented stimuli at 
120ms, it was found that LPP amplitudes during ERP studies were larger in 
response to late selective processing over centro-parietal areas and a greater 
negative shift in ERPs over temporo-occipital sensors indicated early selective 
processing at around 150ms (Schupp et al., 2003, Schupp et al., 2004).  High 
arousal showed greater sensitivity, however Schupp et al. (2003a) noted erotic 
images elicited greater response than all other stimuli.  They noted a problem 
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with the gender ratio in their sample (14 women and 2 men) and reflected upon 
gender differences being a consideration (Schupp et al., 2004).   
 These LPP findings were supported in an EEG experiment by Cuthbert 
et al. (2000) who were interested in assessing the brain’s motivational systems 
when presenting affective images.  Using pleasant and unpleasant IAPS 
pictures of high arousal and neutral stimuli, a positive voltage change began at 
200-300ms, reaching maximum amplitude at 1s and sustained for 6s.  In 
addition, they also found that the duration of the positive slow waves was 
maintained for 5s, suggesting continued affective perceptual processing.  This 
suggests that the processes giving rise to the LPP begin relatively early and that 
consequently the emotional content is at least partially identified by this stage. 
Together, these results were interpreted to mean that affective stimuli reflect 
activity in motivational organisation in the brain and greater allocation of 
attentional resources due to the intrinsic biological nature of the stimuli 
(Cuthbert et al., 2000).   
 Consistent with these results, LPPs were greater when viewing 
emotionally arousing stimuli than neutral stimuli in the absence of external 
cues, judgement tasks or responses.  Neither valence nor arousal affected the 
outcome, but Anokhin et al. (2006) recorded early content-specific ERPs by 
erotic stimuli as opposed to non-erotic stimuli at 185ms in the fronto-central 
region.  The distinct rapid automatic discrimination when passively viewing 
erotica compared to all the other positive, negative, and neutral stimuli, led 
them to speculate a specific neural network for processing biologically and 
evolutionary relevant stimuli.  However, the content of some of the other 
pictures was also biologically significant, (e.g. threat related scenes), from 
which they further hypothesised that the apparent content dissociation may be 
specific to social meaning as opposed to biological significance.  The study 
was limited in as far as the sample group were all female and only a small 
number of EEG electrodes (19) were used, which casts a doubt over the 
accuracy of localisation of electrical activity.  The results of content specificity 
associated with fronto-central regions are unusual in ERP studies, whereby 
more general measurements of neuroelectrical responses relating to affect are 
the norm (Anokhin et al., 2006).   
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 Hajcak et al. (2007) were interested to know if a difficult concurrent 
task would modulate electrocortical response to everyday images of emotional 
content.  Using a mathematical competing task they presented positive, 
negative and neutral IAPS stimuli for 2000ms in an EEG study.  In line with 
previous passive viewing paradigms, LPP modulation was greater for positive 
and negative stimuli than neutral stimuli and the concurrent competing task had 
no impact on affect, although the mathematical performance was not measured 
in terms of influencing emotional processing (Hajcak et al., 2007).   
 Investigating affective anticipation in an EEG study, Takeuchi et al. 
(2005) set out to refine previous findings on the effect of emotional content on 
stimulus-preceding negativity.  By manipulating negative, positive and neutral 
IAPS stimuli they found that the negative pictures elicited higher arousal 
during the anticipatory period (Takeuchi et al., 2005).  In support of these 
results, a recent study investigating a bias in attention towards negative IAPS 
stimuli presented for 1200ms, observed greater amplitude in P2 in response to 
negative affective stimuli than positive, indicating very early negativity bias. 
There was also a greater amplitude in late positive components (LPC) to 
negative stimuli, demonstrating later evaluative processing, and a shorter 
lateralised readiness potential (LRP), meaning a negative shift preceding motor 
processes, signifying a faster response to negative affective stimuli, thus 
demonstrating a negative valence bias (Huang and Luo, 2006).   
 Equally, ERPs were able to detect differences between early and late 
processing of targets, however due to spatial resolution constraints, 
interpretation of ERP activity was restricted, both in terms of inferences about 
the brain structures giving rise to the waveforms studied, and inferences about 
their related functions (Huang and Luo, 2006).   
 So far, it has been demonstrated that pleasant and unpleasant images 
evoke larger LPP responses than neutral images and that ERP responses are 
sensitive to motivational biological relevance (Bradley et al., 2003).  On the 
whole, emotional arousal was reflected in the ERPs, but to a lesser extent so 
was valence in that greater ERP positivity was found for unpleasant images 
than pleasant or neutral images (Cuthbert et al., 2000).   
 Additionally, SCR has been widely used to investigate rapid affective 
processing.  Investigating hemispheric differences to IAPS emotional visual 
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stimuli in a masked paradigm, Kimura and colleagues (2000) presented target 
stimuli in the left or right visual field for 30ms with EOG and no saccadic eye 
movements were indicated.  They found right hemisphere dominance (RHD) in 
SCR response to negative stimuli without awareness (Kimura et al., 2004).  
However, only negative and neutral stimuli were used and the sample group 
were purely male, therefore, valence bias and a biased sample render it difficult 
to generalise.  All the same, a previous study recorded RHD for briefly 
presented stimuli with greater effect for negative stimuli than positive 
(Hartikainen et al., 2000).   
 Pleasant IAPS pictures were employed by Ribeiro, et al. (2007), to 
investigate physiological responses to arousal.  Measuring facial 
electromyographic (EMG) activity, heart rate, SCRs and peripheral 
temperature, eight highly pleasant arousing, eight highly pleasant relaxing, 
eight neutral and eight highly unpleasant arousing IAPS pictures were used.  
The rationale was that sets of pleasant photographs may contain mixed arousal 
levels because they included ‘arousing’ and ‘relaxing’ pictures (Ribeiro et al., 
2007).  This logic seems flawed.  First, if all the pleasant and unpleasant 
stimuli were rated equally for arousal there would be no need for two subsets in 
the pleasant category.  Secondly, the valence bias could distort the results.  
However, the overall findings were that physiological responses varied 
depending upon valence and arousal.   
 Prior to this experiment, in order to examine the organisation of 
emotional perception in terms of motivational systems such as pleasure and 
arousal, Lang and colleagues (1993) presented IAPS stimuli for 6s, 
implemented ratings, personality and cognitive attributes questionnaires and 
then re-presented the stimuli measuring corresponding feelings.  Regardless of 
personality factors and gender differences, a significant relationship was found 
between facial EMG, output valence judgements and SCRs with arousal 
(excited/calm) (Lang et al., 1993).   
 Other contributors have found larger electrodermal responses such as 
SCRs for high arousing stimuli such as threat and erotica (Bradley et al., 
2001a, Bradley et al., 2001b) and a correlation between valence and facial 
EMGs (Davis et al., 1995).   
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 By using physiological methods such as EMG and SCRs and adding 
affective information to RSVP, autonomic and somatic responses indicate 
emotional processing of rapidly presented affective stimuli.  This was 
evidenced in a rapid picture viewing paradigm whereby physiological 
responses were heightened when viewing unpleasant IAPS stimuli as opposed 
to pleasant and neutral pictures (Smith et al., 2006). 
 It is clear by the evidence presented here that natural images are 
successfully used to investigate affect when using the temporal advantages of 
electrodermal responses measured by SCR and neuroimaging techniques such 
as EEG.  Equally neural activity measures such as ERP are highly sensitive to 
synchronised firing of neurons but have indeterminate spatial resolution.  One 
of the advantages of using fMRI is that it provides excellent spatial resolution 
without depending on fine temporal scales.  Therefore, fMRI and affect will 
now be discussed in detail, examining studies of both conscious and 
unconscious affective processing.   
 
1:7:4  fMRI 
 
Measuring the Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) response to 
regional blood flow changes affords more accurate spatial data with regard to 
brain circuitry and functions.  This has led to a miscellany of affective fMRI 
research projects being explored in recent years.  Topics ranging from gender 
differences (LaBar et al., 1998, Levesque et al., 2004, Wrase et al., 2003), 
schizophrenia (Fahim et al., 2004), suppression (Beck, 2002), expectancy 
(Beck, 2002), supraliminal and subliminal exposure duration (Williams et al., 
2006), and comparative stimuli studies such as fearful and angry faces versus 
other types of fearful and angry images (Hariri et al., 2002), have rapidly 
enlightened our understanding of emotion and the neural correlates.   
 Studies investigating gender differences in brain activations during 
emotional processing, for instance, have found some disparity in neuronal 
structures, enough to suggest that gender should be taken into account when 
interpreting results.  One such study by Wrase et al. (2003) presented IAPS 
stimuli for 750ms.  Their findings demonstrated that men showed greater 
activations in the left amygdala and frontal lobe than women when viewing 
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positive stimuli, whilst viewing negative stimuli, women showed greater 
activations in the anterior and medial cingulate gyrus (Wrase et al., 2003).  
However, LaBar et al. (1998) conducted another gender analysis using fMRI 
and IAPS images and found RHD in the amygdala in female subjects compared 
to male, but in both, the amygdala showed greater activation when evaluating 
negatively arousing scenes (LaBar et al., 1998).  In addition, Levesque et al. 
(2004) observed greater BOLD activations in the PFC in female children in a 
suppression of sadness paradigm as compared to adult females using the same 
method.  These findings were related to the immaturity of the PFC (Levesque 
et al., 2004).   
 In order to pinpoint brain regions that correlate with previous ERP 
studies, a replication of Thorpe’s ERP paradigm of an animal go/no-go 
categorisation task briefly presented for 33ms was carried out (Thorpe et al., 
1996).  Using fMRI, similar robust results were found, highlighting regions 
that correlate with previously reported early selective processing (Fize et al., 
2000).   
 Whilst making the point that diligence needs to be practised when 
discussing the distinction between perception of emotional valence and elicited 
emotional experience, Beck (2002) made plain the differences in the neural 
correlates activated by the two conditions: perception of positive and negative 
stimuli was associated with parieto-occipital cortex; and experience or 
‘feelings’ involved the mPFC.  In the same paper, she investigated the 
conscious inhibition of sadness and amusement. Whilst watching the same 
emotional film clips as the previous experiment and following the instruction 
of suppressing any emotional feelings, they found that in both conditions 
activations in the inferior frontal gyrus and insula were evident.  The 
experience of amusement, however, witnessed greater activations in the STG, 
putamen, parahippocampus, medial temporal lobe and the thalamus, and the 
suppression of sadness was associated with the visual cortex, thus indicating 
that the regulation of emotion is subserved by discrete neural correlates (Beck, 
2002).   
 Beck’s study investigated conscious inhibition of affect, but fMRI does 
not have the temporal parameters to pick up true affective change (Panksepp, 
1998).  As previously mentioned, PET is far better suited for the necessary 
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time course, as evidenced by other investigators.  Damasio, for example, used 
PET to compare recalled and re-experienced personal emotional episodes 
inducing the feelings of sadness, happiness, anger and fear.  By monitoring the 
specific neurochemical system afforded by PET technique, neural patterns 
were observed in direct relation to the immediacy of the associated feeling 
(Damasio et al., 2000).  Whereas fMRI measures blood oxygenation related to 
local changes and therefore, does not measure neuronal responses directly, 
moreover the fMRI time-course of the haemodynamic response does not 
necessarily reflect the time course of the underlying neural activity (Jezzard et 
al., 2001).   
 Although Beck quite rightly emphasised the distinction between 
affective feelings and perception, her study did not take this into account on a 
pragmatic level.  This is a pivotal point.  Therefore, as the central premise of 
the present discourse is to investigate specific ROIs in relation to neural 
correlates of conscious and unconscious processing of emotion, for which 
fMRI is best suited, it is pertinent to focus on the cognitive perception of 
affective stimuli only (Panksepp, 1998).   
 Comparing cued emotional and neutral IAPS stimuli to elicit 
expectancy with uncued emotional and neutral pictures to gauge perception, 
Bermpohl and colleagues found that the two conditions recruited discrete 
neuronal networks.  The resultant dissociation led them to deduce that 
expectancy and perception are two different components of affective 
processing (Bermpohl et al., 2006).  However, they stated that the IAPS 
pictures are matched for colour, complexity, semantic content and luminance, 
relating to valence, but IAPS make no such claim; in fact it is difficult, to 
balance all these criteria in this selection of natural images.  Equally, their 
experiment was not valence-specific.  Therefore, it was difficult to know 
exactly what stimuli they used and how criterion was established.   
 Many studies use IAPS stimuli in supraliminal presentations.  One such 
study implemented by Bradley et al. (2003) investigated the motivational view 
of emotional organisation, in that appetitive and defensive motives direct 
attention.  Presenting IAPS stimuli with Japanese and Caucasian faces, which 
were rated for arousal and valence following the IAPS scale, for 12s each, they 
found that greater cortical activations were in direct relation to stimuli with 
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high ratings of arousal, such as erotica and evidence of threat, (e.g. body 
mutilation), regardless of colour/greyscale presentation.  Therefore, greater 
functional activity was observed for survival-related stimuli providing evidence 
of  motivational attention (Bradley et al., 2003).  This was an all male study 
and it was not clear who rated the non-IAPS stimuli, therefore values and effect 
of arousal may have been biased by gender considerations.   
 Effects of IAPS ratings of arousal levels were also investigated in 
another gender biased study with nine females profiled as fearful and nine 
profiled as non-fearful, where activity in the amygdala and inferotemporal 
visual cortex was examined.  Presented with threatening and non-threatening 
categories of stimuli for 6s, it was demonstrated that the amplitude of 
activation in the two ROIs is directly correlated with ratings of arousal levels 
and is sensitive to individual disposition (Sabatinelli et al., 2005).   
 In an effort to match the properties of the content of a selection of IAPS 
stimuli (e.g. colour), Northoff and colleagues (2000) presented various 
categories of stimuli rated for positive and negative affect for 6s.  Using a 
combination of fMRI and magnetoencephalography (MEG), the investigators 
were able to present evidence of early, strong activation in the medial OFC  
when processing negative emotion, and later, weaker lateral OFC and lateral 
PFC when viewing positive emotion.  These results demonstrated that the 
medial and lateral OFC subserve different affective functions (Northoff et al., 
2000).  Although the authors state, however, that the images only differed in 
valence and not in arousal, they also explain the picture selection by giving the 
example of a ‘mutilated face’ for a negative image and a ‘smiling baby’ for a 
positive image.  These two examples are quite clearly different arousal ratings, 
so it is not clear what was actually being measured.  
 Grimm, et al. (2006), who supports the view that regions in the PFC 
process distinct emotional functions, conducted a very neat study.  Using IAPS 
stimuli of human faces and human figures, they compared affective judgement 
with affective viewing whilst watching each image for 4s.  They reported 
involvement of the vMPFC with valence processing; the right ventrolateral 
PFC controlling arousal judgement; the DLPFC with valence evaluation; the 
dorsomedial PFC with an interaction with attention and judgement of affective 
arousal; and the perigenual ACC with recognition of response (Grimm et al., 
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2006).  The stimuli chosen were emotionally evocative human images only.  It 
would have been interesting to test for the effect of non-human affective 
images (e.g. inanimate objects), to clarify if the results were purely an 
indication of the comparison between judgement and viewing conditions or 
indicative of the chosen stimuli.   
 Research using fMRI and IAPS stimuli investigating conscious 
processing of emotion are harvesting both interesting and excellent results.  
Some of these use facial expressions with IAPS stimuli as in enquiries if the 
amygdala demonstrates stronger activations for faces relative to stimuli of less 
social significance with regards to fear and threat (Hariri et al., 2002), or ROI 
analysis examining the effect of happy, sad, angry and fearful conditions 
revealing distinct and overlapping neural correlates of faces and IAPS stimuli 
(Britton et al., 2006b), or a design using IAPS images with additional 
photographs from various photographic sources calibrated by independent 
raters (Mourao-Miranda et al., 2003).  Equally, there are those studies that use 
IAPS only and divide them into categorical subsets.  For instance, Hariri et al. 
(2003) chose two subsets of IAPS stimuli depicting threat, one set was of 
natural images such as snakes and sharks and the second set of artificial 
images (e.g. guns and air crashes).  There were three experimental conditions, 
one was a matching task, selecting which 2 out of 3 images matched, the 
second condition showed a target image and two linguistic labels, ‘natural’ and 
‘artificial’, and the participants were asked to label the picture accordingly, the 
third was a control condition.  The purpose of the study was to investigate the 
dynamics between the limbic system (engaged by the matching condition) and 
the neocortical regions (stimulated by the higher cognitive demands from the 
labelling condition).  It was found that perceptual processing in the matching 
task activated the amygdala bilaterally, but amygdala response was attenuated 
when cognitive evaluation took place, which correlated with greater activation 
in the right PFC and ACC.  Thus highlighting the importance of the role of the 
PFC and ACC in modulating amygdala response through conscious appraisal 
and evaluation (Hariri et al., 2003).   
 What of fMRI studies looking at emotional processing below the 
threshold of conscious awareness? 
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 Most of the fMRI studies investigating unconscious affective 
processing report findings from stimuli of facial expressions.  These include 
studies on healthy participants examining the effects on the amygdala when 
presented with unattended fearful faces (Etkin et al., 2004, Pessoa et al., 2005b, 
Reinders et al., 2006, Zipern, 2004), with masked (Whalen et al., 1998b) and 
selectively attended fearful and happy faces (Williams et al., 2005), as well as 
an emotional learning study using masked angry faces demonstrating amygdala 
lateralisation; RH for masked presentations and LH for unmasked presentations 
(Morris et al., 1998b).   
 Amygdala activations have been investigated along with other brain 
regions in a study using sad and happy faces in a backward masking 
experiment (Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd, 2004).  The target stimuli were 
presented for 20ms followed immediately by a neutral face for 100ms.  
Bilateral activations were evident in both the amygdala and ACC for happy 
faces, but sad faces generated only ACC activations in the LH.   Equally, when 
comparing faces mediating fear and disgust, the amygdala responded to covert 
fear and the insula to covert disgust (Phillips et al., 2004).  Both these studies 
are examples indicating that different regions are components of distinct neural 
networks for affective face processing below the threshold of conscious 
awareness.   
 Patient studies contribute enormously to our understanding of implicit 
affective visual processing.  For instance, blindsight is a result of damage to the 
striate cortex (V1), the result of which is blindness in the contralateral visual 
field.  However, some patients are able to accurately ‘guess’ the presence of 
stimuli in their blindfield, even when they are not consciously aware of stimuli 
presentation (Weiskrantz et al., 1974).  These include emotional facial 
expressions, as evidenced when patient GY was presented with greyscale 
fearful and happy faces during an fMRI experiment.  Results indicated that fear 
related stimuli can be processed without visual awareness in the amygdala as 
part of an extrageniculostriate neural pathway (Morris et al., 2001).  Another 
blindsight patient study found that angry, happy and fearful faces involved the 
right amygdala in unconscious processing of all three emotions (Pegna et al., 
2005).   
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 There is a corpus of literature investigating implicit visual affective 
processing with fMRI, but few to date have used a wide range of complex 
natural images.   
 
 1:7:5  Natural Stimuli and Category Membership 
 
Finally, it is necessary to briefly address authors who divide natural stimuli 
into categorical subsets to use as separate conditions.  Already discussed are 
VanRullen and Thorpe’s experiment comparing IAPS natural animals with 
artificial means of transport (see section 1:7:2) (VanRullen and Thorpe, 2001a) 
and Hariri et al. employing IAPS natural and artificial images of threat (see 
section 1:7:4) (Hariri et al., 2003).   
 Others examining category specificity have used a diverse set of 
images.  Kreiman et al. (2000) using electrodes, were particularly interested in 
the medial temporal lobe and noted selective responses to faces of emotional 
expressions, household objects, animals, cars, photographs of famous people, 
drawings of people and cartoon characters (Kreiman et al., 2000), whilst 
Gorno-Tempini and Price (2001) identified fusiform activation when presented 
with famous faces and parahippocampal/lingual areas responded preferentially 
to buildings (Gorno-Tempini and Price, 2001).   
 For clarity the key points of this review will now be summarised.   
 
1:7:6  Summary 
 
The key points to this review are as follows: 
 
• We know from recent evidence from ERPs, EOGs and RTs that 
complex images are processed rapidly in categorisation tasks.   
• Using affective images, physiological responses demonstrate distinct 
effects of valence and arousal. 
• ERP studies report both early and late processing of affect. 
• Arousal and valence of affective visual stimuli are reliably rated when 
presented supraliminally. 
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• fMRI experiments have afforded a wealth of data implicating ROIs and 
neural networks activated by implicit and explicit processing of 
affective faces in both healthy and brain damaged participants. 
• Little or no previous research has been conducted on the unconscious 
processing of emotional valence using a wide range of complex natural 
images (with the exception of faces), using fMRI.  
 
 It is argued here that abstract visual stimuli such as dots and gratings do 
not capture certain essential properties of visual processing and, as such, are 
neither ecologically valid nor is there an obvious evolutionary rationale for 
predicting responses to such stimuli, therefore more experiments on natural 
images are needed to advance our understanding.  
 On the basis of the literature reviewed here, there is a lack of 
information on the neural mechanisms that allow us to identify affective 
properties (such as emotional valence and intensity) in complex images. 
Furthermore, there is a lack of information on whether the affective properties 
of such stimuli can be identified when they are presented subliminally, that is, 
below the threshold of detection.   
 I believe this line of enquiry is fruitful.  Work on subliminal perception 
suggests that the affective content of certain stimuli can be detected at very 
brief exposures, even when the observer is unaware of having seen the 
stimulus.  fMRI studies of facial emotion suggest that there is a direct and rapid 
subcortical route to the amygdala that mediates unconscious perception.  
Threats and opportunities that are important in evolutionary terms do not 
present themselves in the form of standardised visual stimuli in an uncluttered 
scene.  It is likely, as the works of Thorpe and collaborators show, that the 
brain has evolved to extract categorical information very rapidly from complex 
scenes (Fabre-Thorpe et al., 2001, Rousselet et al., 2002, Rousselet et al., 2003, 
Rousselet et al., 2004b, Rousselet et al., 2004c, Thorpe et al., 1996, Thorpe et 
al., 2001b, VanRullen and Thorpe, 2001a).  It is hypothesised here that one of 
the important items to be extracted is affect, and the experiments conducted in 
this thesis will test this idea.   
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1:8  Present Research Programme 
 
The purpose of the present study is to further the theory of automatic emotional 
processing, but in the context of natural everyday vision, by comparing 
response to emotional valence using complex natural images.  Differences in 
the responses to complex stimuli, differing in emotional valence, will be 
studied both in a behavioural paradigm and in relation to BOLD response of 
the nine selected ROIs – Amygdala, ACC, mPFC, OFC, DLPFC, Fusiform 
Gyrus, Parahippocampus, Insula and STG.   
 
 1:8:1  Key Points of this Research Programme 
• Aims: 
(1) To determine whether the emotional valence of complex visual 
stimuli can be detected subliminally in brief, masked presentations. 
(2) To determine whether the emotional valence of complex visual 
stimuli can be determined on trials when the observer is unaware there 
is a target stimulus present. 
(3) To identify neural correlates of positively and negatively valenced 
emotional stimuli in brief, masked presentations, as well as in free 
viewing, using fMRI.  
(3a) To determine whether masked emotion-inducing stimuli 
activate brain areas (ROIs) known to be associated with the 
conscious awareness of visual stimuli.  
(3b) To address the question of whether positive and negative 
emotions involve ROIs that are distinct in the two hemispheres.  
4) To identify possible category-specific effects of complex visual 
stimuli using behavioural and fMRI methods. 
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• Procedures: 
A forward and backward masking paradigm is developed in a 
behavioural experiment and the first fMRI experiment.  This is 
followed by a dual image compound stimulus design in the second 
fMRI experiment. 
• Working definitions: 
See Glossary page x.   
• Originality: 
This thesis will provide new evidence of the breadth of variety in the 
types of affective visual stimuli we are able to perceptually process 
close to the threshold of conscious perception, and identify brain 
regions that are differentially activated by the affective valence of such 
stimuli.  
 
1:9  Hypotheses 
 
The aims of this thesis are to try to add to our understanding of the attentional 
and perceptual requirements needed for affective complex image processing.  
By increasing the difficulty of complex image categorisation of affect with 
challenging tasks, it is hypothesised that:  
H¹ The valence of complex images can be identified both 
above and below the threshold for detecting the presence 
of the image in a forward – backward masking 
experiment.  
H² There are valence-specific effects of complex images on 
fMRI activations in some or all of the nine ROIs identified 
from the literature as responding to affective stimuli.  
H³ In brief, masked images there are valence-specific effects 
of complex images (presented close to the threshold for 
conscious detection) on fMRI activations in some or all of 
the nine ROIs.  
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H4 In dual image presentations, there are valence-specific 
effects of complex images on fMRI activations in some or 
all of the nine ROIs responding to affective stimuli, both 
for ‘attended’ and for ‘to-be-ignored’ images.  
 
 To summarise, the next chapter (Chapter 2) will detail with the 
methodology used for all three experiments.  Hypothesis One will then be 
investigated with a behavioural experiment (Chapter 3) seeking to determine 
the efficacy of the stimuli using a forward and backward masking paradigm.  
By measuring detection of stimuli and discrimination of valence response, 
perception of natural images below the threshold of conscious awareness is 
reported and validity of the stimuli established.   
 The effects of the same stimuli are then objectively measured in a very 
similar paradigm using fMRI (H2) (Chapter 4).  To test temporal parameters, 
the target presentation of just 10ms (see section 2:1:2) provided evidence of a 
limited, but significant level of emotional processing near or below the level of 
conscious perception in some of the nine ROIs (H3).   
 To further the overall line of enquiry into the breadth and experimental 
viability of natural images, a second fMRI experiment (Chapter 5) was 
designed to divide attention between highly visible images in a dual image 
presentation (H4), using a small image superimposed on a large image of 
opposite valence with the instruction to ignore the surrounding stimulus.  The 
implications of this will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2  Stimuli and fMRI Methodology 
 
2:1  fMRI Experiments 
 
To ensure clarity and avoid repetition, the first section of this chapter discusses 
details that are relevant to both fMRI experiments.  In the second section, a list 
of stimuli for all experiments is presented. 
 
2:1:1  MNI Coordinates 
The averaged Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) (Friston et al., 1995) 
coordinates (Table 2.1) were selected as the centres of 10mm and 8mm radius 
spherical ROIs for second level fMRI analyses.  They were taken from 
published literature of previous research and validated using PickAtlas 
(Maldjian et al., 2003).   
Anatomical location of cluster x y Z 
  
Amygdala ±24 -3 -19 
ACC ±12 28 20 
mPFC ±16 52 0 
OFC ±48 30 -6 
DLPFC ±46 38 -10 
Parahippocampus ±20 -36 -11 
Fusiform Gyrus ±34 -48 -20 
Insula ±36 12 8 
STG ±58 4 -4 
  Table 2.1  Second level MNI coordinates 
 
 This analysis was first conducted using a sphere of 10mm radius, but 
there was a concern that this radius was quite large and may include areas that 
are not relevant, which means that the average effect size might be quite small, 
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(i.e. a 10mm radius gives a sphere of 155 voxels using a voxel size of 
3x3x3mm), therefore a second analysis was performed using an 8mm radius 
giving a sphere of 79 voxels, which is a fair balance between sensitivity and 
accuracy.   
 
2:1:2  fMRI Data Acquisition 
 
Brain images were acquired using a 3 Tesla Siemens Trio MRI scanner with an 
8 channel array head coil.  This scanner is located at Royal Holloway 
University of London2.    
 In order to present stimuli and obtain responses with some precision the 
Cogent 2000 toolbox was used3 (LON Cogent 2000 team and Romaya, 2000) 
(http://www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent) and was added to the MATLAB toolbox 
(MATLAB Inc, 2002) (http://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab).  The 
Cogent output in the form of a log file was obtained from every participant and 
each was carefully checked to verify the actual block and scan timings.  Where 
a log file identified errors in presentation or scans these participant data were 
eliminated.  This would have included occasions when images were not 
displayed for the correct period of time.   
 The stimulus display was controlled from a Sony Vaio laptop computer 
connected to the scanner, from which synchronised pulses effected stimulus 
changes.  It needs to be noted that with the screen resolution used, the refresh 
rate of the laptop was 60Hz, which may have provided an actual image display 
time of 16.6˙ms where the design required a target display time of 10ms.  This 
is still considered to be near or below conscious awareness.  However, every 
precaution was taken to increase accuracy of image display timings.  First, the 
laptop displayed directly onto the projector with no intervening software.  To 
obtain the highest possible frame rate on the scanner projector, the laptop 
display was set to the external projector only, so that the laptop monitor was 
                                                 
2 Royal Holloway are part of the CUBIC (Combined Universities Brain Imaging Centre) 
consortium and have the largest share at 40%, whilst Brunel, Reading and Surrey universities 
own 20% each.  This research facility was largely funded from a Science Research Investment 
Fund (SRIF) grant.   
3 “This experiment was realised using Cogent 2000 developed by the Cogent 2000 team at the 
FIL and the ICN and Cogent Graphics developed by John Romaya at the LON at the Welcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience”  
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blank.  In addition, the windows task manager was used to update speed in 
Matlab to the highest priority. 
 The scanner employs an LCD projection system (Sanyo projector: 
Model: PLC-XP40L) that transmits the stimulus onto a screen located behind 
the participant’s head, reflected by a mirror mounted in the participants visual 
field with a viewing distance of 88cm. 
 In order to minimise excessive head movement, and to aid comfort, the 
participants, whilst lying supine in the scanner, were supported with foam 
wedges in the lateral space between the coil and their head. 
 An intercom system is installed to facilitate communication between 
the participant and control room.  In case of an emergency or breakdown in 
communication, an alarm button was available to the participant in the scanner 
at all times.  
    
 2:1:3  fMRI Design 
 
The dual image and masked experiments were block designs, whereby each 
unit or trial was presented to compare neural responses in a discrete epoch of 
time.  A series of trials were presented in blocks where a discrete emotional 
stimulus condition was maintained.  This paradigm accommodates many trials 
in a row and the signal acquired in each block is compared to signals from 
other blocks where different emotional stimuli are involved.  In addition to 
these ‘target’ blocks, as ‘baseline’ a rest condition of no stimulus was 
introduced.  This means that the block design alternates periods of activation 
(e.g. negative emotion stimuli A) and periods of rest (task B).  This method 
used with fMRI gives maximum BOLD signal and maximal signal-to-noise 
ratio, which refers to a signal of interest, (e.g. activation from stimulation), 
compared with ‘noise’ which is inescapable arbitrary differences in image 
intensity even when no stimulation is presented (Jezzard et al., 2001).   
 The decision to run these experiments as an explicit emotional 
categorisation task was to try to ensure as far as possible that the participants 
continuously attended to the pictures without distraction.   
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 2:1:4  fMRI Analysis 
 
Prior to functional image acquisition, high-resolution anatomical images for 
each participant were recorded in the same orientation as the functional data 
(see sections 4:3:4 and 5:3:4) to enable accurate location of individual brain 
activity.  In both the fMRI experiments in this study, anatomical images were 
acquired using an MP-RAGE three dimensional T1-weighted, gradient echo 
sequence (Mugler and Brookeman, 1990) (TR=1830ms; TE=4.43s; FoV 
256x256 mm) in which 176 1mm sagittal slices were obtained. 
 Statistical parametric mapping software SPM2 (Friston and Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, 2003) (http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) 
was used for the statistical processing, which was implemented in MATLAB.   
Prior to the statistical analysis, the data files or time series (a series of images 
in time) were converted from Digital Imaging and Communications in 
Medicine (DICOM) format, realigned to ensure spatial alignment in case of 
slight participant movement.  Where translation was greater than 2mm and/or 
more than 2° rotation during acquisition, the participants’ data sets were 
discarded.  All functional images were then coregistered with the anatomical 
images for accurate individual neuroanatomical alignment.  These were then 
normalised (once only for each participant) into an averaged anatomical space 
to facilitate comparison and deduction (by warping functional and anatomical 
images to fit a standard brain template).  These data were not spatially 
smoothed as this would introduce blurring which would defeat the constructs 
of the chosen ROIs in these experiments (Huettal et al., 2004).  
 After pre-processing, using SPM2, the experimental design was 
convolved with a haemodynamic response function (hrf) to model the 
haemodynamic lag in the BOLD response. 
 The basic statistical assumption used was the cognitive subtraction 
method, whereby the activations in blood oxygenation related to local changes 
in neural activity associated with task A (emotional response) were subtracted 
from those in task B (control).  This, in theory, identifies cortical regions 
involved in task A.   
 However, the subtraction method has been criticised in that conditions 
employed may elicit several different signal changes (Jezzard et al., 2001).  To 
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take account of this possible disadvantage, every effort was made to make the 
conditions identical in every aspect apart from the point of interest.   
 For the sake of comparison, the same ROIs and MNI coordinates were 
investigated for both fMRI experiments.  An exploratory first level analysis 
was performed across nine ROIs utilising PickAtlas (Maldjian et al., 2003) 
with a significance level of p<0.05 using value adjustments family-wise error 
(FWE) to estimate the fixed effects of the experimental conditions on each 
participant.  This was followed by second level analysis using MarsBar toolbox 
for SPM2 (Brett et al., 2002) (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net).  Using the 
general linear model, a group random effects analysis was carried out 
measuring the level of activations in the sphere of 8mm radius centred around 
the averaged ROI symmetrical coordinates as defined by MNI, which were 
chosen from previous research (see section 2:1:1).   
 The statistic table for the output from MarsBar provides (for each ROI) 
a contrast value, a t-statistic, an uncorrected one-tailed p-value for this t-
statistic, and a corrected p-value (corrected for the number of ROIs in the 
analysis).  The data used as input for the second level analysis is the contrast 
value.   
 “For a t-statistic, contrast value is an effect size…. A t-
statistic consists of an effect size divided by the standard 
deviation of this effect……. (the contrast values are the same as 
the value of the parameters in the visual event).  The value of 
these parameters will be the best-fitting slope of the line relating 
the height of the hrf regressor to the fmri signal.  This effect size 
measure is the number that SPM stores for each voxel in the 
con_0001.img, con_0002.img…series, and these are the values 
that are used for standard second level / random effect analyses”.  
MarsBaR-development tutorial http://marsbar.sourceforge.net   
 
2:2  Stimuli - International Affective Picture System (IAPS) 
 
Neuroimaging studies have shown variable neuronal activations when studying 
visual emotion-laden stimuli.  This may be due to the diverse selection of 
uncalibrated stimuli employed to evoke an emotional response.  In the present 
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study, the content of stimuli is balanced with regard to emotional meaning, 
using two determining factors: valence (negative value of things to be avoided 
or positive value of things that are appealing); and arousal (level of sensory 
excitability) content.  This was achieved by using a calibrated, standardised set 
of pictures of various emotion inducing animals, faces, scenes and inanimate 
objects from the IAPS collection (Center for the Study of Emotion and 
Attention [CSEA-NIMH], 2001).  The valence and arousal IAPS ratings are set 
at 9 for positive valence or high arousal and 1 for negative valence or low 
arousal.  An experiment using the complete range of valence scores found a 
linear correlation with BOLD signal continuum in the PFC and insula, thus 
supporting the IAPS sliding rating system of positive and negative stimuli 
(Heinzel et al., 2005).   
 The IAPS series has been used as an emotionally evocative inducer for 
a wide range of behavioural and neuroimaging studies, results of which 
correlate with physiological measures such as SCR (Lang et al., 1993), and 
enjoys the reputation of reliability and ecological validity by facilitating the 
comparison of results, replication between studies and tighter experimental 
control when selecting real photographic visual stimuli.   
 The pictures varied in magnification, colour, viewing angle, luminance 
and spatial frequency in accordance with everyday vision.  These variations are 
consistent with a previous study using high-speed presentations of emotional 
visual stimuli, which found that affective discrimination was unconnected with 
the image properties listed above as well as complexity (Junghofer et al., 
2001).  Equally, the presentation of each set of stimuli in the present study was 
not influenced by prior familiarity as the participants had not been exposed to 
the pictures before (NB different IAPS pictures were used in the pre-
experimental briefing).   
 It has been argued that there are two main dimensions to emotional 
experience – valence and arousal (Watson and Tellegen, 1985).  Equally, it is 
postulated that these primary dimensions may be controlled by different neural 
systems (Heller, 1993).  As this is a study researching valence effect, only 
levels of valence were manipulated.  Therefore, levels of arousal were 
equalised between high and low valence stimuli and remained consistent in the 
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three studies described (see Table 2.2).  The neutral images used as controls 
were low in arousal and intermediate in valence.     
 The level of arousal for the target stimuli were set moderately high 
(5.00 – 7.21), which is not the highest rating.  This was because images 
calibrated for very high arousal were of erotica (positive) and body mutilations 
(negative), and as the participants were drawn from a cross section of society 
(e.g. various ages and religious backgrounds), ethically it was decided not to 
use those that may cause discomfort or offence.  Therefore, moderately high 
arousal images were used.  
  
2:2:1  Images Used - Behavioural Experiment 
 
The stimuli consisted of 24 pictures.  The two conditions were twelve images 
of high valence (> 6) and high arousal (5.00-7.21) plus twelve low valence (< 
4) and high arousal (5.00-7.21).  In addition 24 neutral pictures were chosen 
with valence (v) of (4 < v < 6) and low arousal (< 5) (Table 2.2) (Lang et al., 
2001).   
 All emotional stimuli were presented at short exposure (10 ms) and 
were masked before and after each presentation (mask duration 150 ms).  The 
pre-mask and post-mask stimuli were different neutral pictures, paired at 
random.  They were used as a pair twice, once masking a pleasant picture and 
once masking an unpleasant.  This counterbalancing was to avert the possibility 
of the emotional response to specific neutral pictures influencing the 
pleasant/unpleasant decision overall.  Therefore, 24 neutral pictures (12 pairs) 
were used twice to mask the 24 emotional targets.   
 Twelve different neutral pictures (6 pairs) were used in the control 
condition.  The control condition consisted of a pair of masking stimuli without 
the intervening emotional target (control duration 150 ms each). These neutral 
pictures were also randomised and repeated twice to ensure that the 
participants did not identify that the control condition was different from the 
experimental condition (Table 2.2).  For further explanation of this 
experimental design see section 3:3:2.     
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Description Slide 
Number 
Valence 
Mean  
Valence 
SD 
Arousal 
Mean 
Arousal 
SD 
Category and 
Valence 
Puppies   1710 8.34 1.12 5.41 2.34 Animal (HVa) 
Jaguar    1650 6.65 2.25 6.23 1.99 HVa  
Monkeys    1811 7.62 1.59 5.12 2.25 HVa 
Att Female  4250 6.79 2.05 5.16 2.76 Face (HVf) 
Baby 2071 7.86 1.32 5.00 2.34 HVf  
Athletes 8380 7.56 1.55 5.74 2.32 HVf 
Skier 8190 8.10 1.39 6.28 2.57 Scenes (HVs) 
Skydivers  5621 7.57 1.42 6.99 1.95 HVs  
Waterfall  5260 7.34 1.74 5.71 2.53 HVs 
Money   8501 7.91 1.66 6.44 2.29 Inanimate (HVi) 
Icecream 7270 7.53 1.73 5.76 2.21 HVi  
Fireworks 5480 7.53 1.63 5.48 2.35 HVi 
Shark 1932 3.85 2.11 6.47 2.20 Animal (LVa) 
Attack Dog 1525 3.09 1.72 6.51 2.25 LVa 
Snake 1050 3.46 2.15 6.87 1.68 LVa 
Baby Tumour 3170 1.46 1.01 7.21 1.99 Face (LVf) 
Angry Face 2120 3.34 1.91 5.18 2.52 LVf 
Batt Female 3180 1.92 1.13 5.77 2.21 LVf 
Bomb 9630 2.96 1.72 6.06 2.22 Scenes (LVs) 
Air Crash   9611 2.71 1.95 5.75 2.44 LVs 
Car Crash 9911 2.30 1.37 5.76 2.10 LVs 
Toilet 9301 2.26 1.56 5.28 2.46 Inanimate (LVi) 
Elect Chair    6020 3.41 1.98 5.58 2.01 LVi 
Flies on Pie 7360 3.59 1.95 5.11 2.25 LVi 
Lamp               7175 4.87 1.00 1.72 1.26 Neutral/Mask 
Chair              7235 4.96 1.18 2.83 2.00 Neutral/Mask 
Bowl               7006 4.88 0.99 2.33 1.67 Neutral/Mask 
Tissue         7950 4.94 1.21 2.28 1.81 Neutral/Mask 
Book 7090 5.19 1.46 2.61 2.03 Neutral/Mask 
Clothes Rack 7217 4.82 0.99 2.43 1.64 Neutral/Mask 
Abstract Art 7185 4.97 0.87 2.64 2.04 Neutral/Mask 
Trash Can 7060 4.43 1.16 2.55 1.77 Neutral/Mask 
Towel 7002 4.97 0.97 3.16 2.00 Neutral/Mask 
Clock 7190 5.55 1.34 3.84 2.06 Neutral/Mask 
Mug 7035 4.98 0.96 2.66 1.82 Neutral/Mask 
Stool 7025 4.63 1.17 2.71 2.20 Neutral/Mask 
Baskets 7041 4.99 1.12 2.60 1.78 Neutral/Mask 
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Beads 7207 5.15 1.46 3.57 2.25 Neutral/Mask 
Cabinet 7705 4.77 1.02 2.65 1.88 Neutral/Mask 
Abstract Art 7184 4.84 1.02 3.66 1.89 Neutral/Mask 
Mushroom 5510 5.15 1.43 2.82 2.18 Neutral/Mask 
Mug 7009 4.93 1.00 3.01 1.97 Neutral/Mask 
Hair Dryer 7050 4.93 0.81 2.75 1.80 Neutral/Mask 
Shoes 7038 4.82 1.20 3.01 1.96 Neutral/Mask 
Mushrooms 5533 5.31 1.17 3.12 1.92 Neutral/Mask 
Fork 7080 5.27 1.09 2.32 1.84 Neutral/Mask 
Fire Hydrant 7100 5.24 1.20 2.89 1.70 Neutral/Mask 
Abstract Art 7187 5.07 1.02 2.30 1.75 Neutral/Mask 
Shadow 2880 5.18 1.44 2.96 1.94 Neutral/Control  
Umbrella   7150 4.72 1.00 2.61 1.76 Neutral/Control  
Basket             7010 4.94 1.07 1.76 1.48 Neutral/Control  
Clock 7211 4.81 1.78 4.20 2.40 Neutral/Control  
Rolling Pin 7000 5.00 0.84 2.42 1.79 Neutral/Control  
Light Bulb 7236 5.64 1.31 3.79 2.24 Neutral/Control  
Shoes 7031 4.52 1.11 2.03 1.51 Neutral/Control  
Light Bulb 7170 5.14 1.28 3.21 2.05 Neutral/Control  
Still Life 5535 4.81 1.52 4.11 2.31 Neutral/Control  
Rug 7179 5.06 1.05 2.88 1.97 Neutral/Control 
Pole 7161 4.98 1.02 2.98 1.99 Neutral/Control  
Agate 7830 5.26 1.38 4.08 2.11 Neutral/Control  
Table 2.2  Ratings of IAPS stimuli – behavioural experiment.  Valence and arousal measures of 
IAPS pictures used for the behavioural experiment. (Lang et al., 2001). 
Key:  HV = High Valence; LV = Low Valence; Att = Attractive; Batt = Battered; Elect = 
Electric.   
 
 2:2:2  Images Used - Masked fMRI Experiment 
 
To ensure consistency, the same IAPS pictures (Lang et al., 2001) were used as 
emotional targets as those in the behavioural experiment, and categorised as 
animals, faces, scenes and inanimate objects.  In masked stimulus blocks, each 
target was presented for 10ms (see section 2:1:2) and was masked by 2 neutral 
stimuli presented for 1s each.  Three repetitions of this target picture 
combination occurred within a block, each separated by 2s blanks, with 
different targets having the same valence type.  However, additional IAPS 
pictures were needed for the second normal viewing condition, in which the 
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presentation time of the emotional stimuli was 1.01s (forward masked by 
neutral stimuli for 1s), but the same block structure, categories, valence and 
arousal measures were maintained (Table 2.3) (Lang et al., 2001).  The masked 
blocks were followed by two randomised normal viewing blocks, each 
separated by a 3s blank to ensure return to baseline level.  For more detail of 
this experimental design see section 4:3:2. 
 
Description Slide 
Number 
Valence 
Mean  
Valence 
SD 
Arousal 
Mean 
Arousal 
SD 
Category and 
Valence 
Coyote   1640 6.16 1.88 5.18 1.93 Animal (HVa) 
Lion        1720 6.79 1.56 5.32 1.82 HVa  
Jaguars   1722 7.04 2.02 5.22 2.49 HVa 
Baby 2058 7.91 1.26 5.09 2.48 Face (HVf) 
Romance 4601 6.82 1.22 5.08 2.01 HVf  
Tennis Player 8350 7.18 1.56 5.18 2.28 HVf 
Mountains 5660 7.27 1.59 5.07 2.62 Scene (HVs) 
Mountains 5600 7.57 1.48 5.19 2.70 HVs  
Liftoff 5450 7.01 1.60 5.84 2.40 HVs 
Sports Car 8531 7.03 1.50 5.41 2.15 Inanimate (HVi) 
Money 8502 7.51 1.72 5.78 2.49 HVi 
French Fries 7460 6.81 2.08 5.12 2.49 HVi 
Spider 1200 3.95 2.22 6.03 2.38 Animal (LVa) 
Roaches 1274 3.17 1.53 5.39 2.39 LVa 
Snake 1120 3.79 1.93 6.93 1.68 LVa 
Toddler 2095 1.79 1.18 5.25 2.34 Face (LVf) 
Eye Disease 3160 2.63 1.23 5.35 1.79 LVf 
Batt Female 3181 2.30 1.43 5.06 2.11 LVf 
Ship 9600 2.48 1.62 6.46 2.31 Scene (LVs) 
Fire 9495 3.34 1.75 5.57 2.00 LVs 
Ruins 9470 3.05 1.51 5.05 1.98 LVs 
Aimed Gun 6260 2.44 1.54 6.93 1.93 Inanimate (LVi) 
Dirty 9300 2.26 1.76 6.00 2.41 LVi 
Bomb 2692 3.36 1.61 5.35 2.19 LVi 
Checkerboard  7182 5.16 1.31 4.02 2.12 Neutral 
Shadow 2880 5.18 1.44 2.96 1.94 Neutral 
Mug 7009 4.93 1.00 3.01 1.97 Neutral 
Hair Dryer 7050 4.93 0.81 2.75 1.80 Neutral 
Baskets 7041 4.99 1.12 2.60 1.78 Neutral 
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Shoes 7038 4.82 1.20 3.01 1.96 Neutral 
Fire Hydrant 7100 5.24 1.20 2.89 1.70 Neutral 
Pole 7161 4.98 1.02 2.98 1.99 Neutral 
Light Bulb 7170 5.14 1.28 3.21 2.05 Neutral 
Clock 7190 5.45 1.34 3.84 2.06 Neutral 
Rug 7179 5.06 1.05 2.88 1.97 Neutral 
Scarves 7205 5.56 1.39 2.93 2.16 Neutral 
Light Bulb 7236 5.64 1.31 3.79 2.24 Neutral 
Clothes Rack 7217 4.82 0.99 2.43 1.64 Neutral 
Checkerboard 7183 5.58 1.39 3.78 2.19 Neutral 
Stool 7025 4.63 1.17 2.71 2.20 Neutral 
Fan 7020 4.97 1.04 2.17 1.71 Neutral 
Table 2.3  Ratings of IAPS stimuli – masked experiment.  Valence and arousal measures of  
additional IAPS pictures used for the fMRI masked experiment. (Lang et al., 2001) 
Key:  HV = High Valence; LV = Low Valence; Att = Attractive; Batt = Battered; Elect = 
Electric.   
 
 2:2:3  Images Used – Dual Image Experiment 
 
To ensure a direct comparison with the behavioural and first fMRI experiment, 
exactly the same target IAPS images were used for the dual image experiment 
(Table 2.4).  Therefore all three experiments used the same target images, apart 
from the additional normal viewing images used in the masked experiment 
(Table 2.3).   
 A block consisted of three neutral images (1s duration each) separated 
by a 1s blank, this was followed by a 2s blank and three target images of the 
same valence and arousal (again 1s duration each).  Each block was 
randomised and presented three times as different conditions – control 
condition one - large-field, control condition two - small-field and the 
experimental condition: - dual image.  For greater detail of this experimental 
design see section 5:3:2.   
 
Description Slide 
Number 
Valence 
Mean  
Valence 
SD 
Arousal 
Mean 
Arousal 
SD 
Category and 
Valence 
Puppies  1710 8.34 1.12 5.41 2.34 Animal (HVa) 
Jaguar    1650 6.65 2.25 6.23 1.99 HVa  
Monkeys  1811 7.62 1.59 5.12 2.25 HVa 
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Att Female 4250 6.79 2.05 5.16 2.76 Face (HVf) 
Baby 2071 7.86 1.32 5.00 2.34 HVf  
Athletes 8380 7.56 1.55 5.74 2.32 HVf 
Skier 8190 8.10 1.39 6.28 2.57 Scenes (HVs) 
Skydivers  5621 7.57 1.42 6.99 1.95 HVs  
Waterfall  5260 7.34 1.74 5.71 2.53 HVs 
Money     8501 7.91 1.66 6.44 2.29 Inanimate (HVi) 
Icecream 7270 7.53 1.73 5.76 2.21 HVi  
Fireworks 5480 7.53 1.63 5.48 2.35 HVi 
Shark 1932 3.85 2.11 6.47 2.20 Animal (LVa) 
Attack Dog 1525 3.09 1.72 6.51 2.25 LVa 
Snake 1050 3.46 2.15 6.87 1.68 LVa 
Baby Tumour 3170 1.46 1.01 7.21 1.99 Face (LVf) 
Angry Face 2120 3.34 1.91 5.18 2.52 LVf 
Batt Female 3180 1.92 1.13 5.77 2.21 LVf 
Bomb 9630 2.96 1.72 6.06 2.22 Scenes (LVs) 
Air Crash   9611 2.71 1.95 5.75 2.44 LVs 
Car Crash 9911 2.30 1.37 5.76 2.10 LVs 
Toilet 9301 2.26 1.56 5.28 2.46 Inanimate (LVi) 
Elec Chair  6020 3.41 1.98 5.58 2.01 LVi 
Flies on Pie 7360 3.59 1.95 5.11 2.25 LVi 
Umbrella   7150 4.72 1.00 2.61 1.76 Neutral 
Lamp   7175 4.87 1.00 1.72 1.26 Neutral 
Cabinet    7705 4.77 1.02 2.65 1.88 Neutral 
Plate  7233 5.09 1.46 2.77 1.92 Neutral 
Chair  7235 4.96 1.18 2.83 2.00 Neutral 
Dustpan  7040 4.69 1.09 2.69 1.93 Neutral 
Spoon     7004 5.04 0.60 2.00 1.66 Neutral 
Bowl      7006 4.88 0.99 2.33 1.67 Neutral 
Basket   7010 4.94 1.07 1.76 1.48 Neutral 
Tissue   7950 4.94 1.21 2.28 1.81 Neutral 
Clock 7211 4.81 1.78 4.20 2.40 Neutral 
Ironing Board 7234 4.23 1.58 2.96 1.90 Neutral 
Book 7090 5.19 1.46 2.61 2.03 Neutral 
Clothes Rack 7217 4.82 0.99 2.43 1.64 Neutral 
Rolling Pin 7000 5.00 0.84 2.42 1.79 Neutral 
Light Bulb 7236 5.64 1.31 3.79 2.24 Neutral 
Abstract Art 7185 4.97 0.87 2.64 2.04 Neutral 
Trash Can 7060 4.43 1.16 2.55 1.77 Neutral 
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Towel 7002 4.97 0.97 3.16 2.00 Neutral 
Shoes 7031 4.52 1.11 2.03 1.51 Neutral 
Abstract Art 7186 4.63 1.60 3.60 2.36 Neutral 
Clock 7190 5.55 1.34 3.84 2.06 Neutral 
Iron 7030 4.69 1.04 2.99 2.09 Neutral 
Mug 7035 4.98 0.96 2.66 1.82 Neutral 
Table 2.4  Ratings of IAPS stimuli – dual image experiment.  Valence and arousal measures of 
IAPS pictures used for the fMRI dual image experiment.  (Lang et al., 2001).   
Key:  HV = High Valence; LV = Low Valence; Att = Attractive; Batt = Battered; Elect = 
Electric.   
  
2:3  Ethical Considerations 
 
The research was carried out in accordance with Brunel University’s ethical 
guidelines and procedures for research involving human participants: 
http://intranet.brunel.ac.uk/registry/minutes/researchethics/ethicsguidelinesv2.p
df and was given ethical approval by the Research Ethics Committee of the 
Brunel University School of Social Sciences. 
 Additionally, the conduct of fMRI experiments was in accordance with 
the Rules of Operation of the Combined University’s Brain Imaging Centre 
(Rules of Operation is an internal document dated 2002 which was also 
approved by the Brunel Ethics Committee) (Appendix I).  It was also made 
clear to the participants that the fMRI experiment was for research purposes 
only and should not be substituted for medical opinion.   
 The nature of the experiments was thoroughly explained and informed 
consent obtained.  During the briefings, participants were informed of the non-
invasive nature of fMRI.  It was emphasised that some of the images may be 
unpleasant and the participants could withdraw at any time.  The very high 
arousal images for both pleasant (erotica) and unpleasant (bodily mutilations) 
categories were also removed so as not to cause offence.   
 These experiments were conducted in accordance with all the principles 
outlined in the British Psychological Society Code of Conduct (BPS, 2000).   
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2:4  Notes on Participants 
 
All the participants were healthy adults from a wide range of backgrounds with 
ages ranging from 16 years to 75 years with normal or corrected to normal 
vision.   
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Chapter 3  Behavioural Experiment: 
Valence discrimination of complex affective stimuli,  
with and without conscious awareness of detection 
 
3:1  Abstract 
 
The response valence to 24 different images of complex visual stimuli was 
measured in a backward and forward masking paradigm by asking participants 
to classify the overall impression as pleasant or unpleasant.  Employing 
previously calibrated IAPS stimuli, the IAPS stimulus valence rating predicted 
the identification of pleasant versus unpleasant overall impression, but a 
response bias in favour of pleasant responses was found.  However, the 
findings also confirmed that even when the presence of the target was not 
consciously detected (subliminal processing), valence discrimination was 
significant for the majority of stimuli.  In addition, confidence ratings were 
acquired, but it was found that confidence in impression was not strongly 
correlated with accuracy in processing valence.  Although responses differed 
from the IAPS prediction for some of the images, it was concluded that this 
present paradigm was robust and suitable to be used in a follow-up fMRI study.   
 
3:2  Introduction 
 
A forward and backward masking experiment was carried out to establish if it 
is possible to detect the presence of the target picture, and discriminate its 
valence using a wide range of 24 natural images.   
 Stimuli compete for processing resources when common characteristics 
put demands on the same brain regions.  For instance, when two stimuli are 
rapidly presented sequentially in the same spatial proximity, the processing of 
one interferes with the other.  As a consequence, this phenomenon has been 
exploited in visual masking paradigms.  The most popular of these paradigms 
is that of backward masking, where the second stimulus, the mask, reduces or 
totally ‘masks’ the conscious perception of the first stimulus, the target.   
(Breitmeyer and Ogmen, 2000, VanRullen and Koch, 2003b).  However, 
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although detection of the target stimuli may have been prevented, it can still be 
subliminally processed at a significant level (Koch, 2004).   
 Backward masking was employed in the present study, but to achieve 
even greater temporal restraints, a forward masking image was also introduced 
as a contaminating factor in the preliminary processing of the target image.  
The hypothesis is that information processing proceeds in microgenetic stages, 
where the initial presentation of a stimulus to the cognitive percept of the said 
stimulus is made up of ‘bottom-up’ processing stages that are not conscious 
(Flavell and Draguns, 1957).  Thus, the mask image (presented first) modifies 
the microgenesis of the target image (presented second), by interfering in the 
integration period of processing the target (Bachmann et al., 2004).  Efron 
(1973) demonstrated the concept of an integration period in an experiment, 
presenting a red disk for 10ms rapidly followed by a green disk also for 10ms.  
Participants reported seeing a single yellow disk instead of two separate disks 
of different colours.  Thus the temporal parameters of Efron’s experiment 
blended two stimuli into a unitary yellow image, implying an integration period 
(Efron, 1973).  Moreover, there is a great deal of evidence to support automatic 
feedforward processing in the visual system (Delorme and Thorpe, 2001, 
Thorpe et al., 1996).    
 The temporal parameters for the presentations of the overt (masks and 
controls) and covert (target) stimuli were established from previous studies.  
VanRullen and Koch used a backward masking paradigm to determine that 
selective motor responses can be achieved with stimuli presented for only 
26ms (VanRullen and Koch, 2003b).  In addition, Phillips and colleagues 
established a discrimination threshold (the point at which an emotion could be 
discriminated) of 30ms and a detection threshold (the point at which a target 
could be detected) of 10ms using backward masking, exploring facial 
expressions of fear and disgust (Phillips et al., 2004).  Thus, in order to ensure 
strict temporal restraints, a critical time period was set at target presentation 
time of 10ms (see section 2:1:2) with both forward and backward masks of 
150ms each.  Therefore, the combination of very short target stimulus duration 
and heavy masking was to weaken the strength of the target stimulus to below 
the threshold of conscious perception.   
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 A concurrent detection task determined whether one, two or three 
images were seen and this was recorded with self-report questionnaires 
(Appendix II) to ascertain if the participants were aware of a target image.  The 
answer ‘two’ was taken as indication that a target was successfully presented 
below conscious threshold and the answer ‘three’ meant that the stimulus was 
‘seen’ and therefore above conscious threshold.  However, each participant 
could have used a different criterion to report perception with or without 
awareness, for example they may have approached this experiment cautiously 
and reported that they were unaware of a stimulus unless they were completely 
aware, conversely they may report awareness when they were only partially 
aware or ‘felt’ there was a third stimulus (Cheesman and Merikle, 1986).  In 
order to assess these graded levels of awareness, a confidence rating was 
employed to measure how confident they were of having seen (or not seen) a 
third image.  To assess the perception of valence, a single-interval forced-
choice discrimination task was introduced, asking whether the images were 
pleasant or unpleasant.  Higher than chance levels of concordant identification 
of valence, in the absence of reported detection of the third (target) stimulus, 
was taken as the operational definition of perception without awareness.   
 Response bias, however, is still an issue in forced-choice single-interval 
designs, as the participants could have a pleasant or unpleasant disposition. For 
this reason, control stimuli were included in which the target was absent but the 
neutral masks were present.  Control trials on which the participant saw only 
two images (correct rejections) could be compared with target-present trials on 
which the participant saw only two IAPS-neutral mask images (misses).  The 
response bias could then be assessed by the proportion of pleasant and 
unpleasant responses to the correct control trials.   
 Additionally, subjective confidence ratings for each task were used to 
provide further analytical information on a) the level of conscious detection of 
the target and b) confidence in the overall impression of valence, the rationale 
being that the participants would not be fully confident of valence or number of 
images seen unless they are aware or partially aware of this information.  
Therefore, confidence ratings relate to degrees of certainty in accuracy, with a 
low score (i.e. 1) indicating that they were guessing their detection or 
discrimination response and a high score (i.e. 9) reflecting complete certainty 
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of response.  Conversely, if the confidence ratings varied randomly to 
concordant and discordant scores, there would be no evidence of awareness of 
the information and confidence would be unrelated to accuracy (Kunimoto et 
al., 2001).   
 Another potential problem with using IAPS ratings to determine 
whether a response is concordant or discordant is that emotional responses to 
pictures can be very individual. For instance, one participant described a low 
valence image of a rat as ‘cute’.  The data presented will be group data, so that 
individual variation will be addressed by standard statistical arguments, but to 
ensure that the participants’ responses to IAPS stimuli were comparable with 
published norms, post-hoc ratings of the stimuli were obtained.  
 The purpose of this first experiment is a) to evaluate if it is possible to 
measure subliminal processing using natural images; b) to test for any 
significant differences in valence; c) to assess if concordance is or is not an 
indication of perception below conscious threshold; and d) to enquire if 
confidence is a measure of subliminal perception.  The main hypotheses are as 
follows:   
H¹ Participants can discriminate between positive and 
negative valence masked stimuli, on trials when there is no 
detection of the presence of the target stimulus (subliminal 
trials).  
H² There is a difference in perception of positive and negative 
valence between subliminal and supraliminal visual 
stimuli.   
H³ Confidence ratings for detection of the target, and 
confidence ratings of target valence are both correlated 
with detection of the target.  
 
3:3  Method 
 
The details regarding stimuli used for this experiment are described in sections 
2:2 and 2:2:1. 
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 3:3:1  Participants 
 
217 participants completed this experiment: 39 male and 178 female, age range 
16 to 75 years (mean age 25.29 years) from a cross section of society.   
 
 3:3:2  Design 
 
The emotional targets were presented with an exposure time of 10ms (see 
section 2:1:2).  These were ‘sandwiched’ between a pre-mask and post-mask 
stimulus, each with an exposure time of 150ms (Figure 3.1).  The control 
condition consisted of 2 neutral stimuli each of which were presented for 
150ms (Figure 3.2).  The frame size for each picture was 485 x 349 pixels and 
designed in Jasc Paint Shop Pro 7 (Animation Shop 3.00, 2000) software 
(http://www.jasc.com).   
 The order of the presentation of stimuli were randomised and 
counterbalanced for valence (see 2:2:1).  It was also counterbalanced across the 
participants with 117 participants completing the first sequence and 100 
participants completing the same sequence, but in reverse order.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1  Experimental set of slides 
Key: ms = milliseconds 
 
 
 
 
Neutral 
Mask
150ms
150ms 
Neutral 
Mask 
Target 
10ms 
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Figure 3.2  Control set of slides. 
Key: ms = milliseconds 
 
 3:3:3  Procedure 
 
The experiment was thoroughly explained, with time for questions and 
answers, after which the participants were invited to leave if they felt unhappy 
with the procedure.  Consent forms (Appendix III) were then distributed, 
signed and collected before the experiment began.   
 The experiment was displayed either on a laptop computer or via a 
projector and each participant had a clear visual perspective of the stimuli. The 
experimenter had control of the timing of each trial, so that the participants had 
time to answer each question in the correct order.   
 In the first questionnaire (Appendix II) there were four questions for 
each image.  The first question asked “What was your overall impression - 
pleasant or unpleasant?”  The forced-choice design required the marking of one 
of two boxes - pleasant or unpleasant was then ticked.  A Likert scale of 1-9 
followed, measuring how confident they were with their answer.  The third 
question asked “How many images did you see?”  One of three boxes was then 
ticked - one, two or three.  Again a Likert scale of 1-9 for their confidence 
rating regarding this answer was presented.   There were two practice images 
before the experiment began, at which point there was an opportunity to ask 
more questions if unsure of the procedure.  The experiment then continued for 
36 trials (24 experimental trials and 12 control trials).   
Neutral 
Control
Neutral 
Control 
150ms
150ms
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 Once the experiment was completed, the individual slides were 
displayed on a Power Point presentation, so that each participant could rate the 
pictures themselves.  They were given a ‘ratings’ questionnaire (Appendix IV) 
that had three questions for each slide.  The first was “On a scale of 1-9, how 
pleasant or unpleasant did you find this image?  Please tick one of the 
following, 1 = very unpleasant, 9 = very pleasant”.  The same format was 
applied asking how arousing they found this image.  Thirdly, they were asked 
“Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? Yes / No / Not Sure”.  
Again, there were two practice trials to clarify understanding.  Thirty one 
images were then displayed individually, which included all of the target 
images and a sample of the neutral images.   
 Following the experimental procedure, a debriefing form (V) was 
distributed with more information on the nature of this research project, with 
an accompanying reading list.  An unrestricted question time was made 
available.   
 
3:4  Statistical Analysis 
 
For each target slide, the frequency (across participants) of pleasant and 
unpleasant responses was determined, both for those participants who saw two 
slides (target missed) and those who saw three slides (target seen).  Both sets of 
frequencies were then compared with expected values, which were the 
proportions (across participants and slides) of pleasant and unpleasant 
responses to the neutral-mask control slides (correct rejections).  One-sample 
Komolgorov-Smirnov tests were used for discrimination of valence and 
discrimination of target trials from control trials.   
 Since the data were categorical, Chi-square was calculated for each 
target slide in both two-seen and three-seen conditions using an online 
calculator (http://www.graphpad.com/quickcalcs/chisquared1.cfm).  The 
expected values used were the mean frequencies of valence response (pleasant 
and unpleasant) to the control stimulus set, across all participants, when two 
stimuli were seen.  This made it possible to ascertain if there was any 
discrimination of valence for each individual slide.  
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 Examination of valence response found some stimuli responses differed 
from the IAPS prediction.  As a result, and in order to test detectability of 
elements within the IAPS stimli, the saliency toolbox (Walther and Koch, 
2006) was employed using Matlab compatable software 
(http://www.saliencytoolbox..net).    
 To examine the relationship between the IAPS rating norms and the 
current participant sample’s ratings of the stimuli, Pearson correlation 
coefficient was used.   
 To analyse the confidence ratings, Univariate General Linear Model 
Analysis (UNIANOVA) was employed using SPSS (SPSS Inc, 2005-8) 
(https://www.spss.com).  In addition, Wilcoxon was used to test the mean 
detectability of the images and to calculate the response of individual slides 
ANOVA was used.  
  
3:5  Results 
 
The operational definition of subliminal perception adopted in this chapter was 
the perception of stimulus valence in the absence of detection of the stimulus.  
This was tested by examining the valence of the response (discrimination task) 
on those trials where three pictures were presented, but the participant reported 
seeing only two (detection task).  It was predicted that the valence of response 
on these trials will be influenced by the valence of the short-exposure stimulus.  
The null hypothesis (no subliminal perception) would predict that the 
proportion of negative and positive valence responses is the same whether the 
target is positive or negative in valence.   
 The small number of trials where participants report seeing one image 
were eliminated as it is likely that this was due to reporting errors.   
 
 3:5:1  Discrimination of Valence 
 
The overall impression of a trial (valence response) was coded as +1 for a 
‘pleasant’ response, and -1 for an ‘unpleasant’ response.  There was no neutral 
category of response.  Valence of response was averaged separately across all 
IAPS high valence target trials (IH) (Mean = 0.633), and all IAPS low valence 
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target trials (IL) (Mean = 0.141), whether or not the presence of the target was 
detected between the two neutral masks.  The mean valence of response was 
also measured for neutral mask control trials (CN) (Mean = 0.591), in which no 
target was present.  It was found, in one-sample Komolgorov-Smirnov tests, 
that the distributions of response valence deviated significantly from normal 
for all three trial types (IH: Z=2.8, p<0.00005; IL: Z=1.53, p<0.05; CN: 
Z=2.56, p<0.000005).   
 
 3:5:2  Discrimination of Target Trials from Control Trials 
 
The next question to be considered was whether the presence of the brief target 
slide on target trials could be discriminated reliably from its absence on control 
trials.  This was tested by asking participants to judge how many pictures were 
presented in a trial, thus the correct answer for target trials would be three, and 
for control trials two.  Misses would be indicated by the response two on a 
target trial, and false positives by the response three on a control trial.  This 
was averaged across all IAPS high valence target (IH) trials (Mean = 2.659), 
all IAPS low valence target (IL) trials (Mean = 2.601) and all neutral control 
nontarget (CN) trials (Mean = 2.060).  It is clear that the discriminability of 
target and nontarget trials is good.  The false positive rate is low (6%) and 
although more than 60% of target trials are detected, the level of missed targets 
is relatively high (34.1% IH, 39.9% IL).  Again, a one-sample Komolgorov-
Smirnov test showed significant departures from normality for all three 
variables (IH: Z=1.806, p<0.005; IL: Z=2.096, p<0.0001; CN: Z=4.73, 
p<0.0001).   
 
 3:5:3  Discrimination of Valence in Individual Images. 
 
For every individual observer, the response to a trial will fall into one of four 
categories: pleasant two pictures seen; pleasant three pictures seen; unpleasant 
two pictures seen; unpleasant three pictures seen.  As shown in Table 3.1, the 
frequency of responses concordant with the IAPS valence rating varies widely 
from slide to slide. It is not possible with this information alone to determine 
whether, for an individual slide, the obtained frequency of pleasant and 
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unpleasant responses reflects discrimination of stimulus valence, or whether it 
reflects response bias.   
 The control stimuli, however, provide an independent estimate of 
response bias, and this estimate can be used to provide expected values for the 
proportion of positive and negative valence responses.  It is reasonable to argue 
that control stimuli in which two stimuli are reported (i.e. excluding false 
positives) would be identical with target stimuli in which two stimuli are 
reported, unless the target is having a subliminal effect.  The control stimuli 
showed a surprisingly large bias towards pleasant responses.  For all control 
trials on which two stimuli were reported, the proportion of pleasant and 
unpleasant responses was measured.  The percentage of pleasant impressions, 
across all control slides and all participants, was 80.43% and the percentage of 
unpleasant impressions was 19.57%.   
 This allows us to estimate whether the observed frequencies of positive 
and negative valence responses to individual slides are significantly different 
from the expected (control) values, using a chi-square test with one degree of 
freedom.  In the supraliminal case, it is conceivable that the mere detection of 
the presence of a third slide (without detection of its contents), in itself affects 
the valence of response, but this factor should have equal effects, if any, on all 
slides.  Results for the target slide set are shown in Table 3.1, for both 
supraliminal (3 seen) and subliminal (2 seen) trials.   
 16/24 slides provide concordant discrimination of valence in the 
supraliminal condition, and 15/24 slides provide concordant discrimination of 
valence in the subliminal condition (Table 3.1 - yellow highlights indicate 
discordant responses).  This represents a greater than chance discrimination of 
response valence for stimuli on which the target is undetected (Table 3.1).   
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Frequency of pleasant and unpleasant impression responses 
with % concordance. 
Supraliminal (3 seen) Subliminal (2 seen) 
Slide Un-pl Pl % C Un-pl Pl % C 
6 HVA jaguar 13 121 90.3 8 73 90.1 
24 HVA puppies 6 177 96.7 4 29 87.9 
31 HVA monkeys 71 63 47.0 39 43 52.4 
10 LVA attack dog 57 29 66.3 67 61 52.3 
15 LVA  shark 16 102 13.6 10 87 10.3 
33 LVA snake 92 36 71.8 62 27 69.7 
18 HVF baby 13 163 92.6 7 34 82.9 
20 HVF athletes 11 175 94.1 2 28 93.3 
30 HVF att fem 31 148 82.7 11 26 70.3 
7 LVF batt female 106 74 58.9 21 14 60.0 
21 LVF angry man 161 28 85.2 17 11 60.7 
35 LVF baby tumour 96 55 63.6 7 55 11.3 
1 HVS skydivers 9 98 91.6 8 97 92.4 
19 HVS skier 54 48 47.1 63 50 44.2 
23 HVS waterfall 23 71 75.5 36 86 70.5 
2 LVS air crash 3 60 4.8 15 136 9.9 
8 LVS bomb 49 59 45.4 47 61 43.5 
25 LVS car crash 23 113 16.9 8 73 9.9 
4 HVI fireworks 6 142 95.9 7 59 89.4 
13 HVI money 8 106 93.0 14 89 86.4 
22 HVI ice cream 26 127 83.0 3 60 95.2 
11 LVI flies on pie 39 123 24.1 3 52 3.6 
26 LVI elec chair 40 71 36.0 44 62 41.5 
36 LVI toilet 91 34 72.8 40 49 44.9 
Table 3.1  Frequency of valence responses with % concordance. 
Key:   C = Concordant; Un-pl = Unpleasant; Pl = Pleasant; att = attractive; batt = battered; elec 
= electric. 
 
A significant chi-square indicates that the frequency of high valence and low 
valence responses differs from the expected value (mean frequency of high and 
low valence responses to control slides), and thus indicates that the trial’s 
valence can be distinguished from control.  The direction of the deviation from 
expected value indicates whether the discrimination is in the expected direction 
(concordant with IAPS rating) or in the opposite direction (Table 3.2).   
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Frequency of pleasant and unpleasant impression responses, relative to 
control (expected frequencies).  
ex = significant effect in expected direction (concordant with IAPS)  
op = significant effect in opposite direction (discordant with IAPS) 
 Supraliminal (3 seen) Subliminal (2 seen) 
 
Slide 
Chi- 
square p
 Chi- 
square p  
6 HVA jaguar 8.288 <0.005 ex 4.834 <0.05 ex 
24 HVA puppies 30.853 <0.0001 ex 1.163 n.s.  
31 HVA monkeys 95.073 <0.0001 op 40.825 <0.0001 op 
10 LVA attack dog 119.221 <0.0001 ex 87.363 <0.0001 ex 
15 LVA  shark 2.707 <0.1 op 5.283 <0.05 op 
33 LVA snake 222.508 <0.0001 ex 141.904 <0.0001 ex 
18 HVF baby 16.594 <0.0001 ex 0.162 n.s.  
20 HVF athletes 22.033 <0.0001 ex 3.173 <0.1 ex 
30 HVF att fem 0.576 n.s.  2.427 n.s.  
7 LVF batt female 176.821 <0.0001 ex 36.352 <0.0001 ex 
21 LVF angry man 517.028 <0.0001 ex 30.119 <0.0001 ex 
35 LVF baby tumour 185.806 <0.0001 ex 2.699 n.s.  
1 HVS skydivers 8.463 <0.005 ex 9.525 <0.005 ex 
19 HVS skier 72.179 <0.0001 op 94.001 <0.0001 op 
23 HVS waterfall 1.434 n.s.  7.659 <0.01 ex 
2 LVS air crash 6.514 <0.05 op 8.905 <0.005 op 
8 LVS bomb 45.683 <0.0001 ex 39.361 <0.0001 ex 
5 LVS car crash 0.610 n.s.  4.834 <0.05 op 
4 HVI fireworks 22.633 <0.0001 ex 3.368 <0.1 ex 
13 HVI money 11.409 <0.001 ex 2.337 n.s.  
22 HVI ice cream 0.644 n.s.  8.775 <0.005 ex 
11 LVI flies on pie 2.090 n.s.  6.961 <0.01 op 
26 LVI elec chair 19.126 <0.0001 ex 32.422 <0.0001 ex 
36 LVI toilet 225.046 <0.0001 ex 36.412 <0.0001 ex 
Table 3.2  Frequency of valence responses relative to control (expected frequencies). 
Key:  n.s. = not significant; ex = significant effect in expected direction (concordant with 
IAPS); op = significant effect in opposite direction (discordant with IAPS); p = significance 
level; att = attractive; batt = battered; elec = electric. 
 
Overall, 18/24 of the slides on supraliminal trials, and 17/24 of the slides on 
subliminal trials show significant valence discrimination at p<0.05, compared 
with controls.  However, on supraliminal trials, 4/24 slides (highlighted) are 
discriminated significantly from control trials but in the opposite direction to 
that predicted from IAPS valence.  On subliminal trials 6/24 slides 
(highlighted) are discriminated significantly from control, but in the opposite 
direction to that predicted from IAPS valence (Table 3.2).  A significant 
concordant effect in the expected direction for subliminal discrimination was 
observed for the following slides: (one tailed) HVA (jaguar); LVA (attack dog, 
snake); HVF (athletes); LVF (battered female, angry man); HVS (skydivers, 
waterfall); LVS (bomb); HVI (fireworks, ice cream); LVI (electric chair, toilet) 
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(Table 3.2).  The majority of these instances would survive a full Bonferroni 
correction for multiple comparisons (P<0.0021 two-tailed).  However, 
significant discrimination in the direction opposite to that predicted was found 
in a minority of slides: HVA (monkeys); LVA (shark); HVS (skier); LVS (air 
crash, car crash) and LVI (flies on pie) (Table 3.2).  It is possible to make a 
case (with hindsight) that each of these slides changes its visual characteristics 
at short exposure.  In the case of flies on pie and skier, the pie and snow (low 
spatial frequency) is more visible than the flies and skier (high spatial 
frequency) at brief exposures.  Equally, the image of the shark is in an unusual 
view, and out of its normal context as its head is exposed out of water in a 
‘pyramid’ shape.  In the case of monkeys, they are exposing teeth, and this may 
be a salient threat stimulus at brief exposure.  The air crash and car crash are 
scrambled stimuli – containing scattered parts – and may require scrutiny for 
recognition to occur.  However, these are all post hoc explanations.   
 It would seem, without any special pleading, that these anomalous 
images can be explained by two main types of explanation: either a failure to 
detect relevant features or misrepresentation.   However, we need some way of 
testing these ideas.  In order to test detectability of features or elements within 
these images, the saliency toolbox (Walther and Koch, 2006) was used to 
predict where automatic visual attention goes. This toolbox allows an 
implementation of a basic version of Itti & Koch’s (2001) model of visual 
attention (Itti and Koch, 2001) (see section 3:3).  The model starts by detecting 
low-level image features (colour, intensity and orientation) then passes these in 
parallel through opponent (centre-surround, normalising) operators that detect 
discontinuities in each feature type. These parallel streams are then linearly 
combined to produce a saliency map. To generate predictions of the scan path 
(sequence of fixations) the most salient location is selected (winner takes all). 
The next feature is selected by inhibition of return, and so on. The scan path is 
ultimately circular, returning to the first fixation when inhibition is decayed. 
The model predicts several aspects of human psychophysical and oculomotor 
performance (Itti and Koch, 2001). 
   It was hypothesised that emotive features were not detected in early 
fixations in the anomalous pictures.  However, the results revealed that in all 
six instances the relevant features were detected (by the model) at early 
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fixation (e.g. flies on pie – first fixation was a fly, skier – first fixation was a 
skier).  Rather than failing to detect emotive features, therefore, it is probable 
that the images were not identifiable under rapid presentations and as such 
were misrepresented. 
 In summary, concordant valence response was evident during target 
trials when only two images were reported, thus suggesting subliminal 
processing.  However, there were a minority of anomalies that were discordant 
in valence response.   
 
 3:5:4  Independent Ratings Evaluation 
 
Accuracy of concordant results could be influenced by each individual’s 
perception of the image, dependent on the said individual’s own cognitive 
schema. There may also be overall differences between the sample used in this 
study and the normative IAPS sample.  Therefore, to investigate group 
differences in emotion perception, the published IAPS ratings for each slide 
was compared to those of this experimental group.  The average ratings in the 
post experiment questionnaire (Appendix IV) were calculated and marginal 
differences were found with a number of images (Table 3.3).  However, it is 
worth re-iterating here that the images chosen for the experiment were rated in 
IAPS as high valence >6, high arousal >5; low valence, <4 high arousal >5; 
neutral valence >4 <6, low arousal <5 and the sample group complies with 
these criteria for valence, but with six images scoring slightly less than 5 for 
arousal.  Notwithstanding this, it has to be acknowledged that the post-
experiment scoring had the advantage of extended exposure time and does not 
indicate a ‘concordant or discordant’ response under subliminal conditions.  
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 Valence Arousal 
Images in Experiment Sample IAPS Sample IAPS 
Skydivers 6.99 7.57 5.11 6.99 
Air Crash 2.35 2.71 5.73 5.75 
Fireworks 7.41 7.53 5.46 5.48 
Jaguar 7.06 6.65 5.49 6.23 
Battered Female 2.03 1.92 5.64 5.77 
Bomb 2.90 2.96 5.18 6.06 
Attack Dog 2.41 3.09 6.08 6.51 
Flies On Pie 2.69 3.59 4.90 5.11 
Money 7.51 7.91 6.05 6.44 
Shark 2.95 3.85 5.62 6.47 
Baby 8.19 7.86 6.47 5.00 
Skier 7.27 8.1 5.55 6.28 
Athletes 6.81 7.56 4.84 5.74 
Angry Face 2.59 3.34 4.61 5.18 
Ice Cream 6.42 7.53 4.93 5.76 
Waterfall 7.38 7.34 5.97 5.71 
Puppies 7.82 8.34 6.20 5.41 
Car Crash 1.84 2.3 5.55 5.76 
Electric Chair 2.13 3.41 5.44 5.58 
Attractive Female 6.29 6.79 4.29 5.16 
Monkeys 6.06 7.62 4.76 5.12 
Snake 3.32 3.46 5.43 6.87 
Baby Tumour 1.42 1.46 6.72 7.21 
Toilet 1.33 2.26 6.08 5.28 
Neutral chair 5.27 4.96 2.22 2.83 
Neutral basket 5.38 4.94 2.31 1.76 
Neutral stool 4.77 4.63 2.33 2.71 
Neutral iron 4.42 4.69 2.47 2.99 
Neutral fork 4.83 5.27 2.39 2.32 
Neutral book 5.06 5.19 3.05 2.61 
Neutral hairdryer 4.96 4.93 2.70 2.75 
Table 3.3  Scores of average ratings post experiment. 
Key:     Sample Valence = Sample average valence score; Sample Arousal = Sample average 
arousal scores. 
 
The relationship between the sample ratings and IAPS ratings were further 
investigated using Pearson correlation coefficient.  There was a strong positive 
correlation between sample valence and IAPS valence (r= .97, n=31, 
p<0.0005) plus a strong positive correlation between sample arousal and IAPS 
arousal (r= .90, n=31, p<0.001).   
 Establishing that the experimental group ratings of the stimuli fall 
within the same ranges as those of the IAPS ratings, allows us to eliminate this 
as a possible explanation for any disparity in impression of the stimuli.    
However, it is possible that concordance is not the only measure of subliminal 
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processing.  Perhaps confidence in one’s answers is also an indication of 
subliminal perception.   
 
 3:5:5  Confidence Ratings: Analysis for Individual Slides 
 
Another way of looking at subliminal perception is to assume that there is no 
distinct ‘subliminal process’, but rather, there is a graded ability to process 
stimuli, and no fixed threshold.  It is possible to use confidence ratings to 
investigate this hypothesis.  If a subliminal stimulus is simply a weakly 
detected stimulus, for example, the observer’s confidence in the overall 
pleasant or unpleasant impression given by a trial should be higher when the 
target is detected.  Moreover, confidence in the overall pleasant or unpleasant 
impression given by a trial should be higher for ‘correct’ (concordant with 
IAPS rating) than ‘incorrect’ (discordant with IAPS rating) trials.   
 Participants were asked to rate how confident they were in their overall 
judgement of valence for the trial as a whole.  This measure is the valence 
‘impression confidence’ (coni).  A univariate analysis of variance was 
conducted for each individual slide.  The dependent variable was the 
confidence in the impression of valence (coni) and the independent variables 
were the response concordance (i.e. whether the response was concordant or 
discordant with the IAPS valence rating) and the number of pictures seen 
(2=subliminal, 3=supraliminal).  Significant main effects of response 
concordance on valence impression confidence were found in 11/24 slides, and 
significant main effects of number of pictures seen on valence impression 
confidence were found in 5/24 slides (confirming H²).  Significant interactions 
(response concordance x number of pictures seen) were found in 3/24 slides.  It 
was expected that valence impression confidence would be higher for 
concordant responses and seen targets, but there were exceptions to this.  For 
some low valence slides, confidence was higher for discordant responses 
(shark, air crash, car crash and electric chair).  This is because not only is there 
a response bias towards pleasant responses, there is also a confidence bias: 
other things being equal, confidence ratings are higher for pleasant responses 
(mean = 7.23) than unpleasant (mean = 6.66).  This may be an indication that 
more sensory information is required to feel confident in ones answer coupled 
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with a natural reluctance to report an unpleasant response; this is addressed in 
greater detail in the discussion.  Where subliminal and supraliminal trials differ 
in valence impression confidence, this is in the expected direction, with 
confidence being higher for seen trials.  However it is notable that valence 
impression confidence for the majority of trials does not seem to depend 
strongly on whether the target is seen.  Where there is an interaction, a strong 
relationship of valence impression confidence with concordance for 
supraliminal trials is matched with a weaker relationship in the opposite 
direction for subliminal trials (for summary see Appendix VI column 5).   
 Participants were also asked to rate how confident they were in their 
response to the question “how many pictures did you see?”  This measure is the 
‘seen confidence’ (cons).  A second UNIANOVA was carried out on 
confidence in how many seen (DV), with the same IVs.     
 Significant main effects of correct number seen on confidence in how 
many images seen (cons) and was found for 8 out of 24 images: athletes 
F(1,212) = 5.38, p<0.05; icecream F(1,212) = 5.62, p<0.05; puppies F(1,212) = 
12.26, p<0.001; car crash F(1,213) = 25.68, p<0.001; attractive female 
F(1,212) = 12.16, p<0.001; monkeys F(1,212) = 24.23, p<0.0005; snake 
F(1,213) = 11.68, p<0.001; and toilet F(1,210) = 7.60, p<0.01).   
  There were four images with a significant main effect concordant 
response on confidence in how many images seen: attack dog F(1,210) = 8.68, 
p<0.005; car crash F(1,213) = 5.30, p<0.05); electric chair F(1,213) = 4.84, 
p<0.05; toilet F(1,210) = 5.68, p<0.05.   
 Lastly, nine significant interactions were recorded for number seen x 
concordance on confidence in how many images seen: battered female 
F(1,211) = 11.19, p<0.001; bomb F(1,212) = 5.06, p<0.05; attack dog F(1,210) 
= 5.15, p<0.05; flies on pie F(1,213) = 6.79, p<0.01; baby F(1,213) = 5.40, 
p<0.05; angry man F(1,213) = 25.56, p<0.001; car crash F(1,213) = 11.13; 
p<0.005; attractive female F(1,212) = 5.33, p<0.05; toilet F(1,210) = 6.98; 
p<0.01.   
 Although coni and cons were moderately positively correlated with 
each other (mean spearman rho = 0.4 – 0.6), cons was less frequently predicted 
by concordant response (5/24) than was coni (11/24).  Conversely, the number 
 
 
 89
of images where cons was predicted by number of images seen (8/24) was 
slightly higher than for coni.   
 
 3:5:6  Conclusions from ANOVA of Individual Slides. 
 
As shown in section 3:5:3, the analysis of responses to individual slides 
(Appendix VI) shows that for particular slides there is clear evidence of 
valence discrimination, even when the presence of the slide is undetected.  In  
section 3:5:5 it is shown that for a substantial number of slides, the confidence 
in the overall impression of valence is increased for concordant relative to 
discordant responses.  However there are a number of exceptions or anomalies 
revealed by this analysis.  For certain slides, there is discrimination of valence, 
but in the opposite direction to that predicted by IAPS ratings (Section 3:5:3).  
Likewise for certain slides, the confidence in valence impression is higher for 
discordant relative to concordant responses (Section 3:5:5).  Three possible 
explanations for anomalies have been considered.  The first is that there is a 
response bias towards high valence responses, as is evident from the response 
to control trials.  The second is that the spatiotemporal properties of the visual 
system are such that the relative salience of different components or features of 
an image is changed by the brief presentation: most obviously there is a loss of 
high relative to low spatial frequency information.  The third explanation, 
however, using the saliency toolbox, identified misrepresentation as a possible 
reason for the anomalous results.   
 In the next section we consider whether (despite these anomalous 
responses to certain images) it is possible to draw general conclusions about 
the influence of valence and stimulus category on detection, discrimination of 
valence, and confidence ratings.   
 
3:6  Analysis of Response to Stimuli Grouped by Category and Valence.  
 
 3:6:1  Detectability of Stimuli (nseen).  
 
To determine the detectability of each stimulus, it is assumed that if two stimuli 
were seen (i.e. the two masks) the target was not detected.  If three stimuli were 
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seen, the target was detected.  Therefore the detectability of a stimulus is the 
‘number seen’ minus two.  This was averaged over categories and over 
participants to give the mean probability of detection (henceforth 
‘detectability’).  Of the a priori category differences in detectability Wilcoxon 
showed significant differences in detectability with faces seen more than 
animals (z = 8.225, N – Ties 56, p<0.0005),  faces seen more than scenes (z = 
10.507, N – Ties 41, p<0.001), faces seen more than inanimate objects (z = 
8.474, N – Ties 65, p<0.0005), animals seen more than scenes (z = 7.281, N – 
Ties 47, p<0.0005), and inanimate objects more than scenes (z = 7.927, N – 
Ties 55, p<0.0005).  Of the four categories, faces were substantially the most 
detectable, whilst scenes were the least (Figure 3.3).   
 However, it was only for the category of animals that there was a 
significant difference in the mean positive and negative detectability of valence 
(z = 7.954, N – Ties 90, p<0.0005).  There was no significant difference in the 
detectability of valence in the other three categories.  Therefore it is concluded 
that positive and negative valence stimuli in these categories may be 
considered matched in their average valence detectability (Figure 3.3).   
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Figure 3.3  Mean probability of target detection by category and valence.  
 
In Figure 3.3 the mean probability of detecting the target stimulus is shown on 
the Y axis.  It is assumed that if the number of stimuli seen (including the 
masks) is three, then the target has been detected (probability = 1), and if the 
number of stimuli seen (including the masks) is two, then the target has not 
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been detected (probability = 0). Probabilities are averaged across instances 
(slides) and participants for four categories of stimuli (X axis).  The two data 
series represent the high valence and low valence slides within each category.   
 
 3:6:2  Effects of Stimulus Detectability (nseen) on Seen Confidence 
(cons) and Valence Impression Confidence (coni). 
 
It will be expected that seen confidence will be high for trials on which the 
target is clearly detected, and low for trials on which the target is not clearly 
detected.  Thus there should be a positive correlation between detectability 
(nseen-2) and seen confidence. But what about valence impression confidence?  
If overall impression of valence depends on detecting the target, then there 
should be a positive correlation also between detectability and valence 
impression confidence.  The means (across all participants) and the standard 
errors of seen confidence and valence impression confidence were determined 
for every target slide and are shown in Figure 3.4.  There was a positive 
correlation in each case, but the association between detectability and seen 
confidence (r2 = 0.85) was much stronger than that between detectability and 
valence impression confidence (r2 = 0.4).   
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Figure 3.4  Mean confidence ratings for seen confidence and valence impression confidence.  
 
In Figure 3.4 the mean confidence ratings for stimulus detection (seen 
confidence) and for judgments of overall impression of valence (impression 
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confidence) are plotted as a function of the mean detectability (nseen – 2) of 
the target for the 24 target slides. Error bars = 1 S.E.M. 
 
 3:6:3  Effects of Stimulus Valence and Category on Seen 
Confidence (cons).  
 
To find out how seen confidence varied as a function of stimulus valence and 
stimulus category, seen confidence ratings differed for high and low valence 
stimuli for animals (Wilcoxon z = 7.366, N – Ties 30, p<0.005) and faces 
(Wilcoxon z = 2.232, N – Ties 76, p<0.05).  Scenes and inanimate objects 
showed no significant difference in seen confidence for high and low valence 
stimuli.  Therefore we can consider that high and low valence versions of these 
categories of stimuli are balanced with respect to the confidence ratings for 
detection.  As expected, the marginal means showed a similar pattern (Figure 
3.5) to that shown for detectability (Figure 3.3). 
 
6.5
7
7.5
8
8.5
animals faces scenes inanimate
category
co
nf
id
en
ce
hign valence
low valence
 
Figure 3.5  Mean confidence rating for the number of stimuli seen (including the masks) (Y 
axis).  Ratings are averaged across instances (slides) and participants for four categories of 
stimuli (X axis).  The two data series represent the high valence and low valence slides within 
each category.  
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 3:6:4  Effects of Stimulus Valence and Category on Overall 
Impression of Valence (imp). 
 
The overall impression of valence of a stimulus trial (consisting of a target plus 
masks) was analysed as a function of the IAPS valences and categories of the 
target slides.  The overall impression of valence (imp) was scored +1 for 
‘pleasant impression’ and -1 for ‘unpleasant impression’.  Means were then 
calculated across the three exemplar slides of each type (valence x category) 
for each participant, generating a four-point scale (+1, +0.33, -0.33, -1).  Data 
was averaged across both supraliminal (3 seen) and subliminal (2 seen) trials. 
The means are shown in Figure 3.6. Note that the difference in means is 
smaller (and in the opposite direction) for scenes.  Note also that there is an 
overall bias in favour of pleasant responses, as already discussed above.  
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Figure 3.6  Mean overall impression of valence (Y axis).  Valence responses are averaged 
across instances (slides) and participants for four categories of stimuli (X axis).  The two data 
series represent the high valence and low valence slides within each category. 
 
To test for differences in response to high and low valence Wilcoxon was used.  
Significant differences were found for animals (z = 9.294, N – Ties 65, 
p<0.0005), faces (z = 10.824, N – Ties 25, p<0.0005), scenes (z = 3.751, N – 
Ties 95, p<0.0000005) and inanimate objects (z = 9.707, N – Ties 64, 
p<0.0005).   
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 3:6:5  Effects of Stimulus Valence and Category on Confidence in 
the Overall Impression of Valence (coni). 
 
Finally, Wilcoxon tests were carried out to determine how confidence in the 
overall impression of valence (coni) differed for high and low valence stimuli, 
for each category of the stimulus.  Again, a similar overall pattern emerged, 
with significant effects for high and low valence for animals (z = 4.511, N – 
Ties 35, p<0.001), faces (z = 3.195, N – Ties 52, p<0.005) and inanimate 
objects (z = 3.276, N – Ties 37, p<0.005).   
 Mean confidence ratings for valence impression are shown in Figure 
3.7 and the overall greater impression confidence for high valence stimuli and 
faces may be seen.   
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Figure 3.7  Mean confidence rating for the overall impression of valence (Y axis).  Ratings are 
averaged across instances (slides) and participants for four categories of stimuli (X axis).  The 
two data series represent the high valence and low valence slides within each category. Error 
bars ±1 SEM.  This is consistent with the response bias for pleasant responses already 
discussed.  
 
 3:6:6  Conclusions from the Analysis of Response to Stimuli 
Grouped by Category and Valence.  
 
• The detectability of high and low valence stimuli is not significantly 
different for faces, scenes and inanimate objects.   
• The detectability of high valence animals is higher than that of low 
valence animals.   
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• Categories differ in detectability. Faces are the most detectable, scenes 
the least.   
• The confidence in detectability (number seen) is strongly correlated 
with detectability.   
• Confidence in impression of the stimulus valence is less strongly 
correlated with detectability.   
• The overall impression of valence is higher for high valence stimuli 
than low valence stimuli for animals, faces and inanimate objects.  
Scenes are anomalous in that there is a significant difference in the 
opposite direction to that predicted by IAPS.   
• Confidence in the impression of valence was significantly different for 
high and low valence with animals, faces and inanimate objects.  There 
is no significant difference for scenes.   
 
3:7  Discussion 
 
The rationale of the design was to measure affective discrimination when 
participants deny awareness of target stimuli, thus suggesting unconscious 
emotional perception (Merikle et al., 2001).  Stimulus discrimination was 
measured (‘overall impression pleasant vs unpleasant’) and harvested strong 
support for discrimination of valence in brief, masked presentations of IAPS 
stimuli.  If such stimuli can be discriminated, they must necessarily be capable 
of producing differential effects in the brain.  There is thus strong justification 
for predicting that brief, masked IAPS stimuli will generate detectable valence-
related differences in fMRI activations.     
 Choosing a forced-choice pleasant versus unpleasant discrimination 
task has the obvious advantage of preventing irresolute submission (‘don’t 
know’), which reaps little reward in data collection.  The problem with this is 
that single-interval forced choice methods are still susceptible to response bias.  
An accepted technique to measure sensitivity that is independent of response 
bias is signal detection theory (SDT).  However, a preliminary analysis of the 
data in this chapter showed that a SDT approach was not tractable.  Instead, a 
method using nonparametric chi-square was adopted, which meant that 
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categorical data, response bias and any missing data were accounted for in 
valence analysis of individual images.  Evidence for subliminal processing had 
to be sought at the level of responses to individual slides, because the design of 
the experiment required each trial to be classified as ‘target detected (nseen = 
3)’ or ‘target not detected (nseen=2)’.  This means that nseen is necessarily a 
between-participants variable, and furthermore the assignment of each 
participant’s response to the ‘target detected’ or ‘target undetected’ group 
varies for each slide.  Therefore, responses to detected and undetected trials 
cannot be averaged across slides.  Examining each picture one at a time 
rendered it possible to recognise evidence for subliminal perception and also to 
detect the small number of anomalies that were indicated by significant valence 
discrimination in the wrong direction.   
 The main point to consider is valence discrimination in subliminal (seen 
2) responses.  Taking into account only those trials on which the target was 
undetected, 17 out of 24 slides (Table 3.2) showed significant differences in 
‘overall impression of valence’ compared with control (target absent) slides.  
Relying on the operational definition of subliminal perception, this would 
indicate that the valence was detected without conscious awareness.  However 
in 6 out of those 17 slides (Table 3.2), the predominance of valence 
impressions was opposite to the expected direction, even after taking into 
account the response bias revealed by the control stimuli.  This is confirmation 
that some IAPS stimuli are effectively processed below the level of conscious 
awareness.   
  It was found that despite the low detectability of the stimuli, 
participants were able to reliably assign a level of confidence to the overall 
pleasant or unpleasant impression given by a stimulus trial.  Concordance or 
discordance with the IAPS rating produced a significant effect on confidence in 
the stimulus valence impression in 11 out of 24 stimuli (Appendix VI, column 
4).  In 7 of those stimuli, confidence was significantly higher for the 
concordant response, and in four, confidence was higher for the discordant 
response (Appendix VI, column 5).  All of the latter were low valence stimuli, 
suggesting that participants are more confident in giving a positive than a 
negative valence response.  All of the remaining HV stimuli showed a trend in 
the expected direction (confidence higher for concordant responses) but for LV 
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stimuli the results were much more variable.  The conclusion that confidence 
was generally higher for HV responses was confirmed in the overall analysis 
(regardless of detection or non-detection of targets) for animals, faces and 
inanimate objects.   
 A possible explanation for the strong positive bias for valence response 
and confidence ratings is that more sensory evidence is required to report a 
negative than a positive valence stimulus.  This is indicative of a response 
process such as response suppression in perceptual defence.  Rather than 
response suppression signifying a defensive blocking of conscious perception, 
it is well documented that perceptual defence is explained by response 
inhibition.  Using a set of neutral and taboo words, it was found that a 
recognition task reflected how the participants responded, not what they 
perceived (Zajonc, 1962).  In other words, response to unpleasant stimuli is 
inhibited for various internal events, such as personal values and attitudes, as 
well as expectancies of the situation (Erdelyi, 1974).  It is also plausible that, 
due to discomfort, participants have a natural reluctance to label a stimulus as 
unpleasant until certain of the content, therefore needing extra time for 
discrimination (Kline et al., 1998).  This view would explain why the briefly 
presented unpleasant stimuli were sometimes discordant in response.   
 It was found that confidence scores in how many seen were strongly 
correlated with the detectability of the stimulus.  Confidence in the overall 
valence impression was less strongly dependent on the detection of the target, 
lending support in this present study, to the notion that perception of valence 
was occurring below conscious detection threshold (VanRullen and Koch, 
2003b).  If participants were concordant in their valence response and reported 
seeing only 2 slides, but were not confident with their answer then this can be 
argued as a case for graded conscious perception.  This is because it is likely 
that participants would not be highly confident if their valence response was 
based on a simple ‘feeling’ that a trial was pleasant or unpleasant.    
 This supports the mounting evidence for graded conscious perception in 
that the distinction between conscious and unconscious visual perception is not 
as dichotomous as previously assumed.  The ‘all-or-nothing’ idea would appear 
unlikely, as in this instance it is evident that some information from 
unconsciously perceived visual stimuli reaches beyond the early stages of the 
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visual system to higher cortical or subcortical levels which are selectively 
activated to valence (Li et al., 2002).  
 Previous studies investigating subliminal perception using confidence 
ratings have produced conflicting results.  For instance, a study replicating 
blindsight in normal participants presented two displays of visual texture 
stimuli, one visible and the other not.  They found no correlation between 
confidence levels and detection or localisation of target (Kolb and Braun, 
1995).  By attempting to replicate Kolb and Braun’s study, Morgan, et al., 
(1997) found that confidence ratings correlated highly with accuracy in 
performance.  To explain the discrepancy in results, the authors criticised Kolb 
and Braun for instructing the participants to use the full range in the confidence 
scale regardless of the level of certainty (Morgan et al., 1997).  More recently, 
Kolb and Braun’s study was duplicated by Robichaud and Stelmach (2003) in 
terms of methodology but added a pointing response as an extra condition.  The 
results were the complete opposite to those of Kolb and Braun (1995), and 
supported those of Morgan, et al. (1997) in that confidence ratings and 
accuracy were correlated well (Robichaud and Stelmach, 2003).  Scharli, et al. 
(2003) supported these findings in another simulation of blindsight.  Detection 
and localisation performance was measured on visual stimuli presented below 
level of awareness.  It was concluded that correct detection and localisation did 
correlate with confidence regarding accuracy, which they interpreted as an 
impoverished level of conscious awareness (Scharli et al., 2003).   
 In the present study, there was a strong positive correlation between 
confidence in how many seen and detectability (number of stimuli seen).  Lack 
of confidence implies ‘guessing’, suggesting that participants are unaware of 
any information that leads to their detection and discrimination response.  This 
premise is supported by Kunimoto and colleagues, who assert that the 
association between confidence and accurate response is a measurable criterion 
for awareness and participants are only aware of stimuli when confidence is 
related to concordance (Kunimoto et al., 2001).  The strong correlation 
between confidence in the number seen and probability of detection meets the 
criterion of Kunimoto et al. (2001).  There is a significant positive relationship 
between concordance and valence impression confidence for some slides, a 
negative relationship for others, and for further slides there is no relationship, 
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therefore on this criterion, conscious awareness of valence is somewhat weak 
and variable across the sample of stimuli.   
 Therefore, this experiment succeeded in presenting stimuli both above 
and below conscious awareness.  Equally, when taking incorrect detection of 
target stimuli as no awareness (i.e. subliminal - seen 2 images when 3 
presented) and taking into account response bias when calculating valence 
response on undetected stimuli, there is also evidence of subliminal processing.   
 This investigation now requires further analysis.  Repeating the 
behavioural study using fMRI eliminates concerns over response processes and 
potentially can reveal evidence for neural processes underlying valence 
discrimination across diverse categories of stimuli.  The behavioural study, 
however, revealed some anomalous valence responses to certain images.  The 
most likely explanation for this was the probability that these images were not 
identifiable under rapid presentations and therefore misrepresented.  This 
necessitates a further procedure for the next fMRI experiment and so, the 
decision was made to choose another full set of stimuli as a second condition.  
These were matched as closely as possible for valence, arousal and category 
with the first target set.  The only difference was that they were a completely 
different set of images, so that their physical properties were necessarily 
different.  The two sets were thus matched for the variables of interest (valence 
and category), but not for image features.  It is also worth reiterating that 
Wilcoxon tests in the behavioural experiment did show that high and low 
valence stimuli were matched for detectability, for the faces, scenes and 
inanimate objects.  Therefore, any effects of valence for these categories were 
not confounds with detectability.   
 Finally, when re-examining these data by averaging responses across 
categories, there was some evidence of category effects over and above the 
variation in individual slides.  The faces were the most detectable category, and 
they also showed the clearest discrimination between high and low valence 
stimuli.  The animals and inanimate objects were also relatively well detected 
and showed differential valence responses to IAPS high and low valence 
stimuli.  The scenes showed the most anomalous valence responses and the 
lowest detectability.  Equally, when considering the neuroimaging literature it 
is clear that stimuli are frequently defined in terms of a priori categories, e.g. 
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animals (Bacon-Macé et al., 2005, Delorme et al., 1999, Delorme et al., 2004, 
Fize et al., 2000, Fize et al., 2005, Kirchner and Thorpe, 2006, Li et al., 2002, 
Rousselet et al., 2004b, Thorpe et al., 1996, Thorpe et al., 2001b, VanRullen, 
2007); faces (Delorme and Thorpe, 2001, Rousselet et al., 2004b, Rousselet et 
al., 2004a, VanRullen et al., 1998, VanRullen et al., 2005); scenes (Delorme et 
al., 1999, Delorme et al., 2004, Fabre-Thorpe et al., 2001, Mace et al., 2005, 
Rousselet et al., 2005, Thorpe, 2002); objects (Thorpe et al., 1996, Thorpe et 
al., 2004, VanRullen and Koch, 2003a, VanRullen and Koch, 2003b); vehicles 
(Li et al., 2002, VanRullen, 2007, VanRullen and Thorpe, 2001c); and food 
(Delorme et al., 2000).   
 Therefore, to facilitate critical assessment of the fMRI findings with 
previous research and to investigate any apparent category variation in the 
fMRI activations to the images, the stimulus blocks in the following fMRI 
study in Chapter 4 will now be defined in terms of category membership as 
well as valence.  
 
3:8  Conclusion and Summary 
 
Concordant responses and confidence ratings were taken as a measure of 
subliminal processing of affect.  It was shown that it is possible to rapidly 
evaluate valence discrimination in complex natural images when presented 
below the threshold of conscious awareness (confirming H¹).   
 Hypothesis two was partially confirmed, as there was a significant 
difference in valence perception between subliminal and supraliminal 
presentations for 6 out of 24 slides.  However, for most slides, the subliminal 
effect was similar to the supraliminal one but slightly weaker. 
Hypothesis three was confirmed, in that there was a positive correlation 
between confidence in seeing the target and target detection. There was also a 
positive but much weaker correlation between confidence in the impression of 
valence and target detection. This can be taken as indicating a partial 
independence between valence discrimination and target detection.  
 There is strong evidence that the chosen natural images are effective 
stimuli for emotional valence even when presented in brief, masked exposures. 
There was partial validation of the division of stimuli into four a priori 
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categories, in that category effects showed some consistency, but this was 
complicated by the large variation in detection and valence discrimination 
responses to individual images. In order to objectively re-examine the 
effectiveness of the complex pictures, they will now be presented as categories 
to map the neural correlates of affective processing.  Therefore, the next step is 
to conduct this experiment using fMRI.   
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Chapter 4  fMRI Masked Experiment: 
fMRI activations in different brain regions (ROIs)  
to complex affective stimuli. 
Effects of brief, masked presentations, 
stimulus category and valence 
 
4:1  Abstract 
 
The previous behavioural experiment has confirmed valence discrimination 
without conscious awareness for a proportion of selected complex natural 
stimuli of affect.  In order to support and complement these findings, the same 
stimuli in a similar forward and backward masking paradigm were re-examined 
using fMRI.  This provided objective description of neural activations 
associated with stimuli category variation and valence effect.  The results 
strengthened the initial evidence that natural images presented in normal and 
brief viewing conditions are effectively discriminated for valence and category 
in nine selected ROIs and demonstrated some hemispheric differences.   
 
4:2  Introduction 
 
Having established significant subliminal valence response employing natural 
images in a behavioural study, the next step is to examine targeted areas in the 
brain where valence processing of brief, masked images may occur.  Therefore, 
using fMRI, the effect of brief, masked presentations of the same images in 
relation to activations in nine relevant ROIs (see section 1.6) were investigated 
for further objective evidence of rapid processing of valence in diverse images.   
 As discussed in Chapter 3, conscious visual processing does not occur 
without sufficient strength of visual input.  This visual input can be reduced by 
suppressing feedforward activity by forward masking.  The now weakened 
input can then be further suppressed by interfering with late reentrant level 
backward masking.  A reentrant theory of perception asserts that lower level 
processing of sensory input cannot be analysed if it is not confirmed by higher 
level processing (e.g. confirmation of identification by testing initial sensory 
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input with previously available sensory evidence).  If confirmation is 
interrupted, as in the case of backward masking, then the percept will decay 
and conscious perception will not occur (Koch, 2004).  In order to present 
stimuli below, or close to the threshold of conscious awareness, without 
suppressing unconsciously perceived emotion (Dolan, 2002), as in the 
behavioural experiment, a forward and backward masking (by neutral images) 
paradigm was used.   
 The main purpose of the present study is to investigate processing 
complex affective stimuli below, or close to, the conscious threshold.  Using 
fMRI, exploration of this phenomenon will now be considered in relation to 
nine ROIs in terms of high and low valence, and four different categories.  
Therefore, this chapter will address the following hypotheses concerning 
activations to contrasts between emotional and neutral IAPS stimuli within 
each of the nine ROIs:   
H¹ There are significant effects involving valence for 
normally viewed stimuli.  
H² There are significant effects involving valence for brief, 
masked stimuli. 
H³ Valence effect is different between normally viewed and 
brief, masked presentations (interaction between valence 
and experimental condition). 
H4 There are significant effects involving category. 
H5 There are hemispheric differences between activations in 
paired ROIs. 
H6 There are significant effects involving category for brief, 
masked presentations.   
 
4:3  Method 
 
 4:3:1  Participants 
 
Thirteen healthy participants took part in this experiment, seven males and six 
females (age range 19 – 45 years, mean age 29.3).  None of the thirteen had a 
history of brain injury or psychiatric illness and they were not taking any 
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regular medication.  The nature of the experiment was thoroughly explained 
and informed consent obtained.  During the briefing, it was emphasised that 
some of the pictures may be of an unpleasant nature and some of the stimuli 
are associated with phobic reactions, (e.g. spiders, snakes etc).  Armed with 
this information, participants could choose to continue with the experiment or 
not and were informed that they could stop the procedure at any time.   
 For those who travelled independently to the scanner, travel expenses 
were reimbursed.  This was the only payment made.   
 
 4:3:2  Design 
 
This was a block design fMRI study with three conditions.  In the brief, 
masked condition, the target (T) pictures were presented for 10ms (see section 
2:1:2), ‘sandwiched’ between two neutral (N) masking pictures with an 
exposure time of 1s each (Figure 4.1).  This was followed by a 2s blank and the 
sequence was repeated three times in each block, ending with a 3s blank to 
ensure return to baseline level (Figure 4.2).  The baseline (3s blanks) was 
modelled implicitly, therefore was not specified as a separate condition.  The 
brief, masked blocks were randomised for categories.  The brief, masked 
blocks were followed by two different normally viewed blocks 1 and 2 
composed of target stimuli of the same category, valence and arousal.  The 
target stimuli within each of the normally viewed blocks were presented for 
1.01s, preceded by a neutral picture of 1s exposure (Figures 4.3 and 4.4).  One 
of the normally viewed presentations (p) was of the same images as the 
preceding brief, masked condition and the images within these blocks were 
counterbalanced.  The other normally viewed presentation (P) was a different 
image of the same category, but calibrated for the same valence and arousal.  
The order of the two normally viewed blocks was randomised.  The 3 different 
target pictures in each block were of the same category (e.g. face) and valence 
(e.g. HV) (Figures 4.1 and 4.2).  The purpose of using two different normally 
viewed stimuli sets was to establish the reliability of responses to valence and 
category using stimuli with diverse structure and content.   
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 Four control blocks were introduced randomly, consisting of a neutral 
picture (10ms duration) ‘sandwiched’ between two neutral images of 1s 
duration.    
 Table 4.1 shows an example of a presentation order of blocks, (please 
read each row from left to right).   
c b p P b P p b p P c b p P 
b P p b P p c b p P c b P P 
Table 4.1  A presentation order of blocks 
Key: c = control; b = brief masked; p = same image as brief masked presented under normal 
viewing; P = different image presented under normal viewing. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1  Actual image sequence for a brief masked block HVf.    (Lang et al., 2001) 
Key:  S = Slide number; N = Neutral; T = Target; B = Blank; s = seconds; ms = milliseconds.  
 
 
S 4250 T 
10ms 
S 7150  
N  
B 
B 
S 7705 N 
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Figure 4.2  Stimulus sequence for a brief masked block 
Key: N = neutral; T = target; s = seconds; ms = milliseconds. 
 
Figure 4.2 demonstrates the brief, masked condition whereby the target stimuli 
(e.g. HV face 1 – Attractive Female, 2 - Baby and 3 - Athletes) of 10ms (see 
section 2:1:2) exposure are ‘sandwiched’ between two neutral stimuli of 1s 
exposure.  The grey squares represent the blank screen between each target set.   
 
1s 
 N 
T3
N
N
T2
N
 N 
T1 
N 
1s 
1s 
10ms 
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
 1s 
1s 
10ms 
10ms 
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Figure 4.3  Stimulus sequence for a normally viewed (p) block         
Key: N = neutral; T = target; s = seconds. 
 
Figure 4.3.  The same target stimuli were used for one of the presentations of 
the normally viewed condition with exposure time of neutrals 1s and target 
1.01s.  Again, three targets were presented in each block of the same category 
and valence.   
         
Figure 4.4  Stimulus sequence for the second normally viewed (P) block 
Key: N = neutral; T = target; s = seconds. 
 
 
T3
N 
T2
1s  
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s  
1s  
1.01s 
1.01s 
1.01s 
N 
T1 
N 
T6
 N
T5
N 
T4 
N 
1s  
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s  
1s  
1.01s 
1.01s 
1.01s 
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For comparison purposes, a second normally viewed condition (P) was 
presented in a randomised order to the first presentation (p).  Here different 
target pictures were used, but maintained the same paradigm as the first 
normally viewed condition.  The purpose of the second normally viewed block 
was to establish the reliability of the constructs ‘category’ and ‘valence’ across 
variations in individual images (Figure 4.4).   
 
       
Figure 4.5  Stimulus sequence for a control block 
Key: N = neutral; s = seconds; ms = milliseconds.  
 
Figure 4.5 illustrates a control block of neutral images (10ms) sandwiched 
between two neutral images (1s each).   
 Each block ran for 13.03s, with eight brief, masked, eight normally 
viewed (same image as brief, masked), eight normally viewed (different 
images) and four controls.  Thus 28 blocks were presented for a total time of 
6.08 minutes.   
 
 
1s 
 N
N3
N
N
N2
 N
 N 
N1
N 
1s 
1s 
10ms 
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
1s 
 1s 
1s 
10ms 
10ms 
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 4:3:3  Procedure 
 
The well-being of the participants is a priority and, even though fMRI is 
reported to be safe by the International Society for Magnetic Resonance in 
Medicine (www.ismrm.org/public/index.htm), each participant was still 
required to complete an initial screening form (Appendix VII) to establish if 
they were at risk (e.g. suffering from claustrophobia, had any metal implants 
etc.) and if so, they would have been eliminated from the experiment without 
the need to go to the MRI unit.  At the same time, each participant was given 
an information sheet with basic explanations concerning fMRI, procedures for 
scanning and safety requirements (Appendix VIII).  This initial process was 
completed at least one week before scanning to allow time for an informed 
opinion on participation.  On the day of scanning, a second screening form 
(Appendix IX) was filled in to ensure that all safety measures were in place, at 
which point a consent form was signed (Appendix X).   
 Whilst briefing the participants in the control room, a trial run was 
displayed on a laptop computer for familiarisation.  This showed a group of 
typical pictures, not used in the experiment.  This enabled the participants to 
ask any questions or choose to withdraw from the experiment.   
 The contents of an instruction slide used in the experiment were as 
follows:   
• Each picture will appear quickly. 
• Please indicate whether the images are pleasant or unpleasant. 
• Press the left button for pleasant and the right button for unpleasant. 
• GET READY. 
 The button box used in the experiment was a dummy, simply used to 
ensure greater attention and central fixation.  The ‘pleasant or unpleasant’ 
decision via button press was required for control stimuli as well as emotional 
stimuli.   
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 4:3:4  fMRI Data Acquisition 
 
Data were acquired using procedures as outlined in section 2:1:2 and 2:1:4.  
Functional images were recorded using a 3T MRI scanner.  Using a T2*-
weighted gradient echoplanar imaging (EPI) data were attained over 6.08 
minutes acquiring 35 slices per TR.  The parameters set were TR 2s, TE 30ms, 
FoV = 192x192mm, flip angle = 90°, voxel size 3x3x3, number of 
measurements = 184 volumes.     
 
 4:3:5  Data Analysis 
 
SPM2 (Friston and Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, 2003) 
(http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) was used for statistical processing, which 
was implemented in MATLAB (MATLAB Inc, 2002) 
(http://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab).  Pre-processing was carried out 
as outlined in section 2:1:4.   
 As described in section 2:1:4, a preliminary first-level fixed effects 
analysis was implemented across the nine ROIs.  Following on, a more 
comprehensive second level analysis of nine ROIs was performed using 
MarsBar toolbox for SPM2 (Brett et al., 2002) (http://marsbar.sourceforge.net) 
(again see section 2:1;4).   
 
4:4  Results 
 
 4:4:1  First Level Analysis 
 
Using a mean group contrast image a fixed effects analysis on the nine ROIs 
was carried out in order to advance initial inferences about this measured data.  
Activations, when presented with control stimulus, were subtracted from 
activations when presented with each of the experimental conditions (e.g. HV 
animals supraliminal > controls or HV animals subliminal > controls) with a p 
value of 0.05 using value adjustments family-wise error (FWE).  The results of 
these contrasts are displayed in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3. 
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 Having demonstrated how the normally viewed stimuli were 
randomised, the point of interest now is to examine if there were any 
differences between the two presentations.  To facilitate this, the normally 
viewed presentations will be labelled in this section as presentation 1 (P1) and 
presentation 2 (P2) to identify any presentation order effect. 
 Table 4.2 shows significant activations to each presentation of the 
normally viewed stimuli (P1, P2).  By displaying the significant results from 
the contrasts, one can see a striking similarity in activations between the first 
and second presentation of the normally viewed stimuli, regardless of 
presentation order.  This firstly confirms the reliability of the categorisation of 
stimuli, and secondly suggests that presentation order of the normally viewed 
images does not have an effect.  Thirdly, at first glance there appears no 
obvious habituation.  It is also interesting to note that at this preliminary stage, 
there are differences evident in ROI activations according to the category and 
valence of stimuli.   
 
  ACC mPFC Para Amy STG Ins Fusi DLPFC OFC 
P 1 L   R L   R L  L   R L   R L L L LVA P 2 L   R L   R L   R  L   R L   R L L L 
P 1      L L   R   LVF P 2       L   R   
P 1             R        LVS P 2   L   R    L   R   
P 1 L   R L   R L   R       R L   R L   R L L   R L   R LVI P 2 L   R L   R L   R  L   R L   R L   R L   R L   R 
P 1   L   R          R   HVA P 2  L   R     L   R   
P 1 L L L   R L   R      R  L   R  L HVF P 2 L   R L L   R      R L   R  L   
P 1      R       R         R   HVS P 2  L        
P 1  L   R L   R     L   R   HVI P 2 L   R L   R     L   R   
Table 4.2  First level analysis of normally viewed conditions after subtracting controls  
Key:  Pink = exactly the same image as brief masked image; Black = different image but same 
valence and category; P 1 =  normally viewed first presentation; P 2 =  normally viewed second 
presentation; L = left; R = right; ACC = Anterior Cingulate Cortex; mPFC = medial Prefrontal 
Cortex; Para = Parahippocampus; Amy = Amygdala; STG = Superior Temporal Gyrus; Ins = 
Insula; Fusi = Fusiform Gyrus; DLPFC = Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex; OFC = Orbital 
Frontal Cortex; LVA = LV Animals; LVF = LV Faces; LVS = LV Scenes; LVI = LV 
Inanimate objects; HVA = HV Animals; HVF = HV Faces; HVS = HV Scenes; HVI = HV 
Inanimate objects.   
 
To ascertain if there are any differences between normally viewed and brief, 
masked presentations, the results of first level analysis are displayed in Table 
4.3 (brief, masked results are in turquoise).   
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  ACC mPFC Para Amy STG Ins Fusi DLPFC OFC 
B L   R L   R   L   R L   R  L L 
P1 L   R L   R L  L   R L   R L L L LVA 
P 2 L   R L   R L   R  L   R L   R L L L 
B  L   R L   R   L   R L    
P 1      L L   R   LVF 
P 2       L   R   
B           L  L   R   
P 1             R        LVS 
P 2   L   R    L   R   
B      R L   R   L   R L L   R   
P 1 L   R L   R L   R       R L   R L   R L L   R L   R LVI 
P 2 L   R L   R L   R  L   R L   R L   R L   R L   R 
B L   R L   R L    R  L   R L   R L L   R L   R 
P 1   L   R          R   HVA 
P 2  L   R     L   R   
B          R          R 
P 1 L L L   R L   R      R  L   R  L HVF 
P 2 L   R L L   R      R L   R  L   
B L   R  L    R  L   R L   R L   R  L 
P 1      R       R         R   HVS 
P 2  L        
B L   R L   R        
P 1  L   R L   R     L   R   HVI 
P 2 L   R L   R     L   R   
Table 4.3  First level analysis comparison of brief masked condition with normally viewed 
condition  
Key: Turquoise = brief masked presentations; Black = both normally viewed presentations. 
P 1 =  normally viewed first presentation; P 2 = normally viewed second presentation; L =  left; 
R = right; ACC = Anterior Cingulate Cortex; mPFC = medial Prefrontal Cortex; Para = 
Parahippocampus; Amy = Amygdala; STG = Superior Temporal Gyrus; Ins = Insula; Fusi = 
Fusiform Gyrus; DLPFC = Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex; OFC = Orbital Frontal Cortex;  
LVA = LV Animals; LVF = LV Faces; LVS = LV Scenes; LVI = LV Inanimate objects; HVA 
= HV Animals; HVF = HV Faces; HVS = HV Scenes; HVI = HV Inanimate objects.   
 
Surprisingly, Table 4.3 shows that significant activations in the amygdala were 
absent, even for fear-related stimuli (e.g. LV faces) in both brief, masked and 
normally viewed presentations.  There was also an unexpected absence of 
activations in the fusiform gyrus when viewing both HV and LV faces in the 
brief, masked condition.   
  It is equally apparent that both similarities (e.g. LVF) and differences 
(e.g. HVI) occur in different ROIs when comparing brief, masked and normally 
viewed activations.  It would also appear that some regions are activated 
similarly by brief, masked and normally viewed presentations of the same 
stimuli.   
 Valence effects were found in the first level analysis within each 
category.  This was demonstrated using the contrast masking facility of SPM2. 
Control activations were subtracted from target activations and were 
exclusively masked by the opposite valence (e.g. HVA > control masked by 
LVA > control FWE p = 0.05).  This was then reversed in order to ascertain 
which ROIs were activated in the HV condition and not in the LV condition, 
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and vice versa.  Some regions, (e.g. ACC), showed both HV and LV patterns 
of activation within a particular category.  Thus, globally, the ACC shows no 
specific effect of valence, though it appears that it contains both HV and LV 
specific subregions.  Equally, when looking at the black letters L and R it is 
clear that over all conditions (with the exception of the second normally viewed 
presentation of HVS) there is a scattering of valence effects in all nine ROIs.   
It is interesting to note that in the insula, the valence effect is exactly the same 
in the brief, masked and the first presentation normally viewed conditions and 
remains similar in the second presentation normally viewed.  Strong 
similarities of valence effect are also seen in the STG and mPFC across all 
three conditions (Table 4.4).   
1 2 ACC mPFC Para Amy STG Ins Fusi DLPFC OFC 
 
BRIEF MASKED 
     
 
     
LVA>c HVA>c L     R L     R   L     R L     R  L      R L 
HVA>c LVA>c L     R L     R      L      R  
LVF>c HVF>c        R L     R   L L          R L L 
HVF>c LVF>c                 R         R 
LVS>c HVS>c       L      R          R  
HVS>c LVS>c  L      L  
LVI>c HVI>c L     R L     R L      R L L     R L     R L L      R L      R 
HVI>c LVI>c        R  L     R        
NORMALLY 
VIEWED 
Presentation 1 
         
LVA>c HVA>c L     R L      R L  L      R L     R L L       R L      R 
HVA>c LVA>c  L             R   
LVF>c HVF>c      L L      R  L 
HVF>c LVF>c L L      R L      R L      R         R  L      R   
LVS>c HVS>c  L      R                R  
HVS>c LVS>c         R L         R            R L  
LVI>c HVI>c L     R L      R L      R          R L     R L     R L L        R L      R 
HVI>c LVI>c L     R L      R     L      R   
NORMALLY 
VIEWED 
Presentation 2 
         
LVA>c HVA>c L     R L     R L      R  L     R L     R L L      R L     R 
HVA>c LVA>c  L     R     L     R   
LVF>c HVF>c       L     R   
HVF>c LVF>c L     R L     R L     R        R L     R     
LVS>c HVS>c   L     R    L     R   
HVS>c LVS>c          
LVI>c HVI>c L     R L     R L     R L L     R L     R L     R           R L     R 
HVI>c LVI>c       L   
Table 4.4  First level analysis valence effects   
Key: 1,2 = column 1 masked exclusively by column 2;  
LVA>c = low valence animal > control; LVF>c = low valence face > control;  
LVS>c = low valence scene > control; LVI>c = low valence inanimate > control;  
HVA>c = high valence animal > control; HVF>c = high valence face > control;  
HVS>c = high valence scene > control; HVI>c = high valence inanimate > control;  
ACC = Anterior Cingulate Cortex; mPFC = medial Prefrontal Cortex; Para = 
Parahippocampus; Amy = Amygdala; STG = Superior Temporal Gyrus; Ins = Insula; Fusi = 
Fusiform Gyrus; DLPFC = Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex; OFC = Orbital Frontal Cortex; 
Purple = animals L and R no effect of valence; green = faces L and R no effect of valence; blue 
= scenes L and R no effect of valence; red = inanimate objects L and R no effect of valence; 
black L and R = an effect of valence in any category. 
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 4:4:2  Second Level Analysis 
 
The first level analysis identified the brain regions that were activated on 
average across participants and confirmed that the quality of the data was 
worthy of further investigation.  Unexpectedly, results from first level analysis 
revealed only small and variable activations in the amygdala for all categories 
and in the fusiform gyrus when presented with brief, masked faces.  The insula, 
OFC and DLPFC were mainly activated by LV stimuli only and there was a 
difference between normally viewed activations and brief, masked activations.  
To be able to generalise such findings to a wider population, it is necessary to 
take into account the variation between participants, therefore a group random 
effects analysis was employed.   
 This was achieved by examining each ROI (same coordinates as first 
level analysis with an 8mm radius) and calculating the means of the contrast 
values for all voxels within each ROI, for each of the 24 contrasts (Table 4.5).  
These contrast values were the t-contrasts obtained in SPM when comparing 
activations in control conditions with the three experimental conditions (e.g. 
low valence animal brief, masked>controls) for each combination of factors 
(valence and category).  The resulting contrast values were entered into an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA).  Four within-participants factors were entered 
(hemisphere: 2 levels, condition: 3 levels, valence: 2 levels and categories: 4 
levels) for each ROI with a p(crit) = 0.0167 using a Bonferroni adjustment for 
multiple comparison (three levels of condition, since the three conditions were 
regarded as replications).  These means are graphically displayed for each ROI 
(see sections a to i below).   
 A Priori hypotheses held that there were a) main effects of valence 
(high and low) and b) category effects (animals, faces, scenes and inanimate 
objects) specifically for brief, masked stimuli.  To test for significant effect, an 
ANOVA was partitioned to propagate the different stimulus conditions: brief, 
masked (b), normally viewed (P) and normally viewed (p) using p(crit) = 0.05.   
  ANOVA computed estimated marginal means for the contrast values, 
which were plotted to aid the interpretation of additive and interactive effects 
among factors.  This procedure produced line graphs highlighting significant 
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values for the four IVs, category, hemisphere, valence and condition to guide 
the interpretation of the significant effects in the ANOVAs in the discussion.   
 To correct for a type I error, a test of the assumption of homogeneity of 
covariance (sphericity) Mauchly’s test of sphericity was applied.  Where the 
assumption of homogeneity of covariance was violated, the degrees of freedom 
of the F test were modified to make it more conservative.   
In addition, to err on the side of caution and as this was a multifactor 
design, partial eta squared was used as a measure of the strength of association 
between one independent variable and one dependent variable (Tabachnick and 
Fidell, 2001).   
 The data were entered into an SPSS (SPSS Inc, 2005-8) 
(https://www.spss.com) spreadsheet. 
 
 
 
Masked Experiment 
 Mean Contrast Values for Effect Sizes in ROIs  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
LVAb > c 0.33 0.35 -0.05 -0.04 0.05 -0.06 -0.21 0.08 0.11 0.48 0.46 -0.20 -0.10 0.33 0.24 -0.50 0.14 0.15 
LVAp > c 0.27 0.46 -0.06 -0.02 0.15 -0.14 0.03 0.23 0.17 0.61 0.42 -0.23 -0.06 0.13 0.29 -0.46 0.09 0.26 
LVAP > c 0.31 0.43 -0.02 0.03 0.38 -0.24 -0.10 0.24 0.10 0.67 0.51 -0.11 0.05 0.61 0.38 -0.51 0.06 0.20 
LVFb > c -0.05 -0.08 -0.18 -0.34 -0.24 -0.35 0.02 -0.43 -0.09 0.16 -0.15 -0.36 -0.26 0.07 -0.24 0.22 -0.35 -0.54 
LVFP > c  -0.05 -0.13 -0.08 -0.03 -0.08 -0.36 0.01 -0.45 -0.06 0.10 -0.22 -0.24 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.39 -0.54 -0.52 
LVFp > c -0.04 -0.09 -0.21 -0.04 -0.14 -0.28 0.15 -0.46 -0.29 0.02 -0.13 -0.27 0.07 0.06 -0.09 0.45 -0.45 -0.40 
LVSb > c -0.02 -0.17 -0.09 -0.15 -0.03 -0.11 0.06 -0.38 -0.28 0.12 -0.18 -0.12 -0.16 0.02 0.02 0.24 -0.34 -0.52 
LVSp > c 0.07 -0.05 0.03 -0.15 -0.15 -0.11 0.04 -0.37 -0.16 0.16 -0.04 -0.10 -0.19 -0.02 0.08 0.27 -0.40 -0.33 
LVSP > c -0.04 -0.06 0.26 -0.17 0.01 -0.18 0.05 -0.16 -0.13 0.01 -0.15 0.17 -0.23 -0.09 -0.05 0.32 -0.29 -0.46 
LVIb > c 0.23 0.41 0.18 0.21 0.70 0.02 0.20 0.75 0.31 0.46 0.46 0.27 0.07 0.56 0.48 -0.34 0.34 0.62 
LVIp > c 0.32 0.45 0.30 0.44 0.82 0.09 0.31 0.87 0.61 0.50 0.43 0.41 0.43 0.57 0.61 -0.22 0.47 0.72 
LVIP > c 0.32 0.44 0.43 0.45 0.89 0.19 0.57 0.85 0.50 0.50 0.42 0.69 0.54 0.59 0.89 -0.01 0.39 0.65 
HVAb > c  -0.01 0.36 -0.08 -0.18 0.08 -0.07 -0.13 0.15 -0.17 0.04 0.08 -0.25 -0.05 0.09 -0.58 0.12 0.21 -0.03 
HVAP > c -0.01 0.25 -0.07 -0.13 0.22 -0.06 -0.09 0.13 -0.25 -0.02 0.04 -0.11 0.02 0.04 -0.44 0.34 0.01 -0.14 
HVAp > c  -0.10 0.18 -0.14 -0.18 0.13 -0.15 0.08 0.06 -0.06 -0.08 0.01 -0.22 -0.07 -0.12 -0.60 0.37 0.05 -0.06 
HVFb > c -0.07 0.06 -0.07 0.16 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.17 0.00 0.05 -0.04 0.09 0.14 0.02 -0.01 0.20 0.26 
HVFP > c -0.12 0.02 -0.01 0.31 -0.09 0.01 0.33 -0.01 0.32 -0.14 -0.07 -0.02 0.41 -0.06 -0.03 0.42 -0.04 0.14 
HVFp > c -0.04 0.17 0.06 0.28 -0.17 0.01 0.17 -0.11 0.07 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.39 -0.16 0.03 0.18 -0.08 -0.07 
HVSb > c -0.15 -0.08 -0.11 -0.07 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.12 -0.03 -0.01 -0.16 -0.10 0.05 0.06 
HVSp > c -0.14 -0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.06 -0.08 0.17 -0.13 -0.12 -0.08 -0.01 0.11 0.00 -0.05 -0.14 0.28 -0.13 -0.03 
HVSP > c 0.03 0.11 0.04 -0.04 -0.36 -0.06 0.18 -0.15 -0.46 0.10 0.18 0.00 0.06 -0.26 0.07 0.01 -0.15 -0.14 
HVIb > c -0.03 0.34 -0.03 -0.19 0.09 0.00 0.01 -0.15 -0.22 0.15 0.15 -0.03 -0.12 0.07 -0.23 0.12 0.07 -0.11 
HVIP > c 0.03 0.20 0.12 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.40 -0.02 -0.08 0.19 0.17 -0.08 0.15 -0.17 -0.25 0.34 0.03 -0.17 
HVIp > c 0.05 0.05 0.24 0.13 -0.03 -0.10 0.23 -0.15 -0.28 0.17 0.16 0.05 0.17 -0.14 -0.15 0.42 -0.09 -0.26 
Table 4.5  Mean contrast values for effect sizes in ROIs – masked experiment 
Key:  1=L ACC 2=L mPFC 3=L Parahippocampus 4=L Amygdala 5=L STG 6=L Insula 7=L Fusiform gyrus 8=L DLPFC 9=L OFC  
                            10=R ACC 11=R mPFC 12=R Parahippocampus 13=R Amygdala 14=R STG 15=R Insula 16=R Fusiform gyrus 17=R DLPFC 18=R OFC; c =  controls
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a) Anterior Cingulate Cortex   
 
Figure 4.6  Significant cluster of activation in ACC from an individual’s data.  The 
colorimeter scale displays the percentage intensity of voxels activated.  The cross-hairs show 
activation in the ACC right hemisphere for the significant effect of LV animals > control in 
the normally viewed condition 
 
ANOVAs confirmed a significant main effect of valence (F(1,12) = 9.1; 
p<0.0167); with an effect size (partial eta squared) of 0.432.  Although the 
ACC has not previously been reported as category specific, a main effect of 
category was found (F (3,36) = 7.9; p<0.0000005; partial eta squared = 
0.398).   
 Partitioning the ANOVA matrix confirmed a significant effect of 
valence across all three conditions: in brief, masked (F(1,12) = 6.9; p<0.05; 
partial eta squared = 0.366); normally viewed (P) (F(1,12) = 6.8; p<0.05; 
partial eta squared = 0.362); and normally viewed (p) (F(1,12) = 12.2; 
p<0.005; partial eta squared = 0.503).  A significant effect of category was 
also found, in each of the brief, masked (F(3,36) = 4.4; p<0.01; partial eta 
squared = 0.207); normally viewed condition (P) (F(3,36) = 7.2; p<0.001; 
partial eta squared = 0.374); and normally viewed condition (p) (Mauchly 
(W=.35, p<0.05)), (F(1,12) = 6.2; p<0.05; partial eta squared = 0.341).   
 There was no significant difference between the presentation 
conditions, therefore, there is no difference in ACC response to brief and 
longer presentations.   
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Figure 4.7  ACC estimated marginal means comparing low and high valence  
 
The estimated marginal means in the line graphs represent the outputs of the 
ANOVAs.  These were calculated from the effect sizes which are a measure 
of response magnitude (see Table 4.5).  
 Visual interpretation of the estimated marginal means line graph for 
valence x category (Figure 4.6 and 4.7) shows that low valence animals and 
inanimate objects tend to produce greater activation than control stimuli, 
whereas all high valence stimuli, plus low valence faces and scenes, produce 
activations similar to or smaller than control stimuli.   
 To conclude, the ACC was sensitive to the valence of stimuli, 
responding more strongly to low valence than to control or high valence 
stimuli (see Figure 4.7).  The moderate effect sizes indicate that valence 
differences in overall activations for category depend on the particular 
category.  This effect was found for both normally viewed presentations and 
brief, masked stimuli.   
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b) Medial Prefrontal Cortex 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8  Significant cluster of activation in mPFC from an individual’s data.  The 
colorimeter scale displays the percentage intensity of voxels activated.  The cross-hairs show 
activation in the mPFC right hemisphere for the significant effect of LV inanimate objects > 
control in the brief masked condition 
 
A significant main effect of category was found but did not survive 
Bonferroni correction (F(1,12) = 8.5; p=0.013; partial eta squared = 0.414).  
 Partitioning the ANOVA matrix confirmed a main effect of category: 
in the brief, masked condition (Mauchly (W=.223, p<.01)), (F(1,12) = 9.1; 
p<0.05; partial eta squared = 0.431) (see Figure 4.8); in normally viewed 
condition (P) (Mauchly (W=.097, p<0.0000005)), (F(1,12) = 7.0; p<0.05; 
partial eta squared = 0.368); and in normally viewed condition (p) (Mauchly 
(W=.196, p<0.005)), (F(1,12) = 6.3; p<0.05; partial eta squared = 0.345).   
 There were no significant main effects of presentation condition, 
hemisphere, or valence.   
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Figure 4.9  mPFC estimated marginal means comparing conditions  
Key: b = brief masked; p = same image as brief masked presented under normal viewing; P = 
different image presented under normal viewing. 
 
It can be seen from the plot of estimated marginal means for category x 
condition (Figure 4.9) that the strength of activations in the mPFC was greater 
for animals and inanimate objects (both low and high valence) than for 
controls.  For faces and scenes these were lower than or similar to controls 
(both low and high valence).   
 To conclude, mPFC was sensitive to the category of stimuli for all 
three conditions.   
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c) Parahippocampus 
 
 
Figure 4.10  Significant cluster of activation in Parahippocampus from an individual’s data.   
The colorimeter scale displays the percentage intensity of voxels activated. The cross-hairs 
show activation in the Parahippocampus right hemisphere for the significant effect of LV 
inanimate objects > control in the normally viewed condition 
 
ANOVAs demonstrated significant main effect of presentation condition 
(F(2,24) = 10.4; p<0.005; partial eta squared = 0.465).   
 Partitioning the ANOVA showed that in normally viewed (P) there 
was a significant effect of category (F(3,36) = 4.5; p<0.01; partial eta squared 
= 0.274) (see Figure 4.10).  There was no significant main effect of valence, 
and no hemispheric differences were found.   
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Figure 4.11  Parahippocampus estimated marginal means comparing category x condition, 
Key: b = brief masked; p = same image as brief masked presented under normal viewing; P = 
different image presented under normal viewing.  
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Figure 4.12  Parahippocampus estimated marginal means comparing low and high valence x 
categories (valence x category). 
 
 
 
 123
The greatest estimated marginal means in Figures 4.11 and 4.12 are evident 
when viewing LV inanimate objects in all three conditions with a marginal 
positive value for LV scenes under normal viewing.   
 Results support the view that the parahippocampal region is concerned 
with visual processing of high level properties, and indicates that this region is 
associated not only with ‘places’ (Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998, Epstein et al., 
1999, O'Craven and Kanwisher, 2000), but also with inanimate objects.  
Activation is greater for normally viewed than brief, masked stimuli.  It is not 
possible to say whether responsiveness to inanimate objects overlaps the 
parahippocampal place area (PPA).  Greater mean activations were found 
when processing inanimate objects than animals or faces (Figure 4.11 and 
Figure 4.12).  The inanimate stimuli could be defined as either arousing, 
surprising or novel, (e.g. dirty toilet, electric chair or fireworks) and, as such, 
would also support previous findings of the PPA being associated with 
surprise or novelty detection (Schroeder et al., 2004).   
 
d) Amygdala 
 
Figure 4.13  Significant cluster of activation in the amygdala from an individual’s data.  The 
colorimeter scale displays the percentage intensity of voxels activated.  The cross-hairs show 
activation in the amygdala right hemisphere for the significant effect of LV inanimate objects 
> control in the normally viewed condition 
 
A significant main effect of condition was found, (Mauchly (W=.481; p<.05)), 
(F(1,12) = 5.1; p<0.05; partial eta squared = 0.300). 
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Figure 4.14  Amygdala estimated marginal means comparing category x condition. 
Key: b = brief masked; p = same image as brief masked presented under normal viewing; P = 
different image presented under normal viewing.  
 
Estimated marginal means for category x condition show means with positive 
values are evident only for inanimate objects and faces in the two normally 
viewed conditions (Figure 4.14).  This is also evident in Figure 4.13 showing 
a significant effect of LV inanimate objects.   
 These results are surprising as the amygdala is associated with fast 
processing of fearful stimuli in particular and no evidence was found of either 
valence effects or brief, masked processing.   
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e) Superior Temporal Gyrus 
 
 
Figure 4.15  Significant cluster of activation in STG from an individual’s data.  The 
colorimeter scale displays the percentage intensity of voxels activated.  The cross-hairs show 
activation in the STG left hemisphere for the significant effect of LV inanimate objects > 
control in the normally viewed condition 
 
There was a significant main effect of valence (F(1,12) = 19.3; p<0.001; 
partial eta squared = 0.616).  There was also a significant main effect of 
category (F(3,36) = 7.7; p<0.0005; partial eta squared = 0.392).   
 Partitioning showed a significant effect of category in all three 
conditions: brief, masked (F(3,36) = 4.2; p<0.05; partial eta squared = 0.261); 
normally viewed (P) (F(3,36) = 5.6; p<0.005; partial eta squared = 0.319); and 
normally viewed (p) (Mauchly (W=.299; p<.05)), (F(1,12) = 5.1; p<0.05; 
partial eta squared = 0.300).  However, valence was not significant in the 
brief, masked condition, but was significant in normally viewed (P) (F(1,12) = 
23.2; p<0.0000005; partial eta squared = 0.659) and normally viewed (p) 
(F(1,12) = 19.1; p<0.001; partial eta squared = 0.614).   
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Figure 4.16  STG estimated marginal means comparing low and high valence x categories . 
 
The valence effect displays some category specificity (Figure 4.16), showing 
positive values only with low valence animal and inanimate stimuli (see 
Figure 4.15).  This was supported statistically when partitioning with a 
significant interaction between valence x category for normally viewed (P) 
(F(3,36) = 3.8; p<0.05; partial eta squared = 0.241) and normally viewed (p) 
(F(3,36) = 4.0; p<0.05; partial eta squared = 0.252).   
 A role for STG in the processing of emotional valence is indicated, 
with greater activations during the processing of LV animals and inanimate 
objects under normal viewing.   
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f) Insula 
 
 
 
Figure 4.17  Significant cluster of activation in the Insula from an individual’s data.  The 
colorimeter scale displays the percentage intensity of voxels activated.  The cross-hairs show 
activation in the insula right hemisphere for the significant effect of LV inanimate objects > 
control in the normally viewed condition 
Significant interactions were found.  Hemisphere x valence (F(1,12) = 9.7; 
p<0.01; partial eta squared = 0.446) and valence x category (Mauchly 
(W=.341; p<0.05)), (F(3,36) = 7.8; p<0.0000005; partial eta squared = 0.393). 
 Partitioning supported these findings across all three conditions: 
hemisphere x valence brief, masked (F(1,12) = 8.0; p<0.05; partial eta squared 
= 0.401); normally viewed (P) (F(1,12) = 11.0; p<0.01; partial eta squared = 
0.478); and normally viewed (p) (F(1,12) = 5.7; p<0.05; partial eta squared = 
0.323).  Valence x category: in the brief, masked condition (Mauchly 
(W=.260; p<.05)), (F(1,12) = 5.8; p<0.05; partial eta squared = 0.325); in 
normally viewed condition (P) (Mauchly (W=.310; p<.05)), (F(1,12) = 6.7; 
p<0.05; partial eta squared = 0.359); and in normally viewed condition (p) 
(F(3,36) = 6.2; p<0.005; partial eta squared = 0.340).   
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Figure 4.18  Insula estimated marginal means for low valence x hemisphere x condition. 
Key: b = brief masked; p = same image as brief masked presented under normal viewing; P = 
different image presented under normal viewing. 
 
RightLeft
Hemisphere
0.00
-0.05
-0.10
-0.15
-0.20
-0.25
Es
tim
at
ed
 M
ar
gi
na
l M
ea
ns b
p
P
Condition
Insula
High Valence
 
Figure 4.19  Insula estimated marginal means for high valence x hemisphere x condition. 
Key: b = brief masked; p = same image as brief masked presented under normal viewing; P = 
different image presented under normal viewing. 
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Figure 4.20  Insula: estimated marginal means for valence x category.  
 
The line graphs Figures 4.18 and 4.19 show estimated marginal means for an 
interaction between hemisphere x valence with positive values found only for 
the RH whilst viewing LV stimuli.  Figure 4.20 shows estimated marginal 
means for category x valence, where LV animals and LV inanimate objects 
display positive values.  To conclude, the insula responded to stimuli of 
negative valence with the right insula specifically activated by low valence 
stimuli (in particular inanimate objects) (Figure 4.17).   
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g) Fusiform Gyrus 
 
Figure 4.21  Significant cluster of activation in the Fusiform gyrus from an individual’s data.  
The colorimeter scale displays the percentage intensity of voxels activated.  The cross-hairs 
show activation in the Fusiform Gyrus right hemisphere for the significant effect of HV faces 
> control in the normally viewed condition 
  
ANOVA showed main effect of presentation conditions (F(2,24) = 14.2; 
p<0.001; partial eta squared = 0.542).  There was also a main effect of 
category (F(3,36) = 3.9; p<0.0167; partial eta squared = 0.244).   
 An effect of category was absent in the brief, masked condition when 
partitioning, but remained significant in one normally viewed presentation (P) 
(F(3,36) = 4.7; p<0.01; partial eta squared = 0.282).   
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Figure 4.22  Fusiform gyrus estimated marginal means for condition x category. 
Key: b = brief masked; p = same image as brief masked presented under normal viewing; P = 
different image presented under normal viewing.  
 
Figure 4.22 shows estimated marginal means for category x condition. Values 
were positive for faces, scenes and inanimate objects in both normally viewed 
conditions.   
 A significant effect of category under normal viewing was not 
surprising in view of the literature that links the fusiform cortex with faces 
(see Figure 4.21), but there was also evidence of responsiveness to scenes and 
inanimate objects.   
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h) Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex 
 
 
 
Figure 4.23  Significant cluster of activation in DLPFC from an individual’s data.  The 
colorimeter scale displays the percentage intensity of voxels activated.  The cross-hairs show 
activation in the DLPFC left hemisphere for the significant effect of LV inanimate objects  > 
control in the normally viewed condition 
For the overall ANOVA, there was only a marginal significant main effect 
with an interaction between hemisphere and condition (F(2,24) = 3.4; p = 
0.05).  The other main effects did not survive Bonferroni corrections.  
Therefore caution must be applied to interpreting the subdivided ANOVA.   
 When partitioning, categories were significant with all three 
conditions: in the brief, masked condition (Mauchly (W=.227; p<.01)), 
(F(1,12) = 5.3; p<0.05; partial eta squared = 0.308); normally viewed (P) 
(Mauchly (W=.274; p<.05)), (F(1,12) = 7.8; p<0.05; partial eta squared = 
0.394); and normally viewed (p) (Mauchly (W=.188; p<.005)), (F(1,12) = 5.5; 
p<0.05; partial eta squared = 0.313).   
 Equally, an interaction between valence x category was significant for 
the brief, masked condition (Mauchly (W=.342; p<.05)), (F(1,12) = 5.1; 
p<0.05; partial eta squared = 0.298) and one normally viewed presentation (p) 
(F(3,36) = 7.2; p<0.001; partial eta squared = 0.376) (Figure 4.23).   
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Figure 4.24  DLPFC estimated marginal means for condition x hemispheres  
Key: b = brief masked; p = same image as brief masked presented under normal viewing; P = 
different image presented under normal viewing.  
 
The estimated marginal means in Figure 4.24 show a significant interaction 
with hemisphere x condition.  It would appear that the RH responds more 
strongly to brief, masked affective stimuli and the LH to normally viewed 
stimuli, but note the negative value for normally viewed stimuli in the RH 
(stronger response to control stimuli).  Equally, the scale shows that these 
differences are very small.   
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Figure 4.25  DLPFC estimated marginal means for condition x categories  
Key: b = brief masked; p = same image as brief masked presented under normal viewing; P = 
different image presented under normal viewing.  
 
Figure 4.25 shows estimated marginal means for category x condition. In all 
three conditions, the DLPFC responds more strongly to animals and inanimate 
objects.  
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Figure 4.26  DLPFC estimated marginal means for category x valence. 
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Figure 4.26 shows estimated marginal means for category x valence. LV 
inanimate objects show a greater difference relative to stimuli in other 
categories or valence which are displayed in the DLPFC line graph and can be 
seen in the cluster of activation in Figure 4.23.   
 To conclude, the observations from ANOVA indicate that the DLPFC 
is more sensitive to LV inanimate objects in all three conditions.  In addition, 
there was a marginal indication that the RH is dominant for processing brief, 
masked emotional stimuli, and the LH for normally viewed emotional stimuli.   
 
i) Orbitofrontal Cortex 
 
Figure 4.27  Significant cluster of activation in OFC from an individual’s data.  The 
colorimeter scale displays the percentage intensity of voxels activated.  The cross-hairs show 
activation in the OFC right hemisphere for the significant effect of LV animals > control in 
the normally viewed condition 
 
An interaction of valence x category was significant, (Mauchly (W=.227, 
p<0.01)), (F(1,12) = 12.0; p<0.005; partial eta squared = 0.499).   
 When partitioning the ANOVA, category effects were significant in 
one normally viewed condition (P) (F(3,36) = 5.4, p<0.005; partial eta squared 
= 0.309).  Also a significant interaction between valence and category 
remained for: brief, masked (Mauchly (W=.304, p<.05)), (F(1,12) = 7.2, 
p<0.05; partial eta squared = 0.376); normally viewed (P) (F(3,36) = 8.1, 
p<0.0000005; partial eta squared = 0.404); and normally viewed (p) (F(3,36) 
= 12.2; p<0.0005; partial eta squared = 0.504) (Figure 4.27).   
 
 
 
 136
Inanimate
Objects
ScenesFacesAnimals
Category
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
-0.2
-0.4
Es
tim
at
ed
 M
ar
gi
na
l M
ea
ns
High
Low
Valence
OFC
 
Figure 4.28  OFC estimated marginal means for high and low valence . 
 
Figure 4.28 shows estimated marginal means for category x valence. OFC 
demonstrates positive values for LV inanimate objects with a clear similarity 
to the line graph for the DLPFC (Figure 4.26).   
 Based on the statistical evidence and values shown in the line graph, 
greater activations were evident in the OFC when viewing LV inanimate 
objects as in the DLPFC.  However, there was no evidence of hemisphere 
specificity as there was in the DLPFC.   
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 4:4:3  Summary 
 
Significant effects from the fMRI experiment are summarised in table 4.6.  
 
ROI Significant 
effects of 
valence or 
category on 
response to 
brief masked 
presentations 
Significant 
differences 
between responses 
to brief masked and 
normally viewed 
presentations  
Significant effects 
of valence or 
category on 
response to 
normally viewed 
presentations 
Other significant 
effects before 
partitioning 
ACC Val* 
Cat** 
n.s. P val:* 
p val:** 
P cat:** 
p cat:* 
Main eff val:* 
Main eff cat:**** 
mPFC Cat* Con x cat* P cat:* 
p cat:* 
Main eff cat* 
Para n.s. Main eff con:** P cat:** n.s. 
Amy n.s. Main eff con:* n.s. n.s. 
STG Cat* n.s. P val:* 
p val:** 
P cat:** 
P cat:* 
P val x cat:* 
p val x cat* 
Main eff val:** 
Main eff cat:**** 
Ins Hem x Val* 
Val x Cat* 
Hem x con* 
 
P Hem x Val:** 
P Val x Cat:* 
p Hem x Val:* 
p Val x Cat:* 
Hem x Val:** 
Val x Cat:* 
Fusi n.s. Main eff con:*** P cat:** Main eff cat:* 
DLPFC Cat* 
Val x Cat* 
n.s. P cat:* 
p cat:* 
p Val x Cat:** 
Main eff cat* 
Val x Cat:* 
 
OFC Val x Cat* n.s. P cat:** 
P Val x Cat**** 
p Val x Cat*** 
Main eff cat:* 
Val x Cat:** 
Table 4.6  Summary of significant effects 
Key: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; **** p<0.0001; n.s. = not significant;  eff = effect; 
Val = Valence; Hem = Hemisphere; Con = condition; Cat = Category;  P and p = Normally 
viewed; Para = Parahippocampal gyrus; Amy = Amygdala; Ins = Insula; Fusi = Fusiform 
gyrus.   
 
4:5  Discussion   
 
Participants were presented with complex visual pictures of animals, faces, 
scenes and inanimate objects employing a forward and backward masking 
paradigm.   
 The effects of valence, categories and experimental conditions varied 
between the selected nine ROIs.  There was evidence of processing of briefly 
masked stimuli, especially for low valence presentations of animals and 
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inanimate objects.  In order to discuss these issues coherently, each ROI is 
addressed in turn and in context with previous research.  Some of the present 
findings are in agreement with previous research, other findings differ.  It is 
important to bear in mind that a ROI as defined in this study is not a 
functional unit.  A spherical ROI may include anatomically diverse structures 
of a smaller scale.  It is also difficult to establish anatomical correspondences 
between different studies in the literature, or indeed, in different individual 
brains in the same study, because of the inherent variations of anatomy, and 
this may in large part account for differences in functional findings reported 
by different investigators.  Thus the “typical” co-ordinates given for each ROI 
are only a statistical approximation to the location of a given structure.  
 
 4:5:1  Regions of Interest   
 
a) Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
 
The data show that the ACC was modulated by emotional valence both with 
brief, masked presentations and under normal viewing, thus supporting 
previous findings of the correlation between valence and ACC activations 
(Berthoz et al., 2002, Cunningham et al., 2004). 
 This may reflect the novelty (Downar et al., 2002) and complexity of 
IAPS pictures (Winston et al., 2003) depicting the premise of cognitive and 
emotion interactions. Equally, this experiment incorporated a valence 
categorisation task in which cognitive demands may have elicited greater 
neural activity in the ACC, as it is shown in previous studies that the ACC 
processes both cognitive and emotional tasks  (Bush et al., 2000, Reiman et 
al., 1997, Whalen et al., 1998a).  In emotional picture experiments, previous 
research found greater activations in the ACC during trials requiring 
subjective emotional responses (Hariri et al., 2003, Lane et al., 1997a).  In 
addition, the valence categorisation tasks required greater attentional demands 
than experimental paradigms of passive viewing.  The role of the ACC and 
attentional processing is well documented and is evidenced by an experiment 
comparing one condition that required emotional responses, (e.g. 
pleasant/unpleasant), and the other asking for contextual responses, (e.g. is 
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this scene indoors or outdoors) (Lane et al., 1997a).  The former showed 
greater activation in the ACC when attentional resources were engaged in 
subjective emotional responses.  The evidence from the present experiment 
supports this premise as modulation of the ACC due to valence categorisation 
was greater for the emotional experimental conditions than the non-emotional 
control condition.  
 Statistically significant differences were also found when processing 
stimuli of different categories in all three conditions, with greater activations 
for low valence animals and inanimate objects.  Hitherto there is little 
evidence of ACC response to different categories in terms of emotional 
processing in the literature.  Therefore, category specificity will be discussed 
at greater length in the general discussion below.   
 
b) Medial Prefrontal Cortex 
 
When examining the data, it was apparent that the mPFC was sensitive to 
processing of categories both with brief, masked presentations and under 
normal viewing.  It has been hypothesised that the mPFC is involved in 
maintaining attention in order to assess and process information from other 
brain regions.  However, it is also reported that activations in the mPFC 
decrease (as opposed to increase in the ACC and DLPFC) during an 
attentionally demanding cognitive task, thus suggesting that within this region 
there is an active relationship between cognition and emotion (Bush et al., 
2000, Simpson et al., 2001a, Simpson et al., 2001b).  As previously stated, 
this experiment did employ a valence categorisation task, which may have 
modulated emotional processing.   
 Equally, the role of the mPFC in emotional self awareness (Lane et al., 
1997b) and the recurring feelings of emotional memories (Damasio, 1999), 
may explain mPFC activations based on associated personal experience.  For 
instance, Phan et al. (2004) noted that activations in the vMPFC reflect the 
modulation of self association more than the value of emotional valence (Phan 
et al., 2004).   
 There was no evidence to suggest any significant difference in positive 
or negative valence processing.  This complements previous findings in two 
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meta-analyses in that the mPFC is not valence specific, but has a more general 
role in emotion processing (Lane et al., 1997c, Murphy et al., 2003, Phan et 
al., 2002).  This is also supported by a study using IAPS stimuli (Lane et al., 
1997c) and lesion studies whereby damage to the mPFC resulted in changes in 
both positive and negative emotional experience (Damasio, 1994).   
 
c) Parahippocampus 
 
These findings support previous research that the parahippocampus is 
category specific (Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998, Epstein et al., 1999, 
Nakamura et al., 2000, O'Craven and Kanwisher, 2000).  Response was 
greater when viewing inanimate objects as compared to scenes, faces and 
animals.  In part, this is consistent with previous findings comparing objects 
relative to faces (Kanwisher et al., 1996).  There were no effects of valence.   
 It was also evident that the parahippocampus was activated for 
normally viewed presentations only.  There is no evidence to suggest that this 
region is activated below or close to the threshold of conscious awareness.   
 
d) Amygdala 
 
Previous data demonstrate a rapid response in the amygdala to the emotional 
content of stimuli (LeDoux, 2002), which is implicitly processed (Whalen et 
al., 1998b).  Equally, the amygdala is known for rapid habituation of 
responses to affective faces (Breiter et al., 1996, Whalen et al., 1998b).  
According to these published views, positive activations to emotional stimuli 
(relative to control stimuli) were expected to be found with brief, masked 
presentations as well as under normal viewing, but this was not the case.  
Lateralisation of amygdala responses has been previously reported in 
neuroimaging studies.  One such experiment used a backward masking 
paradigm with visual images of faces, and noted more neural activation in the 
RH for masked presentations and greater activations in the LH for unmasked 
presentations.  They concluded that lateralisation varies in relation to 
conscious awareness of the target stimuli (Morris et al., 1998b).  Again, the 
present study found no evidence of this.   
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 Another unexpected negative finding is that there was no significant 
effect of valence - as the amygdala is well documented to be fear-related, one 
would have expected a difference in responses to high and low valence 
stimuli.  Two possible explanations seem plausible.  First, the content of many 
of the low valence IAPS face stimuli could be associated with disgust or 
sadness rather than fear, for instance a tumour on a baby’s face, eye disease 
and battered female.  The stimuli that could be associated with fear were 
mainly inanimate objects, (e.g. aimed gun), or animals, (e.g. attack dog).  It is 
interesting, therefore, to note that the greatest value in the estimated marginal 
means was found with low valence inanimate objects.  In support of this 
interpretation, Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd (2004) found zero activation in 
the amygdala when viewing nonconscious masked sad faces, hypothesising 
that sadness is not of immediate survival value whereas fear is (Killgore and 
Yurgelun-Todd, 2004).  On the other hand, the amygdala has been reported to 
have a more generalised role in emotional processing than previously thought, 
(e.g. processing happy facial expressions) (Adolphs, 2002, Breiter et al., 1996, 
Britton et al., 2006b), sadness (Blair et al., 1999), and anger (Whalen et al., 
2001).  Therefore, an effect of valence would not necessarily be apparent 
using a positive and negative dissociation.   
 In addition, the authors listed above all reported affective results from 
face stimuli which are partly comparable to this experiment, in that faces 
incurred the second greatest value in the estimated marginal means in the 
amygdala.  As an example of the varying results using different stimuli, 
Britton et al. (2006b) compared face stimuli with IAPS pictures of scenes and 
noted activation in the amygdala whilst viewing happy facial expressions, but 
not for positive IAPS scenes (Britton et al., 2006b).  A similar study found 
greater amygdala response to fearful facial expressions than IAPS images of 
scenes evoking a fearful response (Hariri et al., 2002).  These findings, in part, 
run counter to those studies using IAPS pictures demonstrating that positive 
and negative affect are both processed by the amygdala, thus concluding a 
more general role in emotional processing (Amaral et al., 2003, Liberzon et 
al., 2003).  One point of view suggests that because the amygdala is part of 
the ‘primitive’ limbic brain, it is thought to be recruited for primary aversive 
detection, (e.g. danger).  However, Liberzon argues that appetitive detection is 
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also of primary importance, as highlighted by ‘positive’ survival functions, 
(i.e. sustenance and reproduction) (Liberzon et al., 2003).   
 Secondly, the arousal ratings of the stimuli used were not of the 
highest score available in the IAPS set.  As previously discussed, for ethical 
reasons it was decided not to use pictures of mutilated bodies (negative 
valence, very high arousal) or erotica (positive valence, very high arousal).  
Therefore, the small amygdala activations from this experiment may be due to 
the relative subtlety of the stimuli.  The involvement of the amygdala in the 
evaluation of arousal dimension of affect has been previously documented 
(LaBar et al., 1998) and in particular the left amygdala is associated with the 
intensity of emotion (Cunningham et al., 2004).  Others have reported that 
amygdala activations are correlated with arousal and not with valence 
(Heinzel et al., 2005).   
 Equally, this experiment employed a valence categorisation task and 
Pessoa et al. (2005b) found a reduction in amygdala activity to unattended 
affective stimuli during cognitive tasks, which suggested active suppression of 
the amygdala.  This cognitive modulation hypothesis (Pessoa et al., 2005b) 
was drawn from evidence of reciprocal functional exchanges between 
cognitive and emotional systems (Mayberg et al., 1999).  Cognitive evaluation 
attenuating amygdala activations suggesting involvement in emotional 
regulation is documented elsewhere (Hariri et al., 2003).   
 Moreover, although this experiment did not investigate functional 
interactions between ROIs, it is interesting to note that the absence of 
significant activations in the amygdala with regard to brief, masked and 
normally viewed conditions coexists with significant activations in the mPFC 
and DLPFC, which would be consistent with amygdala suppression from 
PFC.  Prefrontal Cortices and amygdala interactions have been investigated 
with reference to emotional processing and cognitive evaluation (Keightley et 
al., 2003, Lange et al., 2003).  One hypothesis is that a modulative integration 
serves to facilitate conscious evaluation to monitor primitive emotions (Hariri 
et al., 2003).    
 There is a third potential explanation for a negative finding regarding 
valence response.  The amygdala is a small structure and an anatomical error 
is a possibility.  This risk was minimised by following the preprocessing 
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procedure (section 2:1:4) and checking the activation patterns with 
coordinates for each participant.  Equally an 8mm radius sphere centred on the 
coordinates for the amygdala in both hemispheres was a fair balance between 
sensitivity and accuracy.  It should be noted that using the same procedures, 
significant activations in the amygdala were recorded in the next fMRI 
experiment. 
  
e) Superior Temporal Gyrus  
 
Using fMRI, Phillips et al. (1998) found significant activation in the STG for 
both facial images and vocal expressions of fear and disgust.  They 
hypothesised that the STG responds to the emotional content of faces and 
vocal sounds suggesting a general role for the perception of emotional stimuli 
(Phillips et al., 1998).  Other studies investigating the neural response of the 
STG with facial stimuli include an experiment conducted by Britton et al. 
(2006b), who compared low rated valence and arousal images of facial 
expressions with higher rated valence and arousal IAPS pictures.  They found 
greater activations for face processing (Britton et al., 2006b).  Greater 
response to faces than IAPS pictures can be partly explained by the hypothesis 
that the STG is involved in processing dynamic facial components, (e.g. 
mouth expression in relation to lip-reading).  This is quite logical as the STG 
is a large structure that contains several functional units that are responsible 
for sound (e.g. primary auditory cortex and Wernicke’s area) (Haxby et al., 
2000).   
 On close inspection of the IAPS stimuli in the Britton experiment 
(Britton et al., 2006b), however, it would appear that the set of pictures used 
included faces, (e.g. babies), and that they were balanced in relation to target 
emotions and not to specific categories.  Therefore, one could surmise that the 
imbalance of the percentage of face stimuli could bias the comparative result.   
 In the current study categories were evenly balanced in terms of 
category membership, valence and intensity, but activations for face stimuli 
were no greater than activations for other categories.  It is interesting, 
however, that the greater significance of LV inanimate objects in the present 
experiment suggests category-related activity for negative stimuli, which 
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supports the significance of low valence images in the Britton et al. (2006b) 
experiment.  Previous studies have drawn attention to greater STG activity 
when presented with LV stimuli such as fear and disgust (Phillips et al., 1998) 
and mutilations from the IAPS series (Kuniecki et al., 2003).  Equally, a study 
using animals, faces, houses and tools found the STG to be category related, 
hypothesising a non-biological object motion association (Chao et al., 1999) 
based on topographical evidence that the temporal gyrus is in the proximity of 
the motion perception areas (V5) (Zeki et al., 1991).  By the same token, 
damage to the occipital-temporal-parietal junction (V5) is reported to impair 
knowledge retrieval about tools (Tranel et al., 1997).  However, to the best of 
my knowledge, no other study than this current research has examined a 
category x valence interaction in the STG and, as such, this is a topic for 
further research.   
 
f) Insula 
 
It was clearly evident that hemispheric specialisation was apparent in the 
insula.  All significant activations were in the RH for LV stimuli across all 
conditions.  These results concur with the valence lateralisation hypothesis, 
which postulates that negative emotions are lateralised towards the RH (Canli 
et al., 1998, Davidson and Irwin, 1999).   
 In addition, RH specialisation in the insula was reported in an explicit 
evaluation task of affective facial expressions (Britton et al., 2006b) and a 
correlation between the RH and valence has also been documented 
(Cunningham et al., 2004).   
 Moreover, the significance of LV stimuli supports previous research, 
in that the insula is associated with the emotion disgust (Calder et al., 2001, 
Phillips et al., 1997, Phillips et al., 2004).  It is interesting to note that in the 
behavioural experiment in the present study the image of the dirty toilet 
evoked the greatest subjective reaction of disgust and in the present fMRI 
experiment LV inanimate objects showed the greatest activations.  
Furthermore, a meta-analysis on 65 studies investigating emotion using 
neuroimaging confirmed insula activations for negative stimuli (Wager et al., 
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2003).  Equally, recalling sadness whilst watching silent film clips 
demonstrated increased activations in the anterior insula (Lane et al., 1997b).   
 
g) Fusiform Gyrus 
 
In keeping with previous research, the fusiform gyrus did show a main effect 
of category.  Looking at the estimated marginal means, it appears that 
inanimate objects showed marginally greater activations than the other 
categories, including faces.  However, positive values were also apparent for 
low and high valence faces under normal viewing, which is consistent with 
previous reports implicating the fusiform gyrus in emotional processing of 
faces (Adolphs et al., 1996, Nakamura et al., 2000), and specifically, fearful 
faces (Vuilleumier et al., 2001).  Nakamura and colleagues however 
demonstrated posterior fusiform gyrus activation non-selectively in both faces 
and scenes and concluded that, in complex images, this region is involved in 
extracting physical features (Nakamura et al., 2000).   
 Previous findings have shown that fusiform activations are modulated 
by valence (Paradiso et al., 1999, Vuilleumier et al., 2001), but present results 
did not reveal any significance of valence.   
 
h) Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex 
 
Hemispheric specialisation was marginally evident in the DLPFC, with 
significant activations in the LH with normally viewed stimuli and RH 
dominance when presented with brief, masked stimuli, although these effect 
sizes were small.  It has been hypothesised that both hemispheres complement 
each other in terms of emotional processing.  This theory suggests that the 
role of the RH is to subserve the subcortical limbic centres and the LH is 
involved in the control capacity of higher cortical structures (Gainotti et al., 
1993).   
 Valence modulation was evident when viewing LV inanimate objects 
both in the brief, masked condition and under normal viewing.  These findings 
demonstrate a) neural activity in the DLPFC close to or below the level of 
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conscious perception and b) that DLPFC shows greater activity for processing 
negative emotion than positive.   
 Previous studies have shown that the DLPFC is modulated by valence 
(Grimm et al., 2006) and in particular aversive stimuli, although the RH is 
implicated (Nitschke et al., 2006).   
 
i) Orbitofrontal Cortex 
 
There was no main effect of valence and this result is consistent with lesion 
studies noting that patients with damage to the OFC suffer from changes in 
both positive and negative emotion (Hornak et al., 1996, Hornak et al., 2003), 
thus suggesting a more general role in emotional processing (Drevets and 
Raichle, 1998, Murphy et al., 2003) and for processing of emotionally salient 
stimuli (Adolphs, 2002).   
 However, the present experiment found greater activation for LV 
inanimate objects, which may have been particularly noticeable (e.g. dirty 
toilet).  This idea was reinforced by a significant main effect of category and 
significant interaction between valence x category.   
 The anatomical connections into autonomic centres in the limbic and 
paralimbic regions (Öngür et al., 1998), and the reported heavy connections 
with the intraprefrontal regions (e.g. DLPFC) (Cavada et al., 2000) support 
the hypothesis of the OFC’s involvement in cognitive-emotion coalescence 
and top-down processing.  However, significant activations were evident in 
the present experiments not only in normal viewing, but also for brief, masked 
stimuli close to and below conscious threshold.   
 
 4:5:2  General Discussion   
 
The purpose of the present study was to examine the effect of valence both in 
normal viewing, and close to or below the threshold of conscious perception, 
whilst viewing four categories of natural images.  Having discussed the results 
of each ROI separately, these findings in relation to the significance of 
valence, unconscious processing and category effects in general will now be 
considered.   
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Valence 
 
There was evidence of significant overall effects of stimulus valence, 
bilaterally in the STG and ACC and in the right insula.  This, in part, supports 
the hemispheric lateralisation valence hypothesis in that the RH is more likely 
to process emotion.  This premise was originally based on behavioural and 
clinical studies (Ross, 1984, Sackheim et al., 1982), but remains controversial.  
Nevertheless, there is some indication in these results to support the 
hypothesis and, as such, there is evidence that right hemisphere dominance 
(RHD) in both near-threshold and suprathreshold emotional processing is 
extended to categories other than faces and scenes.   
 In support of this, LV stimuli elicited greater activations than HV in 
the RH for the insula, and bilaterally in general across most of the remaining 
ROIs.   
 It is clear that unpleasant stimuli activated both phylogenetically older 
(e.g. insula) and newer (e.g. DLPFC) systems.  One would expect the former, 
as unpleasant pictures may elicit disgust derived from distaste associated with 
the danger of contaminated food (Rozin et al., 1994), but the latter is not so 
obvious as prefrontal cortices are associated with employing attentional 
systems to verify emotional content, which are obviously not exclusively 
unpleasant, and can be either pleasant or unpleasant (Berthoz et al., 2002).  
However, studies researching damage to the left DLPFC have highlighted 
that, as a result, patients suffer from depressive symptoms and have therefore 
reasoned that this region is associated with positive affect (Mineka et al., 
1998); although other research has challenged this theory (Gainotti et al., 
1997, House et al., 1990).  Present results, however, show greater processing 
of unpleasant stimuli in areas associated with both cognition and affect.   
 Greater activations for normally viewed images than for brief, masked 
exposures were found in the parahippocampus, STG, amygdala and fusiform 
gyrus.   
 In the ACC, STG, insula, DLPFC and OFC the valence of stimuli was 
processed both in the brief, masked condition and under normal viewing this 
indicates that the level of conscious processing of the stimuli was not an 
overriding factor.  It also tells us that the said regions are activated close to or 
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below the threshold of consciousness and suggests that the activations to such 
brief presentations must be relatively sustained in order to be detected reliably 
in a block-design fMRI experiment.  Hemispheric differences were evident 
between normal viewing and brief, masked conditions in the DLPFC, which 
has been expanded upon above when discussing the DLPFC separately.   
 
Categories 
 
Some concerns were raised as a result of the behavioural experiment of 
Chapter 3 that the a priori stimulus categories (animals, faces, scenes and 
inanimate objects) might have low reliability due to variation between 
individual slides and the small number of slides per category.  This issue was 
addressed in the current experiment by introducing a second set of stimuli, 
thus doubling the number of examples, and allowing a replication of category-
specific effects.  The results of the present fMRI study showed that the 
category-specific effects were indeed replicated, and that the two sets of 
normally-viewed stimuli gave similar results.  Furthermore, the category-
dependent effects seen in the present fMRI study did not follow the pattern 
expected, if they were due to a confounding variable such as detectability (see 
Chapter 3).  There is thus some justification for interpreting the present results 
in terms of category-specificity.   
 Previous research examining the effect of categories has highlighted 
two different classifications of stimuli: ‘natural objects’ such as animals and 
fruit; and ‘man-made objects’ such as vehicles and tools (Moore and Price, 
1999).  These ‘living’ and ‘non-living’ dissociations are based on impairments 
in identification of stimuli from brain lesion studies (Warrington and Shallice, 
1984).  Two theories attempt to explain this tenet.  First, man-made objects 
are identified by their functional attributes, (e.g. sports car is for driving); 
whereas identification of natural objects relies on perceptual features, (e.g. a 
lion has a mane, tail etc.) (Farah and McClelland, 1991, Warrington and 
Shallice, 1984).  The second theory supports the differentiation between 
natural objects and man-made objects not because of their functional and 
perceptual features, but because identifying natural images places different 
neural demands due to their complexities and similarities, compared to the 
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more distinct man-made objects.  Thus the differentiation is one of different 
demands due to levels of distinctiveness on shared neural systems (Durrant-
Peatfield et al., 1997, Gelman, 1988). 
 It is not the remit of this thesis to further elucidate category 
membership, but it serves to illustrate category specificity in context of the 
present findings.  As such, and in accordance with these classifications, the 
categories used in this thesis can be organised thus: animals – natural/living; 
faces – natural/living; inanimate objects – man-made/non-living; scenes – 
both natural/living, (e.g. skydiver, waterfall) and man-made/non-living, (e.g. 
car crash, atomic bomb).  The relative ambiguity of scenes, that were also 
anomalous in the behavioural experiment, may account for the lack of 
significant valence effects compared to the other categories.  In fact, the 
parahippocampus recorded the greatest activations when viewing scenes, 
albeit not significantly so, which is in keeping with previous research 
reporting this region’s specialisation in processing places (Epstein and 
Kanwisher, 1998, Epstein et al., 1999, O'Craven and Kanwisher, 2000).  By 
the same token, face processing in complex images was of marginally greater 
significance in the fusiform gyrus (RH) for both low and high valence, which 
again supports previous research in this region’s recorded specialisation of 
processing faces (O'Craven and Kanwisher, 2000, Schultz et al., 2003).  Even 
though this account, in part, concurs with those of previous authors, it is 
necessary to challenge why affective face stimuli were not of greater 
significance in general.   
 There has been considerable interest in comparing facial expressions 
with IAPS pictures as emotional probes, which has highlighted differential 
and common cortical areas in both conscious and unconscious processing 
(Britton et al., 2006b, de Gelder et al., 2002, Hariri et al., 2002).  An 
experiment employing this comparison found greater amygdala activation for 
negative faces than negative IAPS scenes (Hariri et al., 2002).  Most 
experiments investigating this comparison appear to have used simple face 
stimuli and not pictures of faces from the IAPS series.  However, an 
interesting paper by Keightley et al. (2003) compared emotional faces with 
general emotional pictures, whereby all the images contained one or more 
people, including some (although it is not clear how many) with clear facial 
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expressions,.  They found that affective faces were automatically processed in 
the limbic regions whereas the affective general pictures were effective only 
when attention was directed to emotional content (Keightley et al., 2003).  
The face stimuli in the current experiment were similar to at least some of the 
general pictures in Keightley’s experiment, with a categorisation task 
specifically drawing attention to the emotional content of the images, but the 
results did not concur.  To date there is little data on the effect of face stimuli 
when presented in the complex and variable context of everyday images, 
therefore the same facial expression stimuli need to be presented with 
different pictorial contexts to investigate the possible valence modulation of 
complex presentations.   
 Let us speculate at this point and suggest that the images of animals 
and inanimate objects were more prototypical stimuli (likely to have been 
seen before, e.g. dogs, toilets) whereas the scenes and faces were less 
prototypical (less likely to have been seen before, e.g. air crash, baby tumour).  
Of course, individual perceptual history will vary, but prototypicality effects 
are known to be robust.  The concept of a prototypical category member is 
important in cognitive psychology as it can explain performance in 
categorisation tasks.  The prototypical image is built up from cognitive and 
perceptual information rather than a memory or accurate picture (Rosch, 1975, 
Rosch and Mervis, 1975).  This idea may explain why animals and inanimate 
objects showed greater neural activity than other categories in the majority of 
ROIs.   
 
The Negative Estimated Marginal Means 
 
A further aspect of these findings needs to be considered.  Several of the brain 
regions showed negative estimated marginal means for varying stimuli which 
implies, in these instances, that there were greater activations for the control 
condition than experimental conditions.  One possible explanation is that 
trying to categorise the emotional valence of a control stimulus is less 
straightforward than categorising the pleasant/unpleasant stimuli, in which 
case greater attentional demands would be required (as there is no obvious 
positive or negative answer).  This idea is consistent with visual search 
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experiments whereby targets are processed in shorter reaction times than non-
targets, as more time is needed for analysis (Treisman and Gelade, 1980).   
  
Summary of results.  
 
To summarise, these results show that when presenting affective complex 
stimuli, there are significant effects involving stimulus valence under normal 
viewing conditions, in ACC, STG, insula, DLPFC and OFC (H1).  When 
presented in brief, masked exposures, significant effects involving stimulus 
valence are found in ACC, insula, DLPFC and OFC (H2).  There are some 
differences between brief, masked and normally viewed presentations in 
mPFC, parahippocampus, amygdala, insula and fusiform gyrus (confirming 
H3).  The cause of these differences is uncertain. It is possible that the kinds of 
anomalous effects reported in Ch3 (i.e. reversal of apparent valence due to 
brief, masked exposure) contribute, but if these anomalies are effects of 
individual pictures, they are more likely to appear in higher order interaction 
terms of ANOVA (where cell size is small), and the only plausible confound 
of this kind is the condition x category interaction in mPFC (which should 
therefore be treated with caution).  There are significant effects involving 
category (H4) in ACC, mPFC, parahippocampus, STG, insula, fusiform gyrus, 
DLPFC and OFC.  There is a marginal effect of valence in relation to 
hemispheric specificity in insula (H5); and there are significant effects 
involving category under brief, masked conditions in ACC, mPFC, STG, 
insula, DLPFC and OFC (H6).   
 If brief, masked presentations induced significant activations where 
normally viewed presentations did not, this would suggest that the chosen 
ROIs were activated for brief exposures only.  This was not the case.   
 If normally viewed presentations were significant and brief, masked 
were not, this would suggest that particular region was not significantly 
activated close to or below conscious threshold.  This pattern was evident in 
the fusiform gyrus, parahippocampus and OFC, where there was a category 
effect under normal viewing only, and in the STG for valence and valence x 
category.   
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 However, without exception, we only witnessed significant activations 
to brief, masked stimuli when they were also significant for normally viewed 
presentations.  This could suggest a graded process within a single 
mechanism/pathway, rather than a different mechanism/pathway.   
 
4:6  Conclusion   
 
Forward and backward masked stimuli presented for just 10 ms (see section 
2:1:2) were shown (in Chapter 3) to allow discrimination of valence that was 
significantly different from control stimuli.  These are stringent temporal 
parameters, and might be expected to generate little cortical activity.  
However it is shown in the present chapter that even under these conditions 
significant effects of stimulus valence and / or category were found for a high 
proportion of brief, masked presentations.  Recent research has highlighted 
the rapid and efficient processing of complex natural images (Thorpe et al., 
1996, Thorpe et al., 2001b, VanRullen and Thorpe, 2001c), and the present 
study supports, at least in part, the idea of apparent automatic processing that 
traditionally implies ‘independence from top-down factors’, (e.g. processing 
of coarse information) allowing categorisation in terms of valence and 
arousal.   
 The results of the present study have shown that a limited but 
significant level of processing of complex affective stimuli takes place in the 
near absence of conscious perception.  Two avenues of interest arise.  One is 
to revisit the view that perception without focal attention is severely limited 
and the other is to investigate the extent to which ‘gist’ information is 
processed in unattended images.  To investigate further, an experiment was 
designed to present the same stimuli in conditions of attentional conflict 
between small stimuli presented at fixation, and larger, surrounding stimuli 
extending into the periphery of the visual field.  Although there were no exact 
replications in procedures, a dual stimulus design (selective attention) was 
chosen in comparison with the masked experiment (non-selective attention) in 
order to discuss gist perception and capacity limitations in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5  fMRI Dual-Image Experiment: 
An fMRI study comparing responses to large-field,  
small-field and dual affective stimuli 
 
5:1  Abstract 
 
One of the difficulties with using brief, masked stimuli for fMRI studies is 
that the stimuli are by definition weak.  This in itself may reduce the 
likelihood of obtaining strong patterns of activation in the ROIs.  The purpose 
of the present study is to determine whether similar patterns of sensitivity to 
IAPS stimulus valence and category can be obtained with a different 
paradigm.  Rather than reducing the visibility of the target stimulus by brief 
presentation and masking, the intention here is to reduce conscious processing 
of a highly visible suprathreshold stimulus by providing a second competing 
image.  This was achieved by introducing a ‘dual image paradigm’4, for a 
relatively long duration, using a small (foveal) image superimposed on a large 
(peripheral) image of opposite valence, thus exploiting the poverty of 
peripheral vision in order to explore demands on selective attention. The main 
question is whether ‘to-be-ignored’5 peripheral stimuli result in similar 
activations in the chosen ROIs to brief, masked stimuli, even though there is a 
difference in attentional demands.   
 The variables of interest were the same as those in the previous 
experiment: valence (low and high); category (animals, faces, scenes and 
inanimate objects) and hemispheric specificity.  These findings are discussed 
in light of the results from the masked experiment in context of gist 
information and attentional capacity.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Dual image – compound image consisting of the attended condition superimposed on the 
‘to-be-ignored’ condition of opposite valence. 
5 To-be-ignored condition – instructed to ignore large image, surrounding foveal image of 
the same category, but opposite valence. 
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5:2  Introduction  
 
The density of cone receptor cells for processing photopic visual information 
is greatest in the fovea of the retina.  The cone bipolar neurons and the 
ganglion cells that receive their signals, whose axons form the optic nerve, 
decrease in density moving away from the fovea.  The LGN and primary 
visual cortex both have a strong magnification factor favouring the foveal 
input.  All this means that visual acuity is keenest in the fovea and quickly 
declining in resolution, thus decaying, towards the periphery (Enns, 2004),  
hence the need for saccadic eye movements to bring a stimulus back into 
foveal vision for finer analysis (Liversedge and Findlay, 2000).  
 The technique to be adopted in the present experiment is a selective 
attention approach.  Independent reports completed outside the scanner were 
able to confirm that the more peripheral stimulus in a dual array had a limited 
impact on valence judgments (see Section 5:4:1).  The visual system has 
limited processing capacity and multiple objects in the visual field compete 
for neural representation.  This competition can be biased by selective 
attention, which can adjust neural activity in the visual cortex (Desimone and 
Duncan, 1995).  Existing data (Lavie, 1995, Pashler, 1998) suggest that the 
neural substrate of perception may be suppressed or even eliminated if 
attentional resources are diverted by contending tasks.  Lavie’s theory is that 
the importance of attention is to filter relevant and irrelevant information from 
‘noisy’ visual scenes (Lavie and Tsal, 1994).  For instance, when participants 
were engaged in a linguistic task, they were instructed to ignore a 
simultaneously competing visual task of moving stimuli; as a result motion-
related fMRI activations in area MT were reduced (Rees et al., 1997).  A 
possible exception to this selective mechanism is the processing of emotional 
stimuli, which as previously stated, is said to be automatic, therefore not 
needing attention.  Calvo et al. (2007) briefly presented stimuli in the 
peripheral visual field and found greater selective orientation and preferential 
processing for emotional scenes than for neutral stimuli (Calvo et al., 2007).   
 To reiterate, it is further postulated that visual processing of facial 
expressions is not only automatic, but can also be processed without 
conscious awareness (Dimberg et al., 2000).  This claim is supported only in 
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part by Vuilleumier et al (2001).  Using a matching task of images of faces 
and houses presented at various locations in the visual field, they 
demonstrated that attention modulates fusiform activity especially for fearful 
faces, whereas amygdala response to fearful faces was consistent regardless of 
attentional demands (Vuilleumier et al., 2001).  On the other hand, a study 
(Pessoa et al., 2002a) examining the neural correlates of faces with emotional 
content, including the amygdala, found that processing was not automatic and 
needed sufficient attentional mechanisms in order to process faces, and 
therefore under top-down control.  In addition, it is argued that emotional 
(especially negative) stimuli can bias the competition for processing 
resources.  Again, this means that emotionally valenced stimuli have a 
competitive advantage over neutral stimuli.   
 Developing on from this, it is possible to detect differences in 
‘attended’6 (foveal) and ‘to-be-ignored’ (peripheral) perception of emotion of 
visual stimuli.  For instance, previous studies have demonstrated that the 
advanced visual processing of foveal information suggests that it is easier to 
ignore stimuli presented in the low resolution periphery, where acuity of 
object recognition is too poor to be accurate (Beck and Lavie, 2005, Thorpe et 
al., 2001b).  In order to bring objects into foveal vision, studies have 
demonstrated that both saccadic eye movements and selective attention are 
necessary (e.g. Liversedge and Findlay, 2000).   
 Although stimuli presented in the visual periphery are normally 
outside the focus of overt attention, a recognition study conducted by Calvo et 
al. (2005) presented complex images of affective scenes in the parafoveal 
visual field, and found the perception of emotional scenes had the advantage 
over neutral scenes.  Interpretation of these results concluded that analysis by 
the cognitive system (i.e. recovery of semantic information) of affective 
scenes began covertly in parafoveal vision in advance of overt attention at 
foveal fixation, thus suggesting that the attentional field for emotional stimuli 
is broader than just the foveal spatial field (Calvo and Lang, 2005).   
 On the other hand, attention does not search out information by 
sweeping the visual field as the searchlight metaphor implies (Cave and 
                                                 
6 Attended condition – instructed to voluntarily attend to a small image presented in the 
fovea superimposed on a large image of the same category, but opposite valence. 
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Bichot, 1999).  Rather, Sperling and Weichselgartner argue a stage light 
analogy being more accurate in that it focuses on different actors in turn 
(Sperling and Weichselgartner, 1995).  However, this implies a fast sequential 
process of which there is little evidence (Findlay and Gilchrist, 2003).  In fact, 
the pursuit of understanding the selection of the next fixation attracts lively 
interpretation. 
 Studies have shown that it is also possible to covertly attend to items, 
(i.e. that attention can shift away from fixation without saccadic eye 
movements) (Thorpe et al., 2001b).  Investigating spatial cueing, it was found 
that faster reaction times were achieved when the location of a target was cued 
even without eye movements (Posner, 1980, Posner et al., 1980).  Later it was 
argued that covert perceptual attention precedes a saccade in order to facilitate 
saccades and improve identification of target (Kowler et al., 1995).  On the 
other hand, the advantages of passive covert attention have mystified others 
when one considers the immediate advantages of active overt attention by 
means of a saccade bringing an item into fine detailed foveal vision (Findlay 
and Gilchrist, 2003).   
 Equally, there is evidence that attention can be directed to more than 
one item at once.  Studies asking participants to identify peripheral targets 
whilst fixating on the fovea have shown convincing support of our ability to 
be visually aware outside the focus of attention if the target is salient enough 
(Braun, 1994, Braun and Sagi, 1990).   
 Research continues to explore the relationship between foveal and 
peripheral visual perception, with an increase in the use of natural images as 
stimuli.  These include Li et al. (2002) who used natural images of scenes in 
an animal/vehicle categorisation go/no-go experiment, whereby images were 
randomly flashed in the periphery at around 6.1º eccentricity for, in effect, 
80ms followed by a mask.  They concluded that participants are highly 
efficient at categorising the ‘gist’ of natural scenes (Li et al., 2002).   
 Similar findings using an animal go/no-go task were found when two 
images were presented at the same time in the two hemifields with 
eccentricity of 3.6º left or right of fixation (Rousselet et al., 2002) and a study 
using one full image presented between two partial images, unmasked 
(Thorpe et al., 2001b), as well as presentations in the far periphery (Thorpe et 
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al., 1999).  Equally, a study using a face-gender discrimination task presented 
stimuli at random locations of 8º x 10º of visual angle with SOA for faces at 
133-160ms (Reddy et al., 2004).  These studies, using a foveal peripheral 
paradigm, suggest that complex stimuli are processed rapidly in the near 
absence of attention.   
 Others have concluded that face processing depends on voluntary 
attention, as found in a matching task in peripherally presented faces and 
houses (Wojciulik et al., 1998), and that both pleasant and unpleasant images 
capture overt visual attention (Nummenmaa et al., 2006).  These findings 
were supported in that affective perception occurs in the periphery at the cost 
of needing covert attentional resources (Calvo and Nummenmaa, 2007), and 
although coarse information may be extracted in the peripheral visual field, 
unless this advances selective attention, false alarms are likely (Calvo et al., 
2008).   
 To further this line of enquiry, different methods were employed in the 
present experiment.  For instance, Li and Reddy used extensive training 
procedures in order to coordinate motor demands (Li et al., 2002, Reddy et al., 
2004), which could have affected the outcome.  Motor responses were not part 
of the design for this experiment, so it was not necessary to include training 
procedures.  Equally, Rousselet presented stimuli in the two hemifields 
(Rousselet et al., 2002), whereas this experiment employed a small image 
presented at fixation superimposed on a big image, thus presented in the 
periphery.   
 To take into account the duration of a saccade, with the intervals 
between saccades, it is estimated that 2 to 3 saccadic eye movements are made 
per second (Irwin and Brockmole, 2000, Koch, 2004).  Therefore, in order to 
limit the effect of possible eye movements from one location to another, it is 
not uncommon for researchers to restrict the duration exposure of visual 
stimuli to <250ms (Li et al., 2002, Reddy et al., 2004, Rousselet et al., 2002). 
An example of this was a study by Prado and colleagues (2005) investigating 
cortical systems for reaching towards targets in fovea and peripheral vision, 
using three conditions.  In the first, the target duration was 7s and therefore 
captured by the fovea.  In the second, the target disappeared after 150ms thus 
interfering with fovea capture and therefore processed in the periphery; and in 
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the third the participants were ‘not allowed’ (Prado et al., 2005, p 850) to 
make a saccade during a 7s presentation.  They concluded that reaching in the 
peripheral visual field activates more cortical regions than when reaching in 
central vision (Prado et al., 2005).   
 These parameters were considered when designing the present 
experiment.  However, in order to address the possibility that the brief 
exposure duration of the stimuli in Chapter 4 did not allow for a time to peak 
for the BOLD signal, it was decided to display the stimuli for 1s.  This is the 
minimum for time to peak for short stimuli (Jezzard et al., 2001).  In light of 
this, three measures were undertaken to discourage saccades: a) the 
participants were instructed to attend to the foveal stimulus only - a separate 
behavioural study investigated the efficacy of this instruction; b) by 
continually positioning the foveal image centrally facilitating attention 
directed by expectation (Holm et al., 2008); and c) a categorisation task was 
employed to ensure fixation to target and to challenge attentional 
capacity/resource limitations, thus to reduce peripheral interference.   
 Nevertheless, these stimuli are not presented at or below the detection 
threshold, as in chapter 3 and 4, since it is obvious that the large-field 
surround is always present in the combined stimulus.  The data will be 
examined to determine whether it can support findings from the masked 
experiment, and allow for comparisons of patterns of activations in the nine 
ROIs.   
 In sum, foveal stimuli were used as the voluntarily ‘attended’ target in 
order to measure the voluntarily ‘to-be-ignored’ peripheral stimuli, thus 
investigating the interaction between selective attention and emotional 
evaluation.  
 It was hypothesised that: 
H¹ There are significant effects involving valence for 
‘attended’ conditions.  
H² There are significant effects involving valence for ‘to-be-
ignored’ conditions. 
H³ Valence effect is different between ‘attended’ and ‘to be 
ignored’ conditions.   
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H4 There are significant effects involving category for 
‘attended’ condition. 
H5 There are significant effects involving category for ‘to-
be-ignored’ stimuli 
H6 There are hemispheric differences between activations in 
paired (left and right) ROIs  
 
5:3  Method   
 
 5:3:1  Participants 
 
Eleven females and five males (age range 19 – 37 years, mean age 27.7) 
participated in the experiment.  The same screening process and ethical 
considerations took place as in the masked experiment (see section 2:4:1).   
 Again, the only payment made to the participants was to those who 
travelled to the scanner independently where travel expenses were reimbursed.   
 
 5:3:2  Design  
 
Each image (I) was shown for 1s within a block consisting of three images of 
the same emotional category (e.g. LV faces) and same condition (e.g. large-
field), and three neutral (N) pictures in the same condition (e.g. large-field) to 
ensure that the participant’s emotional response returned to baseline level.  
The baseline (neutral visual stimuli) was modelled implicitly, therefore 
modelling the neutral (baseline) condition as a separate regressor was not 
necessary.   
 Between each image there was a blank (B) screen lasting 1s with a 2s 
blank between each category, therefore each block lasted fourteen seconds 
(Figure 5.1).   
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Figure 5.1  Block time sequence . 
Key: N1-N3 = neutral images.  B = blank.  I1 - I3 = target images. 
 
As the images were not masked, the neutral images and blank screens were of 
extra value in order to reduce any iconic representation after the target images 
disappeared.   
 The same stimuli were presented in three different ways.  The first was 
control stimulus condition 1, a no-conflict condition whereby single large 
versions of the pictures were shown in the central and near-peripheral visual 
field.  This ‘large-field’ single picture occupied a rectangle 16x10 deg (Figure 
5.2).  The second, control condition 2, consisted of small pictures presented at 
the fovea.  The ‘small-field’ condition showed single pictures (3.75x2.5 deg) 
(Figure 5.3).  The third stimulus type (condition 3), combined ‘attended’ 
(foveal) and ‘to-be-ignored’ (peripheral) pictures of opposite valence.  This 
dual image consisted of small-field pictures superimposed centrally on large-
field pictures of opposite valence and equivalent category (Figure 5.4).  There 
were 24 blocks with the presentation order randomised for valence and 
category.   
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Figure 5.2  Large-field control condition one.  LV inanimate slide number 9301 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             
Figure 5.3  Small-field control condition two.  HV face slide number 2071 
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Figure 5.4  Dual image consisting of LV foveal (voluntarily ‘attended’) animal slide number 
1525; with HV peripheral (‘to-be-ignored’) animal slide number 1650. 
 
 5:3:3  Procedure 
 
In keeping with the procedure of the first fMRI experiment, the participants 
carried out the same screening process (see section 4:2:4) and were 
thoroughly briefed in the control room, where they viewed a trial run on a 
laptop computer using different images to those in the actual experiment.   
 
The instruction slide read as follows: 
• Each picture will appear quickly. 
• Please indicate whether the images are pleasant, unpleasant or neutral.  
• Press the left button for pleasant, the right button for unpleasant and 
the middle button for neither. 
• Some of the pictures are big. Some are small.  Some are big with a 
small picture in the centre – when these appear please attend to the 
small central picture only.   
• GET READY 
Once again the button box was a dummy used for greater attention.   
Attended
Foveal 
HV  
HV 
LV 
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 5:3:4  fMRI Data Acquisition 
 
Data were acquired using procedures as outlined in section 2:1:2 and 2:1:4.  
Functional images were acquired using a T2-weighted gradient EPI sequence 
over 5.60 minutes (TR = 2000 ms, TE = 30 ms, FoV = 192 x 192mm, flip 
angle = 90°).  33 transversal (axial) planes were recorded with a thickness of 
3mm.  Voxel size 3 x 3 x 3, number of measurements = 168 volumes.   
 
 5:3:5  Data Analysis 
 
a) Analysis of fMRI data 
 
Again SPM2 (Friston and Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, 
2003) (http://www.fil.ion.ac.uk/spm) was used for statistical processing which 
was implemented in MATLAB (MATLAB Inc, 2002) 
(http://www.mathworks.com/products/matlab).  The same pre-processing was 
carried out prior to statistical analysis (see section 2:1:4).   
 As in the previous fMRI experiment a first level analysis was carried 
out as a preliminary investigation.  In the second level analysis, taking into 
account the variability between participants, a significance level for 
differences in activations between experimental conditions of p<0.05 was 
applied.  Using MarsBar toolbox for SPM2 (Brett et al., 2002) 
http://marsbar.sourceforge.net  to analyse the processing of category and 
valence within each ROI, the means of the contrast values (effect sizes) were 
calculated for each of the 16 contrasts and entered into a data matrix (Table 
5.3).  These means are graphically displayed in Figures 5.7 - 5.28 for each 
ROI.  The data analysis procedure was identical to that of the masked 
experiment (see section 2:1:4).   
 The overall purpose of this experiment was to ascertain if emotional 
processing occurs whilst viewing complex affective pictures presented in the 
‘to-be-ignored’ periphery when selective attention is focused on an affective 
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picture of opposite valence presented in the fovea.  This was achieved by 
measuring the effect of valence and categories on specific contrasts between 
experimental conditions.  Contrasts of high and low valence combined 
condition were compared with high and low valence small-field condition 
(this estimates the contribution of the ‘to-be-ignored’ large-field stimulus in 
the combined display: Figure 5.5).  In addition, contrasts were computed 
between the combined display, and the single large-field stimulus (valence 
matched to the surround of the combined display).  This estimates the effect 
of the ‘attended’, opposite-valence small-field stimulus in the combined 
display (Figure 5.6).  In the first contrast (dual > small field), the valence of 
the fixated stimulus is the same. In the second contrast (dual > large field), the 
valence of the fixated stimulus is opposite.  If the surround has no effect, the 
activations produced by these two stimuli should be zero for dual > small 
field.  If the surround has an inhibitory effect on the centre, the activations 
should be negative for dual > small field.  If the surround has an excitatory 
effect, activations should be positive for dual > small field.  Activations 
should be non-zero (depending on a differential response to positive and 
negative valence) for dual > large field.  The dual > large field contrast 
specifically assesses the effect of the small, central field in the dual stimulus.  
The two contrasts (dual > small field) and (dual > large field) will also be 
referred to as ‘to-be-ignored’ and ‘attended’ for the sake of brevity, because in 
the (dual > small field) ‘to-be-ignored’ contrast (Figure 5.5), the ‘attended’ 
part of the dual stimulus is physically approximated by the control stimulus.  
In the ‘attended’ contrast, the (dual > large field) (Figure 5.6), the ‘to-be-
ignored’ part of the dual stimulus is physically approximated by the control 
stimulus.  When referring to the valence of a contrast condition, this will be 
taken to indicate the valence of the (‘to-be-ignored’) large field part of the 
dual stimulus in the ‘to-be-ignored’ contrast, and of the (‘attended’) small 
field part of the dual stimulus in the ‘attended’ contrast.   
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Figure 5.5  Example of the ‘to-be-ignored’ estimate (the combined animal condition minus 
the small-field control HV animal condition which shows the effect of ‘to-be-ignored’ LV 
animals). 
 
     
Figure 5.6  Example of the ‘attended’ estimate (the combined animal condition minus the 
large-field LV animal control condition which shows the effect of ‘attended’ HV animal 
 
Versions of figures 5.5 and 5.6 have been copied into the footer of each page 
of this section whenever a reference is made to this paradigm.  This is to 
ensure the reader can visualise the ‘to-be-ignored’ and ‘attended’ estimates 
while reading this chapter.   
 
b) Analysis of Behavioural Data 
 
Independent raters were engaged to complete subjective reports to further 
ascertain if the participants ever ‘attended’ the ‘to-be-ignored’ stimuli.  A 
paired-samples t-test was carried out on these subjective reports monitoring 
correct responses (see section 5:4:1).   
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5:4  Results 
 
The important contrasts for testing the experimental hypotheses are those that 
show the activation produced by the combined condition (3) versus condition 
(2) small field as a control condition.  By matching the valence and category 
of the small-field stimulus in (3) and (2), the effect of the ‘to-be-ignored’ 
(peripheral) surround stimulus is shown by subtraction.   
 Initial subjective reports were analysed to determine concordance with 
IAPS ratings of the stimuli used in this experiment.   
 
 5:4:1  Subjective Reports 
 
Subjective reports were completed under experimental conditions, similar to 
those of the fMRI study, and these reports monitored the concordance of 
pleasant/unpleasant responses to the stimuli of the MRI study with the 
published IAPS ratings of the component pictures.  The questionnaires 
(Appendix XI) were completed by independent raters rather than the 
participants in the MRI study, because habituation might alter the valence and 
intensity of responses to a second viewing of these emotional stimuli (Breiter 
et al., 1996, Fischer et al., 2003).  Whereas it cannot be proven that 
participants never attended to the ‘to-be-ignored’ peripheral stimuli, analysis 
of the responses of the independent raters did reveal a strong attentional bias 
for central stimuli.   
 A paired-samples t-test showed that the number of concordant 
responses was not significantly different for the ‘large-field’ single pictures 
and the dual task stimuli (t=0.257, df 23, p=0.799, two tailed); and there were 
no significant differences between the ‘small-field’ single pictures and the 
dual task images (t=0.182, df 23, p=0.857, two tailed) (Table 5.1).  The means 
in Table 5.1 are the means of total concordant responses out of 48 (24 target 
images and 24 neutral images).   
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 Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean N 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Pair 
1 
 
Large-field 
 
Attended foveal in 
dual image 
44.38
44.25
24
24
1.345
1.894
.275 
 
.387 
Pair 
2 
 
Small-field 
 
Attended foveal in 
dual image 
44.33
44.25
24
24
2.014
1.894
.411 
 
.387 
Table 5.1  Descriptive statistics for small field and large field  
Key: Mean = mean of concordant responses.  
 
 5:4:2  First Level Analysis  
 
a) fMRI DATA 
 
An initial first level group analysis was carried out in order to ascertain the 
quality of the data.  In this analysis, the contrast of interest is the subtraction 
of the small-field (foveal ‘attended’) control stimulus from the dual (foveal 
‘attended’ and peripheral ‘to-be-ignored’) stimulus.  This contrast reflects the 
effect of the peripheral ‘to-be-ignored’ stimulus.   
 
b) Effects of valence  
 
Significant activation was found in the left amygdala when viewing ‘to-be-
ignored’ LV stimuli across all four categories and the exact opposite occurred 
when presented with ‘to-be-ignored’ HV stimuli.  This is a significant 
indication that the left and right amygdala subserve different functions in 
emotional processing.  Bilateral activations in the ACC were evident for all 
four categories for ‘to-be-ignored’ peripheral HV, but the left ACC was only 
activated when processing ‘to-be-ignored’ peripheral LV scenes.   
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c) Effects of stimulus category  
 
The fusiform gyrus, parahippocampus and insula were bilaterally activated by 
a ‘to-be-ignored’ peripheral HV and LV surround, and some of these effects 
were category specific.  The fusiform gyrus did not respond only to ‘to-be-
ignored’ peripheral faces, nor did the parahippocampus only react to to-be-
ignored peripheral scenes, suggesting that these areas have only a broad 
categorical response to ‘to-be-ignored’ peripheral stimuli.  STG was activated 
for all ‘to-be-ignored’ peripheral categories regardless of valence. (Table 5.2)   
 
To-Be-
Ignored  
Stimuli 
Amy  ACC mPFC OFC DLPFC Para Fusi Ins STG 
LVA R    L        L      R L      R R L      R 
LVF R    L R L      R R L      R 
LVS R L    R L      R L     R L      R 
LVI R     R      R  R L      R 
HVA L L     R  R L         R L      R L      R L L      R 
HVF L L     R R L      R L         R L       R L    L     R L      R 
HVS L L     R R L    L         R L      R R   L     R L      R 
HVI L L     R L      R L      R L         R L      R L      R R L      R 
Table 5.2  First level activations across all nine ROIs    
Key: Amy = Amygdala;  ACC = Anterior Cingulate Cortex;  mPFC = medial Prefrontal 
Cortex; OFC = Orbital Prefrontal Cortex; DLPFC = Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex; Para = 
Parahippocampus;  Fusi = Fusiform Gyrus; Ins = Insula; STG = Superior Temporal Gyrus.  
 
 
d) Hemispheric differences.  
 
The RH was dominant in the insula for both ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small 
field) LV and HV stimuli, providing evidence that this area is not specific to 
‘to-be-ignored’ peripheral negative emotions.  The RH was dominant across 
all conditions in the fusiform gyrus, parahippocampus and insula.  The left 
ACC saw greater activations than the right, whilst the amygdala was activated 
on both left and right hemispheres equally according to valence.  Overall, 
RHD for ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field) emotional stimuli was recorded.   
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 This first level analysis has shown that the quality of the data did yield 
interesting patterns of brain activation therefore justifying further 
investigation using second level analysis.   
 
 5:4:3  Second Level Analysis 
 
For each pair of ROIs (left and right hemisphere), General Linear Model 
Repeated Measures ANOVA with four factors were entered (hemisphere: 2 
levels, contrast condition: 2 levels, valence: 2 levels and categories: 4 levels).  
These data were entered into an SPSS spreadsheet (SPSS Inc, 2005-8) 
(https://www.spss.com).  This analysis was conducted using a significance 
level for activations of p(crit) = 0.025.  To establish the effect of emotional 
processing, a priori hypotheses maintained that there were significant main 
effects of valence and category.  This was tested by partitioning of the 
ANOVA for dual > small field (Figure. 5.5) and dual > large field (Figure. 
5.6) conditions with a p(crit) of p<0.05.  Mauchly’s test of sphericity was used 
and, where it was significant, degrees of freedom were adjusted according to 
Lower-Bound adjustment.  Where required, further analysis was conducted by 
partitioning the ANOVAs.   
 It is clear from Table 5.3 that each ROI presents a distinctive pattern 
of responses across the nine ROIs and two hemispheric locations.   
 The nine bar charts that follow show the mean contrast values (effect 
sizes) of each ROI for all experimental conditions.   
 However, as the bar charts show, a negative contrast value means a 
greater response to the control stimuli than the target in the combined 
condition.  A preference for ‘attended’, control small-field stimuli may 
account for this pattern.   
 
 
 
 
2nd Level Random Effects Group Analysis Mean Contrast Values 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
LVA Att -0.09 -0.16 -0.30 -0.25 0.19 -0.11 -0.19 0.12 0.02 -0.17 -0.01 -0.41 0.20 0.16 -0.06 0.19 0.06 0.22 
LVF Att -0.02 -0.11 -0.12 -0.24 0.25 0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.31 0.39 0.21 0.44 0.37 -0.05 0.04 
LVS Att -0.03 0.04 -0.07 -0.07 0.31 0.06 0.03 -0.38 -0.13 0.06 -0.02 -0.35 0.54 0.12 0.29 0.71 0.25 0.12 
LVI Att 0.03 -0.08 -0.35 -0.09 0.27 -0.16 -0.02 -0.18 0.02 0.10 -0.03 -0.28 0.48 0.23 0.16 0.66 0.08 0.13 
HVA Att 0.21 0.35 1.19 0.18 -0.47 0.31 0.99 0.71 0.20 0.48 -0.01 1.37 0.09 0.55 0.30 -0.54 0.60 0.30 
HVF Att -0.16 0.12 0.90 0.38 -0.25 0.15 1.26 0.55 0.19 0.03 -0.13 1.16 -0.12 0.20 -0.10 -0.34 0.79 0.64 
HVS Att -0.04 0.16 0.73 0.51 -0.63 0.04 0.90 0.48 -0.11 0.04 -0.01 0.98 -0.20 -0.18 -0.09 -0.58 0.42 0.11 
HVI Att 0.01 0.06 0.78 0.58 -0.85 0.04 0.79 0.52 -0.01 0.04 -0.04 1.16 -0.22 -0.37 -0.35 -0.28 0.53 0.08 
LVA TBI -0.18 -0.27 -0.45 -0.49 0.55 -0.10 -0.10 -0.16 -0.04 -0.20 -0.19 -0.39 0.14 0.23 0.09 0.55 -0.39 -0.08 
LVF TBI -0.15 -0.19 -0.36 -0.31 0.40 -0.06 0.05 -0.04 0.03 -0.24 -0.18 -0.40 0.43 0.43 0.19 0.73 -0.15 0.00 
LVS TBI -0.21 -0.14 -0.48 -0.14 0.48 -0.09 0.08 -0.45 -0.17 -0.31 -0.34 -0.31 0.54 0.39 0.17 1.09 -0.12 0.03 
LVI TBI -0.15 -0.11 -0.46 -0.18 0.38 -0.25 -0.09 -0.27 -0.09 -0.12 -0.20 0.07 0.89 0.30 0.13 0.99 -0.11 -0.04 
HVA TBI -0.40 -0.38 0.67 0.19 -1.01 -0.20 0.84 0.20 -0.33 -0.33 -0.36 1.10 -0.85 -0.68 -0.66 -0.07 0.13 -0.15 
HVF TBI -0.17 -0.15 0.69 0.33 -1.00 -0.17 0.70 0.33 -0.22 -0.05 -0.07 0.96 -0.86 -0.76 -0.71 0.02 0.33 -0.06 
HVS TBI -0.15 -0.05 0.79 0.38 -1.21 -0.26 0.55 0.55 -0.10 0.00 -0.04 0.91 -0.59 -0.79 -0.69 -0.11 0.59 0.11 
HVI TBI -0.05 0.12 0.60 0.36 -0.92 -0.22 0.53 0.46 -0.04 0.14 0.18 0.43 -0.63 -0.77 -0.56 -0.38 0.57 0.11 
 
Table 5.3  Mean contrast values for effect sizes in ROIs – dual image experiment 
Key:   Att = ‘attended’ (dual > large field). TBI = ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field). ROIs 1 – Left Anterior Cingulate Cortex; 2 – Left medial Prefrontal Cortex;  
 3 – Left Parahippocampus; 4 – Left Amygdala; 5 – Left Superior Temporal Gyrus; 6 – Left Insula; 7 – Left Fusiform Gyrus; 8 – Left Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex; 
 9 – Left Orbitofrontal Cortex; 10 – Right Anterior Cingulate Cortex; 11 – Right medial Prefrontal Cortex; 12 Right Parahippocampus; 13 – Right Amygdala;   
 14 – Right Superior Temporal Gyrus;15 – Right Insula; 16 – Right Fusiform Gyrus; 17 – Right Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex; 18 – Right Orbitofrontal Cortex. 
  Nn = +ve means 
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a) Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
 
Figure 5.7  ACC effect sizes. 
Key: 1 LV animals 2 LV faces 3 LV scenes 4 LV inanimate objects 
 5 HV animals 6 HV faces 7 HV scenes 8 HV inanimate objects 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8  Images of the ACC displaying the significant effect of condition, contrasting 
‘attended’ and ‘to-be-ignored’ .  
Key: Green = ‘Attended’ images; Red = ‘To-be-ignored’ images; C = Coronal; S = Sagittal; 
         T = Transverse. 
 
Figure 5.7 shows that there is a difference in activations between ‘attended’ 
(dual > large field) (Figure 5.6) and ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field) 
(Figure 5.5) stimuli in the ACC, with ‘attended’ (dual > large field) (Figure 
5.6) HV animals having the greatest effect size in the RH.  This is 
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demonstrated in Figure 5.8 showing greater activation in the RH with very 
little activation for the ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field) (Figure 5.5) 
condition.   
 ANOVAs confirmed a significant main effect of contrast condition 
(F(1,15) = 12.7; p<0.005), which suggests that the ACC responded differently 
to the stimulus conditions (Figures 5.5 and 5.6).   
 When partitioning the ANOVA matrix, a significant effect of category 
was found in the ‘to-be-ignored’ condition (dual > small field) (F(3,45) = 6.4; 
p<0.005) and a significant interaction between valence x category in the 
‘attended’ condition (dual > large field) (F(3,45) = 5.6; p<0.005).   
 To conclude, these results support previous findings in the masked 
experiment (Chapter 4) in that the ACC is category specific across both 
conditions, but this specificity is dependent upon valence in the ‘attended’ 
condition (dual > large field).  Valence modulation in the ACC has been 
highlighted in previous research (Berthoz et al., 2002, Cunningham et al., 
2004) and visually it is evident that response is greatest for HV animals in the 
‘attended’ condition (dual > large field).   
 
b) Medial Prefrontal Cortex 
 
Figure 5.9  mPFC effect sizes. 
Key: 1 LV animals 2 LV faces 3 LV scenes 4 LV inanimate objects  
 5 HV animals 6 HV faces 7 HV scenes 8 HV inanimate objects 
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Figure 5.10 Images of the mPFC displaying the significant effect of valence (HVI>LVI) for 
‘to-be-ignored’ condition. 
Key: Red = HVI; Green = LVI; C = Coronal; S = Sagittal; T = Transverse. 
 
In Figure 5.9 there is a distinction between ‘attended’ (dual > large field) 
(Figure 5.6) and ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field) (Figure 5.5) stimuli with 
positive activations whilst processing HV stimuli in the LH in the ‘attended’ 
condition (dual > large field); with very little activation in the ‘to-be-ignored’ 
condition (dual > small field) with the exception of HV inanimate objects as 
evidenced in Figure 5.10.   
 A significant main effect of condition was found (F(1,15) = 5.2; 
p<0.05 and a significant interaction between condition x category (F(3,45) = 
7.0; p<0.001.  The trend seems similar to that found in ACC, with negative 
contrast values for the dual > small field contrast.   
 Partitioning showed a significant main effect of category in the ‘to-be-
ignored’ condition (dual > small field) (F(3,45) = 4.5; p<0.01).   
 There was no evidence to suggest an effect of valence, thus supporting 
the supposition that valence modulation is not associated with the mPFC as 
evidenced in the masked experiment and relevant literature (Damasio, 1994, 
Lane et al., 1997c, Murphy et al., 2003, Phan et al., 2002).  
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c) Parahippocampal Gyrus 
 
Figure 5.11  Parahippocampal gyrus effect sizes. 
Key: 1 LV animals 2 LV faces 3 LV scenes 4 LV inanimate objects 
 5 HV animals 6 HV faces 7 HV scenes 8 HV inanimate objects 
 
 
Figure 5.12  Images of the Parahippocampal gyrus displaying the significant effect of 
condition in the LH, contrasting ‘attended’ and ‘to-be-ignored’.   
Key: Red = Attended; Green = To-be-ignored; C = Coronal; S = Sagittal; T = Transverse. 
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Figure 5.13  Images of the Parahippocampal gyrus displaying the significant effect of valence 
in the LH for ‘attended’ condition. 
Key: Red = LVS; Green = HVS; C = Coronal; S = Sagittal; T = Transverse. 
 
 
Figure 5.14  Images of the Parahippocampal gyrus displaying the significant effect of valence 
in the LH for ‘to-be-ignored’ condition . 
Key: Red = LVS; Green = HVS; C = Coronal; S = Sagittal; T = Transverse. 
 
In Figure 5.11 the obvious pattern in the parahippocampus is a clear indication 
of a valence effect which is the same in both conditions.   
 Again, a variation in response to the ‘attended’ (dual > large field) 
(Figure 5.6) and ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field) (Figure 5.5) conditions 
was found as ANOVA revealed a main effect of condition (F(1,15) = 7.6; 
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p<0.025) (e.g. Figure 5.12, sagittal view).  A main effect of valence (F(1,15) = 
9.4); p<0.01) and valence x category (F(3,45) = 2.9; p<0.05) was also evident.   
 Partitioning the ANOVAs showed that valence was significant across 
both conditions ‘attended’ (dual > large field) (F(1,15) = 10.1; p<0.01) 
(Figure 5.13), and ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field) (F(1,15) = 8.2; p<0.05) 
(Figure 5.14).  In the ‘to-be-ignored’ condition (dual > small field), there was 
a significant interaction between valence and category (Mauchly (W=.289; 
p<.01)), (F(1,15) = 4.8; p<0.05).   
 To summarise, when examining the statistics and graph it is evident 
that the parahippocampus responds to HV stimuli more than LV stimuli in 
both the ‘attended’ (dual > large field) and ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field) 
conditions.  There was some evidence of category specificity in the ‘to-be-
ignored’ condition (dual > small field).   
 
d) Amygdala 
 
Figure 5.15  Amygdala effect sizes. 
Key: 1 LV animals 2 LV faces 3 LV scenes 4 LV inanimate objects 
 5 HV animals 6 HV faces 7 HV scenes 8 HV inanimate objects 
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Figure 5.16  Images of the Amygdala displaying the significant effect of valence in the LH . 
Key: Red = LVI; Green = HVI; C = Coronal; S = Sagittal; T = Transverse. 
 
 
Figure 5.17  Images of the Amygdala displaying the significant effect of category in the LH 
for ‘to-be-ignored’ condition . 
Key: Red = Inanimate; Green = Animals; C = Coronal; S = Sagittal; T = Transverse. 
 
In the bar chart (Figure 5.15), there is a very distinctive pattern which 
indicates that the amygdala can apparently respond differentially to stimuli 
according to valence across both ‘attended’ (dual > large field) (Figure 5.6) 
and ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field) (Figure 5.5) conditions.  Greater effect 
sizes are found for LV stimuli in the RH and greater effect sizes for HV 
stimuli in the LH in both conditions.  This pattern concurs with the valence 
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lateralisation hypothesis (Canli et al., 1998, Davidson and Irwin, 1999).  It is 
necessary first to consider whether these differences are statistically 
significant.   
 In part, this observation was supported statistically as ANOVAs 
showed a significant interaction between hemisphere and valence (F(1,15) = 
6.9; p<0.025) (Figure 5.16).   
 Partitioning the ANOVAs revealed a significant main effect of 
category in the ‘to-be-ignored’ condition (dual > small field) (F(3,45) = 6.7; 
p<0.005) (Figure 5.17) and a significant interaction between hemisphere x 
valence (F(1,15) = 8.7; p<0.05).  There were no significant activations in the 
‘attended’ condition (dual > large field).   
 The involvement of the amygdala in rapid processing (LeDoux, 2002, 
Whalen et al., 1998b) is supported with these findings as the only significant 
activations were found in the ‘to-be-ignored’ condition (dual > small field).  
However, there was no main effect of condition.  This will be addressed in the 
general discussion.   
 To summarise, these results support the view that the left and right 
amygdala subserve different functions (Morris et al., 1998b): category effects 
and valence effects are dependent upon hemisphere.  These results bear little 
resemblance to those of the masked experiment.  The validity of comparing 
the two fMRI experimental designs will be discussed in Chapter 6.   
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e) Superior Temporal Gyrus 
 
Figure 5.18  STG effect sizes. 
Key: 1 LV animals 2 LV faces 3 LV scenes 4 LV inanimate objects 
 5 HV animals 6 HV faces 7 HV scenes 8 HV inanimate objects 
 
 
Figure 5.19  Images of the STG displaying the significant effect of condition in the LH . 
Key: Red = To-be-ignored HV; Green = Attended HV; C = Coronal; S = Sagittal;  
         T = Transverse. 
 
In the STG Figure 5.18 displays differences in ‘attended’ (dual > large field) 
(Figure 5.6) and ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field) (Figure 5.5), with 
unilateral effect in HV faces and animals in the attended condition (dual > 
large field), and bilateral effect in all LV ‘attended’ (dual > large field) and 
‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field).   
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 ANOVAs revealed a significant main effect of condition (F(1,15) = 
10.7; p<0.01); a significant main effect of valence (F(1,15) = 10.3; p<0.01); 
plus a significant interaction between condition x valence (F(1,15) = 33.6; 
p<0.001) (Figure 5.19); and condition x category (F(3,45) = 3.4; p<0.05).   
 In the ‘to-be-ignored’ condition (dual > small field), partitioning 
showed a significant main effect of valence (F(1,15) = 19.7; p<0.0000005), 
and in the ‘attended’ condition (dual > large field) there was a significant 
main effect of category, (Mauchly (W=.389; p<.05)), (F(1,15) = 4.6; p<0.05).  
There was also a significant interaction between valence x category in the 
‘attended’ condition (dual > large field) (F(3,45) = 5.5; p<0.005).   
 As the results indicated in the masked experiment, the role of the STG 
in processing emotional valence is again evident with greater emphasis in the 
‘to-be-ignored’ condition (dual > small field), although the bar chart shows 
consistent positive activations when viewing LV stimuli as opposed to HV 
stimuli in both conditions.  There was also a category effect in the ‘attended’ 
condition (dual > large field).   
 
f) Insula 
 
Figure 5.20  Insula effect sizes. 
Key: 1 LV animals 2 LV faces 3 LV scenes 4 LV inanimate objects 
 5 HV animals 6 HV faces 7 HV scenes 8 HV inanimate objects 
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Figure 5.21  Images of the Insula displaying the significant effect of condition when viewing 
LV animals. 
Key: Red = Attended; Green = To-be-ignored; C = Coronal; S = Sagittal; T = Transverse. 
 
In Figure 5.20 the insula shows a valence effect when viewing to-be ignored 
(dual > small field) (Figure 5.5) stimuli, particularly for low valence in the 
RH.  This is also evident in Figure 5.21.  However, this was not supported 
statistically.   
 ANOVAs revealed a significant main effect of condition (F(1,15) = 
17.4; p<0.005) and significant interactions between condition x valence 
(F(1,15) = 7.3; p<0.05) and valence x category (F(3,45) = 2.9; p<o.05.   
 Only an interaction between valence x category remained significant 
in the ‘attended’ condition (dual > large field) (Figure 5.6) after partitioning 
(F(3,45) = 5.2; p<0.005).  ANOVA revealed no significant results in the ‘to-
be-ignored’ condition.   
 The involvement of the insula in processing LV stimuli is well 
documented and these findings support this hypothesis, particularly in the RH 
in the ‘attended’ condition (dual > large field) for certain categories.  These 
results are in accordance with the masked experiment and also confirm the 
lateralisation hypothesis in that the RH responds more to LV stimuli (Canli et 
al., 1998, Davidson and Irwin, 1999).   
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g) Fusiform Gyrus 
 
Figure 5.22  Fusiform gyrus effect sizes.  
Key: 1 LV animals 2 LV faces 3 LV scenes 4 LV inanimate objects 
 5 HV animals 6 HV faces 7 HV scenes 8 HV inanimate objects 
 
 
Figure 5.23  Images of the Fusiform gyrus displaying the significant effect of category for the 
‘attended’ condition.  
Key: Red = LVF; Green = LVI; C = Coronal; S = Sagittal; T = Transverse. 
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Figure 5.24  Images of the Fusiform gyrus displaying the significant effect of valence for ‘to-
be-ignored’ condition. 
Key: Red = HVF; Green = LVF; C = Coronal; S = Sagittal; T = Transverse. 
 
Visually, in Figure 5.22, there is a valence and hemisphere interaction, with 
the RH processing LV and the LH processing HV in both experimental 
conditions, although this was not supported statistically.  In Figures 5.23 and 
5.24 differences can be seen in category and valence processing.   
 There were no main effects when examining the ANOVAs, but there 
were significant interactions between hemisphere x category (F(3,45) = 3.4; 
p<0.05)  and valence x category (F(3,45) = 3.3; p<0.05).   
 After partitioning, a significant valence x category interaction was 
found in the ‘to-be-ignored’ condition (F(3,45) = 4.0; p<0.05).   
 In this instance, the valence effect was modulated by effect of category 
in the fusiform gyrus which has been previously documented associating 
fearful faces with the RH (Paradiso et al., 1999, Vuilleumier et al., 2001).  
These results also confirmed category modulation of fusiform gyrus activity, 
although processing faces specifically more than other stimuli was not evident 
in the present study.  An effect of valence has also been found bilaterally in 
the fusiform gyrus when presented with LV stimuli (Paradiso et al., 1999).  
 Evidence presented in the bar chart supports the valence lateralisation 
hypothesis with an obvious valence x hemisphere interaction, but in the 
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ANOVA only a category x hemisphere interaction was evident.  While the 
ANOVA did not reveal a statistically significant valence x hemisphere 
interaction, the plots (Figures 5.25 and 5.26) thereof support the bar chart.   
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Figure 5.25  Fusiform gyrus estimated marginal means comparing valence x hemisphere for 
‘attended’ condition.   
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Figure 5.26  Fusiform gyrus estimated marginal means comparing valence x hemisphere for 
‘to-be-ignored’ condition. 
 
h) Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex 
 
Figure 5.27 DLPFC effect sizes. 
Key: 1 LV animals 2 LV faces 3 LV scenes 4 LV inanimate objects 
 5 HV animals 6 HV faces 7 HV scenes 8 HV inanimate objects 
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Figure 5.28  Images of the DLPFC displaying the significant bilateral effect of valence for 
‘to-be-ignored’ condition . 
Key: Red = HVS; Green = LVS; C = Coronal; S = Sagittal; T = Transverse. 
 
In the DLPFC, Figure 5.27 shows a difference in valence effect for both 
‘attended’ (dual > large field) (Figure 5.6) and ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small 
field) stimuli (Figure 5.5) with bilateral activations for HV stimuli (Figure 
5.28).   
 A significant main effect of condition was found using ANOVA 
(F(1,15) = 6.5; p<0.05) and main effect of valence (F(1,15) = 4.6; p<0.05).  
Plus a significant interaction between condition x category, (Mauchly 
(W=.338; p<.05)), (F(1,15) = 6.1; p<0.05).   
 After partitioning, it was only in the ‘to-be-ignored’ condition (dual > 
small field) that significant effects of valence (F(1,15) = 5.0; p<0.05) and 
category (F(3,45) = 3.0; p<0.05) were found.   
 Statistically, valence effect and category effect were significant, as 
they were in the masked experiment, the difference being that in this 
experiment, significant effects were only found in the ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > 
small field) condition.  Previous research has argued that the DLPFC is 
modulated by valence (Grimm et al., 2006).   
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i) Orbitofrontal Cortex 
 
Figure 5.29  OFC effect sizes. 
Key: 1 LV animals 2 LV faces 3 LV scenes 4 LV inanimate objects 
 5 HV animals 6 HV faces 7 HV scenes 8 HV inanimate objects 
 
 
Figure 5.30  Images of the OFC displaying the significant effect of condition contrasting HV 
faces in the ‘attended’ and ‘to-be-ignored’ conditions. 
Key: Red = HVF ‘attended’; Green = HVF ‘to-be-ignored’; C = Coronal; S = Sagittal;  
         T = Transverse. 
 
Figure 5.29 shows little disparity in activations for ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > 
small field) (Figure 5.5) stimuli, but greater activations for the ‘attended’ 
condition (dual > large field) (Figure 5.6).  Figure 5.30 compares ‘attended’ 
(dual > large field) HVF and ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field) HVF.  There 
appears to be an overall difference in valence and category.   
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 A significant main effect of condition (F(1,15) = 4.9; p<0.05) and 
significant interaction between condition x category (F(3,45) = 3.5; p<0.05) 
were evident.   
 There were no significant effects or interactions when partitioning the 
ANOVA matrix.   
 Looking at the bar chart alone, it would appear that there is a 
distinction between categories, dependent on experimental conditions, with 
greater activity evident when processing HV animals and faces, whereas the 
emphasis in the masked experiment was on LV inanimate objects, but this was 
not supported statistically.  There was no evidence, therefore, of valence 
modulation, thus supporting a more general role in emotional processing 
(Drevets and Raichle, 1998, Murphy et al., 2003), which was also found in the 
masked experiment.   
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5:4:4  Summary  
 
ROI Significant 
effects of 
valence or 
category on 
response to to-
be-ignored 
presentations 
Significant 
differences 
between responses 
to to-be-ignored 
and attended 
presentations  
Sig effects of 
valence or 
category on 
response to 
attended 
presentations 
Other significant 
effects before 
partitioning 
ACC Cat** Main eff con**  Att Val x cat** n.s. 
mPFC Cat** Main eff con* 
Con x cat*** 
n.s. n.s. 
Para Val* 
Val x cat* 
Main eff con* Att val** Main eff val** 
Val x cat* 
Amy Cat** 
Hem x val** 
n.s. n.s. Hem x val* 
STG Val**** Main eff con** 
Con x val*** 
Con x cat* 
Att cat* 
Att Val x Cat**  
Main eff val** 
Ins n.s. Main eff con** 
Con x val* 
Att Val x cat** Val x cat* 
Fusi Val x cat* n.s. n.s. Hem x cat* 
Val x cat* 
DLPFC Val* 
Cat* 
Main eff con* 
Con x cat* 
n.s. Main eff val* 
OFC n.s. Main eff con* 
Con x cat* 
n.s. n.s. 
Table 5.4  Summary of results for the dual image experiment  
Key: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; **** p<0.0001; n.s. = not significant; eff = effect; 
Val = Valence; Hem = Hemisphere; con = condition; Cat = Category; Att = ‘Attended’ (dual 
> large field); Para = Parahippocampal gyrus; Amy = Amygdala; Ins = Insula; Fusi = 
Fusiform gyrus. 
 
Table 5.4 summarises the results for the dual-image experiment. 
 
5:5  Discussion  
 
The main focus of this experiment was to ascertain if there was a difference in 
activations when processing in the ‘attended’ (dual > large field) condition 
compared with the ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field) condition.  Indeed, a 
main effect of condition was found in the ACC, mPFC, parahippocampus, 
STG, insula, DLPFC and OFC.  To further elucidate, effects will now be 
addressed in terms of valence, category effect and hemispheric asymmetry.   
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 5:5:1  Valence and Category Effects  
 
Valence and category effects in relation to each of the 9 ROIs have been 
discussed at length in chapter 4, and as such, will not be repeated in this 
section.  There are interesting highlights to re-emphasise, however, and will 
now be addressed when summarising the present results in this discussion.    
 Significant effects involving valence for ‘attended’ conditions (H¹) 
were found for ACC, parahippocampus, STG and insula (Table 5.4, column 
4).  In the ‘to-be-ignored’ condition (H²) significant effects for valence were 
found for parahippocampus, amygdala, STG, fusiform gyrus and DLPFC 
(Table 5.4, column 2).  The valence effect was significantly different between 
‘attended’ and ‘to be ignored’ conditions (H³) for STG and insula (Table 5.4, 
column 3).  This means that all areas except mPFC and OFC showed some 
differential response to valence.  A point of interest is that it has been 
consistently shown that the mPFC is not modulated by valence in both the 
current fMRI experiments and previous research, commented upon in section 
4:5:1 (b) (Damasio, 1994, Lane et al., 1997c, Murphy et al., 2003, Phan et al., 
2002).   
 Significant effects involving category were found for the ‘attended’ 
condition (H4) in ACC, STG and insula (Table 5.4, column 4).  There were 
significant effects involving category for ‘to-be-ignored’ stimuli (H5) in ACC, 
mPFC, parahippocampus, amygdala, fusiform gyrus and DLPFC (Table 5.4, 
column 2).  Although there is little evidence that there is a category effect on 
the ACC, the results from both the fMRI experiments in this document do 
suggest that the ACC is modulated by category and is therefore a topic for 
further investigation.   
 The use of dual stimuli has revealed several distinctive qualitative 
differences in the responses of ROIs to differences in stimulus valence and 
category.  The parahippocampal gyrus gave positive activations when the 
‘attended’ part of the dual stimulus was high in valence (dual > large field) 
but also when the ‘to-be-ignored’ part of the dual stimulus was high in 
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valence (dual > small field).  Low valence produced negative activations in 
the two instances.  Valence was also a main effect and significant in the ‘to-
be-ignored’ (dual > small field) condition (Figure 5.5) in the STG (in 
particular for low valence) and DLPFC for high valence.  Stronger activations 
in the STG were also found for low valence stimuli in the masked experiment 
in the present study and this finding is consistent with the work of Britton et al 
(2006) reported in chapter 4 (Britton et al., 2006b).   
 Equally, in the ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field) condition (Figure 
5.5) there was a valence and category interaction in the parahippocampus and 
fusiform gyrus.  Both these ROIs are said to be category specific, but evidence 
here suggests that category activations are modulated by valence.  One of the 
predictions for this chapter was that there was a difference in HV and LV for 
‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field) stimuli (H²).  This was partly confirmed 
when valence effect was category dependent.  In the ‘attended’ (dual > large 
field) condition (Figure 5.6), a valence and category interaction was also 
found in the fusiform gyrus, ACC, STG and insula.  Again, although I found 
no evidence of category x valence interation in the STG when reviewing 
previous studies, the two current fMRI experiments in this study found 
significant evidence of this and is therefore worth revisiting in future work.  
 An interesting question arises when interpreting these results.  Why 
should some ROIs show valence effects only in one condition whereas others 
show valence effects in both conditions?  This will be addressed in the general 
discussion.   
 
 5:5:2  Hemisphere Specificity 
 
Significant hemispheric differences were found only in fusiform gyrus and 
amygdala (H6).   
 A significant interaction was found between hemisphere and category 
in the fusiform gyrus, indicating that the different hemispheres are modulated 
by category membership.  Category specificity particularly in the RH has been 
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previously reported (Rees et al., 2000).  Although the graphs indicated an 
interaction between hemisphere and valence, statistically this was not 
substantiated with ANOVAs.   
 In the ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field) condition (Figure 5.5) an 
interaction between hemisphere and valence was found in the amygdala.  
Visual evidence in the graph indicated that the RH was dominant when 
processing LV stimuli and the LH dominant when processing HV stimuli, 
which means that in this instance hemispheric specialisation was modulated 
by valence in the amygdala.  Several authors have discussed the asymmetry of 
amygdala functions.  Some support the traditional model of lateralisation of 
emotion hypothesis (Adolphs et al., 2001, Canli et al., 1998), others have 
suggested that amygdala lateralisation involves the RH in memory modulation 
of emotion (Kilpatrick and Cahill, 2003) whilst others claim that the LH 
shows greater activations for conscious awareness of target and the RH 
greater for unconscious awareness of stimuli (Morris et al., 1998b).  The 
present results are quite clear in their support of the valence lateralisation 
hypothesis in relation to the amygdala.   
 Statistical and visual evidence of effect sizes in the graphs indicate 
evidence of RHD in the fusiform gyrus and insula when processing negative 
emotional content.  Previous research has indicated RHD in the fusiform 
gyrus when processing fearful facial expressions (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1998) 
along with other supporters of the preferential role of the RH (Adolphs et al., 
1996, Adolphs et al., 2001, Kimura et al., 2004, Smith and Bulman-Fleming, 
2004), however a meta-analysis by Murphy et al. (2003) found no evidence of 
RHD for emotional processing.  Looking at 106 studies using PET and fMRI, 
Murphy and colleagues (2003) reported greater LH activations for appetitive 
stimuli, but symmetrical activations for withdrawal stimuli (Murphy et al., 
2003).  However, their research encompassed studies using a wide variety of 
stimuli in the five sensory modalities and, as such, it is difficult to assess the 
validity of the comparisons.  For instance, RH dominance may be specific to 
certain stimuli and/or particular modality(ies) (Calvo and Nummenmaa, 
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2007).  The present results confirm H³ for some of the ROIs with a clear 
indication of hemispheric specificity dependent upon valence.   
 
 5:5:3  General Discussion 
 
A significant main effect of condition in seven out of nine ROIs demonstrates 
a difference in activations between the ‘to-be-ignored’ and ‘attended’ 
conditions.  Equally, the valence effects (Section 5:5:1) and hemispheric 
differences (Section 5:5:2) are highly noteworthy, and of particular interest is 
why some ROIs reveal valence and hemispheric differences in both or one 
condition, whereas others do not.  Why should the ROIs respond so 
differently in terms of valence to the presentation conditions?   
 An obvious answer is that these results do suggest that the foveal and 
peripheral images were processed differently by the majority of ROIs, but 
what does this actually mean?   
 The first point to make is that the large-field stimulus when presented 
on its own as a control condition, was just as ‘attended’ as the small-field 
stimulus.  Therefore, when subtracting a control condition from the combined 
condition, the ‘attended’ contrast is actually measuring the difference between 
the large-field homogeneous ‘attended’ stimuli with the combined, centrally 
‘attended’ small-field stimuli i.e. the difference between homogenous and 
combined stimuli, irrespective of attention.  After subtraction two types of 
‘residue’ remained.  One was labelled ‘to-be-ignored’ and the other 
‘attended’.   
 Regardless of the chosen label, highly distinct patterns were evident in 
some of the ROIs when looking at bar charts in the results section.  The most 
interesting to note are those where, regardless of orientation of target valence 
(e.g. HV ‘attended’ or LV ‘attended’), the same valence still modulates certain 
ROIs.  In both the ‘attended’ and ‘to-be-ignored’ conditions, valence 
modulation was found in the amygdala (Figure 5.15) and fusiform gyrus 
(Figure 5.22) – the RH was activated for LV and the LH activated for HV; 
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parahippocampus (Figure 5.11) – bilateral activations were evident for HV but 
no significant activation for LV; STG (Figure 5.18) – bilateral activations for 
LV; and DLPFC (Figure 5.27) – bilateral activations for HV.  Therefore, the 
effect of valence was strongly evident after taking into account the difference 
between the homogeneous and combined stimuli, regardless of which 
condition was subtracted.   
 To discuss this further, attentional modulation will now be addressed.  
It is hypothesised that ‘to-be-ignored’ images (dual > small field), may be 
actively inhibited.  However, the 1s stimulus duration period meant that the 
participants had time to fixate on both the ‘attended’ (dual > large field) 
(Figure 5.6) and ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field) (Figure 5.5) stimuli.  
After all, a normal fixation pause is 250ms (Liversedge and Findlay, 2000, 
Reddy et al., 2004), a saccadic eye movement 30-70ms (Koch, 2004) and 
spatial cuing studies have shown that spatial attentional shifts can happen 
even without saccades (Posner, 1980).  By the same token, automatic saccades 
can happen regardless of the efforts of the participants to focus solely on the 
‘attended’ (dual > large field) (Figure 5.6) presentations.  This was 
demonstrated in a study by Calvo and Lange (2004), presenting one emotional 
stimulus and one neutral stimulus at the same time in the periphery.  Part of 
Calvo and Lange’s experiment was to instruct the participants to look only at 
the neutral stimulus.  As processing is biased towards emotional stimuli 
(Calvo and Lang, 2004), not only was the emotional stimulus fixated upon 
first, but it has been found that it takes participants 460 - 490ms to comply 
with instructions and take control over fixation (Nummenmaa et al., 2006).  
Of course, the current study presented two emotional stimuli at the same time, 
so emotional versus neutral competition was not an issue, however it follows 
that late selective orienting would have at least ensured fixation foveally as 
instructed.   
 One of the goals of this experimental design was to tax attentional load 
with a categorisation task in order to suppress the processing of ‘to-be-
ignored’ peripheral stimuli.  Requesting specific semantic information (i.e. 
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pleasant or unpleasant) would have required overt attention to the foveal 
component of the dual image.  It is probable, therefore, that 1s presentation 
time may have still led to degraded processing in the periphery, that was 
limited to coarse or gist information.  It is argued that the amygdala processes 
gist information fast and globally (LeDoux, 1998, Zald, 2003).  In the present 
study, the only significant activations in the amygdala were found for the ‘to-
be-ignored’ (dual > small field) (Figure 5.5) condition, suggesting that coarse 
processing did occur in the periphery, although as already highlighted, the 
effect sizes showed strong patterns of activation for both conditions.   
 Supporting evidence comes from studies of change blindness and 
inattentional blindness which have highlighted gist perception or processing 
global information of an image without being aware of the detail.  It is 
concluded that focal attention is not a requirement for gist perception and 
coarse information, such as category or spatial structure, can be processed 
without awareness (Mack and Rock, 1998, Rousselet et al., 2005).  As 
emotion-laden stimuli are also said to be processed automatically 
(Vuilleumier et al., 2001), it is quite probable that the recovery of the gist of 
the peripheral part of the dual image is sufficient to allow the affective content 
to have been processed.   
 There is a large body of evidence that demonstrates our ability to be 
aware of visual stimuli outside focal attention.  For instance, Braun has 
conducted many dual-task experiments demonstrating the effectiveness of 
salient distractors in the periphery, even when performing demanding tasks at 
fixation (Braun, 1994, Braun and Sagi, 1990).  According to Braun, if a 
stimuli is salient enough and attention is focussed on fixation, some attention 
may still be involuntarily allocated by the simple act of presenting a stimulus 
in the peripheral visual field, thus ‘capturing’ attention (Braun, 2003).    
Traditionally, this research is based on artificial stimuli such as the letters T 
and L.  However, more recent experiments using natural images have 
demonstrated that focal attention is needed even less than previously thought 
(Li et al., 2002, Li et al., 2005, Rousselet et al., 2002).  The possibilities of 
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peripheral processing have been discussed, but it is not possible to accurately 
assess by what degree the peripheral information modulated the ROIs.  That 
said, there are, three relevant outcomes from these results:   
a) There was strong evidence of significant activations that differed 
in response to ‘attended’ (dual > large field) (Figure 5.6) and ‘to-
be-ignored’ (dual > small field) (Figure 5.5) contrasts.  These 
differences were supported statistically in the ACC, mPFC, 
parahippocampus, STG, insula, DLPFC and OFC (main effect of 
condition Table 5.4, column 3).   
b) The bar charts of effect sizes demonstrate strong patterns of 
valence modulation regardless of experimental condition, which 
supports the premise that the processing of affect is extremely 
robust, the most obvious being the parahippocampus, amygdala, 
STG, fusiform gyrus and DLPFC.   
c) ANOVAs showed significant differences in experimental 
conditions for valence in the STG and insula.   
 
5:6  Conclusion 
 
In order to modulate conscious registration of the target stimuli presented in 
the fovea and periphery, a selective attention paradigm was employed (Mack 
and Rock, 1998).  Significant results were obtained supporting the efficacy of 
the ‘attended’ (dual > large field) and ‘to-be-ignored’ (dual > small field) 
contrasts in isolating differential effects of conscious registration of emotional 
stimuli as well as patterns of effect sizes reflecting the automatic nature of 
affective processing.   
 To attempt a coherent overall perspective of these findings, Chapter 6 
will draw together the results of all three experiments in context of the 
rewards and challenges of employing complex everyday visual stimuli.   
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Chapter 6  General Discussion 
 
6:1  Overview and Summary 
 
The behavioural experiment in Chapter 3 determined that the valence of certain 
natural images can be perceived below the level of conscious awareness, 
concordantly with valence ratings.  Using forced-choice discrimination tasks for 
detection of the target and discrimination of its valence, together with ratings of 
the confidence in detection and confidence in valence impression, levels of 
consciously perceived valence response were indexed.  Valence discrimination 
frequencies were compensated for response bias, which was assessed by the 
valence response to control stimuli (neutral masks only, target absent).  It was 
demonstrated that a large proportion of IAPS stimuli can be successfully 
discriminated for affect even whilst the presence of those images is undetected.  
However, six anomalous stimuli (giving significant discrimination in the opposite 
direction to that predicted by the IAPS valence rating) were identified and possible 
explanations were offered for these exceptions.     
 The stimuli were then grouped by category membership to investigate the 
neural correlates of affect in natural images presented below or close to the 
threshold of conscious awareness.  It was clear that valence discrimination in brief, 
masked stimuli was not limited to stimuli of a certain category (i.e. faces) but 
could occur with animals, scenes and inanimate objects as well.  An fMRI 
experiment was conducted in order to identify differential responses to stimulus 
valence in brief exposures and natural images.  To increase the reliability of the 
stimulus set as a measure of key variables (valence and category), a second set of 
images was chosen to present under normal viewing conditions in addition to the 
original stimulus set.  The second set of images was matched with the first set in 
valence and category, providing a basis for replication of fMRI results.  Both the 
normally-viewed sets of stimuli revealed very similar activations.  This therefore 
provided a standard for the assessment of valence and category effects.   
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 The critical finding in this experiment was that if a given experimental 
factor (such as valence, category or cerebral hemisphere) yielded significant 
differences in activations of a ROI in the brief, masked condition, they were also 
significant in the normal viewing conditions.  In the normal viewing condition 
only, different categories produced significantly different activations in the 
parahippocampus and fusiform gyrus, which supports the importance of these two 
regions for previously reported category specificity (Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998, 
Epstein et al., 1999, O'Craven and Kanwisher, 2000, Schultz et al., 2003).  High 
and low valence produced significantly different activations in the STG (Ochsner 
et al., 2004a, Ochsner et al., 2004b).  
 On the basis that processing of brief, masked stimuli only took place when 
the same stimuli were processed under normal viewing, it was argued that there 
was no qualitative difference in conscious and unconscious processing.  This is 
validation of a threshold-based account of unconscious processing and signifies a 
one-way dissociation between conscious and unconscious processing.  This tenet 
is derived from the assumption that if unconscious processing is sensitive to the 
same information as that which is consciously processed, perception without 
awareness is indicated.  By the same token, if unconscious processing takes place 
without conscious processing of the same stimuli, this would imply insensitivity to 
the stimuli at above the level of conscious awareness (Reingold, 1992, Reingold 
and Merikle, 1990), but this was not the case.   
 In order to distinguish between neural responses to conscious events under 
instruction to-be-ignored the dual image experiment was carried out.  Using the 
same stimuli, the difference in activations in ROIs comparing affective ‘attended’ 
(dual > large field) processing and ‘to-be-ignored’ stimuli (dual > small field) 
were examined.  Even though there were differences in attentional demands 
between the masked experiment and the dual image experiment, some of the key 
results were the same and are supported by previous research.  These were the 
significant main effects of valence and categories in the STG , ACC (Berthoz et 
al., 2002, Killgore and Yurgelun-Todd, 2004) and DLPFC (Grimm et al., 2006).   
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 One possible unifying proposal that would tie together the findings of the 
three experimental chapters of this thesis is the concept of a tripartite taxonomy.  
Dehaene and colleagues (2006) argue a distinction between subliminal, 
preconscious and conscious processing.  They hypothesise that early, bottom-up 
activation is necessary, but not adequate enough for conscious processing.  Top-
down amplification is also required (e.g. prefrontal, parietal cortices), to achieve 
conscious access.  However, these joint processes may still not be sufficient for 
conscious processing, as highlighted in studies investigating inattentional 
blindness.  Subliminal processing is defined as weak activation that dies out before 
achieving activation in a global neuronal network (bottom-up), whilst 
preconscious processing is described as activation being accessible, but not 
accessed (i.e. not consciously reported as stimuli are not seen due to inattention) 
due to insufficient or interrupted top-down attentional amplification (Dehaene et 
al., 2006).  Therefore, the differences in the (dual > large field) and (dual > small 
field) conditions in the dual-image experiment could possibly be explained in 
terms of preconscious (having the potential to be consciously reported, but not 
consciously accessed due to top-down attention being temporarily diverted) and 
conscious processing, whereas the differences in the behavioural study and the 
masked fMRI study could be explained in terms of a continuum (not a single, 
abrupt discontinuity) between subliminal and conscious processing. Thus, visual 
processing becomes more conscious with increasing viewing time, because a 
stronger feedback signal propagates through more synapses. Also, persisting 
neural activity at all stages of the visual pathway signals continuity (and therefore 
importance, compared to fleeting impressions and background noise) of the new 
stimulus. For the eye-movement control system, early fixations of a novel stimulus 
are necessarily driven by bottom up salience: the second and subsequent fixations 
can be influenced by information gathered and analysed from the first fixation, 
thus feedback and top-down influences strengthen the conscious percept.  
 The tripartite model concurs with the view that conscious perception 
cannot materialise without attention.  Others also argue that some attention 
resources are needed for processing natural images and are, therefore, not 
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processed as automatically as recently reported.  For instance, the ultra-rapid 
categorisation (URC) experiments previously referred to in this thesis (e.g. Li et 
al., 2002, Thorpe et al., 2001b, VanRullen and Thorpe, 2001a) have been criticised 
by Walker et al. (2008) as not taxing enough, in terms of simplicity of task and 
simple saliency of stimuli, to truly test for attention dependency.  Even though a 
URC experiment simultaneously presented four scenes, and demonstrated capacity 
limitations for multiple categorisation (Rousselet et al., 2004c), criticism for lack 
of clarity regarding the results strengthened the resolve of Walker and colleagues 
(2008) to challenge the claims of ultra-rapid processing of complex images.  Using 
a categorisation task of four objects within a scene in a dual-task paradigm, it was 
found that even at presentations of 500ms, only relatively primary visual 
properties can be processed under such conditions.  These findings support 
conventional visual studies in that some attentional resources are needed for the 
processing of both traditional and natural images and as such Walker et al’s 
criticisms can be applied to all claims for non-attentive processing (Walker et al., 
2008).     
 It has been discussed that even in the amygdala, attention resources are still 
needed to process affective faces compared to nonfaces, although Pessoa et al. 
(2002b) did acknowledge that humans can respond to aversive stimuli outside 
focal attention (Pessoa et al., 2002b).  Others, on the other hand, have 
demonstrated automatic processing of emotion both involuntarily and without 
attention, where activity in the amygdala depended upon valence rather than 
selective attention (Öhman, 2002, Vuilleumier et al., 2001).   
 In order to reconcile these opposing views, we can argue that voluntary 
attention is not necessary for a stimulus to have an effect on the brain, through 
feedforward mechanisms. It could be argued that there is never a complete absence 
of attention in masking experiments; the observer must be looking in the general 
direction of the stimulus in order to get a retinal image. A conscious impression 
seems to require both a certain stimulus strength (so that the stimulus can be 
distinguished from noise) and a certain amount or resource level of attention.  
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 The issue of stimulus strength is thus important to the discussion. 
Detectability of a visual stimulus is one measure of strength, and presumably 
depends on low level visual properties (spatial and temporal luminance contrast, 
etc.).  However, there is another measure of stimulus strength that was used in the 
present study, and that is IAPS arousal rating, which in this instance estimates the 
strength of an emotional stimulus as defined in the circumplex model.  Arousal can 
indicate importance and, as such, guide attention in addition to the influence of 
valence (Barrett et al., 2005).  It is hypothesised that in the real world, unpleasant 
influences prompt relevant motor responses for protection and survival.  If an 
aversive event is not arousing enough, the effect is minimised.  Correspondingly, 
low arousal appetitive stimuli can induce pleasure, such as a meadow (Bradley and 
Lang, 1999).  Thus the effect of arousal may not be equivalent for high and low 
valence stimuli. To equate valence ratings with aversive pictures of both low and 
high arousal is unrealistic in the natural world (Bradley and Lang, 1999).  In the 
present study, this problem (which may indicate a failing of the circumplex model) 
was avoided by using stimuli with moderately high arousal ratings.  
 Having provided operational definitions, it is possible to ask how 
conscious and unconscious processing differs.  Are there qualitative differences?  
It has been established that this may be the case in the two fMRI experiments, but 
no overall valence bias appeared in the MRI data that seemed to explain the 
pleasantness bias observed in the behavioural study.   
 In the IAPS series, variations in physical properties such as spatial 
frequency in terms of size and luminance have been highlighted as a potential 
problem.  A recent study examining the whole IAPS series, found that differences 
in the energy of spatial frequencies was not of particular significance; however, 
when inspecting physical properties of selected subsets potential confounds were 
evident (Delplanque et al., 2007).  This is of a particular concern for studies 
investigating emotional processing for it is hypothesised that the parvocellular 
pathway conveys high spatial frequency information to the visual cortices with 
slow responses and the magnocellular pathway transmits coarse low spatial 
frequency information rapidly to the subcortical areas such as the amygdala 
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(Vuilleumier et al., 2003b).  However, the magno/parvocellular interaction (see 
Section 1:5) has recently been attacked partly because the grating contrast-
sensitivity measurements are too narrow for the range of overlapping stimuli that 
activate both these pathways.  Skottun and Skoyles (2006) have argued that magno 
and parvocellular pathways are not as dichotomous as previously suggested 
because there is a large overlap in spatiotemporal properties.  Therefore, the 
difference between the information the amygdala receives and that of the fusiform 
gyrus for instance, is probably more of a graded difference.  Hence, discussions 
about the functions of these pathways are inconclusive (Skottun and Skoyles, 
2006).   
 Despite possible spatial frequency effects on detection and discrimination, 
ANOVA (Section 3:5:6) did confirm that high and low valence stimuli for the 
chosen categories in the present study were matched for detectability, and as such, 
valence and category were not confounds with detectability.  Equally, in the 
masked fMRI experiment (Chapter 4) a replication of the normal viewing 
condition with different slides was included and differences in valence effects 
were negligible.   
 It is very difficult to control for local properties systematically using 
natural images.  A huge majority of previous studies examining affect in fast 
detection and discrimination paradigms have used highly homogeneous stimuli 
often centrally presented and of the same size.  This makes it difficult to compare 
those results with the results from real life images used in this thesis (Rousselet et 
al., 2004b).  However, even when considering these difficulties, some of the 
results presented here support previous findings.   
 The effect of apparent size on salience of images has been explained in 
terms of an evolutionary benefit, in that retinal size may determine relevance for 
survival and correlate with distance of the point of interest (Codispoti et al., 
2006a).  Equally, as an object moves further away, fine details in terms of high 
spatial frequency are progressively lost (Loftus and Harley, 2005).  Based on this 
fact, it was hypothesised that ERP correlates of early stages of perceptual analysis 
would be modulated by size, in contrast with the LPP which is a long-latency ERP 
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implicated in recognition processes.  Indeed it was found that physical properties 
such as size did modulate early ERP components, whereas the LPP was not 
modulated by physical properties.  These results led to the hypothesis that at the 
LPP stage, stimulus interpretation has been achieved regardless of size (Codispoti 
et al., 2006a).   Top-down influences are evident in visual tasks where the difficulty 
of the task requires the integration of visual information over time.  
 The evidence presented here, however, demonstrates that modulation of the 
neural response to IAPS stimuli by brief, masked presentation (Chapter 4) or by a 
dual stimulus paradigm (Chapter 5) does not eliminate valence or category specific 
responses.  On the other hand, the magnitude of these responses may be altered.  In 
Chapter 4, any modulation of neural activity in the masked condition is most likely 
due to bottom-up processes, since there is a drastic reduction in the spatiotemporal 
energy in the stimulus due to brief, masked presentation.  The preservation of 
responses suggests that higher levels in the processing hierarchy (represented by 
the ROIs) must be receiving some information from the stimulus and may to some 
extent be compensating for the impoverished input.  These findings support the 
work of Codispoti et al explained above (Codispoti et al., 2006a).  Likewise, in the 
behavioural experiment (Chapter 3), discrimination of valence was achieved in the 
absence of detection, thus suggesting a degree of automatic, unconscious 
processing of affect.  Contrariwise, in Chapter 5, differences in response to the ‘to-
be-ignored’ and the ‘attended’ contrast are likely to be due to top-down 
modulation of activities by attention circuits.   
 In summary, together the present results indicate that affective natural 
images of a wide range of categories are effective tools in measuring valence using 
behavioural and fMRI designs.  
  
6:2  Conclusions 
 
The following conclusions can be drawn: 
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1) Do people give consistent valence responses to complex stimuli?  Clearly 
they do because IAPS has been rated.  What is the minimum visual 
information they need in order to do this? Very little – below the detection 
threshold in some cases. 
2) If people can do this, then their brain must be able to register differences in 
valence even when we provide only these minimal, brief, masked 
presentations.  fMRI shows us that the responses are very small for brief, 
masked exposures.  Nevertheless, in certain ROIs there were significant 
main effects of valence or interactions including valence for the masked 
stimuli. 
3) Brief, masked exposures are one way of limiting visual information pickup.  
Another method is to direct attention away from stimuli.  Using dual 
pictures, valence-specific effects were found in an fMRI experiment.  In 
some ROIs, the valence effect was modulated by whether the stimulus was 
‘attended’ or ‘to-be-ignored’. 
4) In all these experiments, there were strong effects of ‘category’.  However, 
‘category’ is an a priori way of classifying the stimuli.  Variation within 
category may be as large as variation between categories because of 
variation in image properties between members of a category, so it is 
unwise to conclude that a significant effect of ‘category’ within an ROI 
indicates that the ROI is category-specific. 
5) It has been suggested that faces are special stimuli.  We might therefore 
expect that if subliminal effects or effects of to-be-ignored stimuli occur, it 
will be for faces.  The results suggest otherwise.  In fact, in some cases the 
valence responses are stronger for other categories of stimuli. 
6) Valence specific effects were found to be widespread across the nine ROIs 
sampled, suggesting that the analysis of emotional valence is carried out by 
a large cortical and subcortical network.  
7) There was some evidence of hemisphere modulation which supported 
previous findings. 
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Even taking into account the methodological differences between the studies in 
this thesis, these results demonstrate a marked consistency of ROI activation near 
or below conscious awareness when presented with many of the images.   
 It is evident that several regions respond to affect, categories and 
experimental conditions.  Other regions are activated for one or two of these 
factors.  Further investigation is needed to expand, validate and explore these 
results using natural everyday images.  The principle contribution of this thesis is 
to demonstrate new evidence that it is possible to employ a wide range of natural 
images to study affect close to the threshold of conscious perception using fMRI. 
  
6:3  Limitations 
 
A criticism of the behavioural experiment and response bias is that the control 
condition consisted of neutral stimuli and it can be argued that a forced choice of 
pleasant or unpleasant did not allow for accuracy, as a picture of an iron, cup or 
plate etc were not at all unpleasant, and as such would have been scored as 
pleasant.  This effect, however, was negated with the neuroimaging studies.  On 
the other hand, the neutral images could be described as boring, which is negative 
valence with low arousal (Posner et al., 2005).  Potentially, this may have distorted 
the fMRI results using the subtraction method.   
 Equally, the behavioural experiment was displayed on either a laptop or 
projector screen.  This introduces an inconsistency in the sizes that the images 
were viewed. 
 As stated in section 2:1:2 although the presentations of the images were 
10ms in the masked experiments, the technical demands of the equipment used 
meant that the actual display time may have been as long as 16.6ms.  However, 
16.6ms is still considered to be near or below conscious awareness and as such 
fulfilled the experimental objectives.   
 Another concern over design was in the dual-image experiment.  The 
small-field image was superimposed on the large-field image and as such would 
sometimes mask out a proportion of relevant information in the large-field image.  
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When displaying the large-field control image, a better design may have been to 
‘blank out’ the area that the small-field image masked in the combined condition.  
Thus the to-be-ignored image and the large-field control image would have 
supplied the same comparative information.  Although this may be considered to 
be a flaw in the design of this experiment, it should be noted that some of the 
results were highly significant, but what was actually measured is a subject of 
debate.  Therefore, this experiment asked more questions than it answered and will 
be pursued to peer review publication.  
 Another note to be made is that when participants became aware of the 
nature and design of an experiment, deliberate and strategic responses may have 
contaminated the results.  Although it has been argued that expectation can 
facilitate fixation  (Holm et al., 2008). 
 One of the criticisms of fMRI is that it is not a direct measure of 
physiological correlates of rapid synaptic and spiking events, but a secondary 
measure of blood flow and blood oxygenation correlating with local changes in 
neural activity which has a slower time course (see section 1:7:4).    Equally, an 
fMRI signal is a fractional measure of local neuronal activity that has been 
averaged over time and space, which is also a limiting factor. These two 
limitations are acknowledged here, but using fMRI is still a tenable, objective tool 
to approximate what is going on in regions of the brain.  In addition, fMRI takes 
static images of the brain, which does not facilitate investigations into neuronal 
networks or distribution of the workings of the brain.  This, however, was not an 
issue in the present experiments as these were ROI analyses.  
 
6:4  Related Ideas and Future Research 
 
Finally, this last section projects ideas for future research and gives consideration 
to two related theories. 
 The cognitive neuroscientific approach is to empirically examine the 
function of brain regions and the interaction of neural networks and how they give 
rise to psychological functioning.  The use of methodological reductionism allows 
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for bite sized questions and answers to build foundations for the bigger questions 
and the biggest question of all is, of course, how the mind and body relate.  
Therefore, to gain a broader perspective of the neuronal and behavioural data 
presented in this thesis, we will now consider two recent developments in 
functionalism: homuncular functionalism and teleological functionalism.   
 Traditionally known as a ‘little man in the head’, the fallacy of the 
homunculus is an illusion of the conscious self in the mind that observes and 
initiates all operations (Solms and Turnbull, 2002).  The idea of the “mind” as the 
perceiving, thinking and feeling entity inside a person, was dismissed by Ryle 
(1949) as a redundant metaphor that simply transfers tasks to a smaller self, which 
in turn moves to another even smaller self inside the initial observer ad infinitum.  
This infinite regression, he argued, proves that the Cartesian idea of mind as a 
thinking entity is illogical as it does not explain anything (Ryle, 1949).   
 The idea, however, that the brain contains anatomical modules 
interconnected to form functional systems, each with a particular cognitive or 
behavioural function, is deeply embedded in neuropsychological thinking. This 
‘homuncular functionalism’ (Attneave, 1961, Dennett, 1978, Lycan, 1981) with 
many little semi-knowledgeable homunculi which are both autonomous and 
interact as an organised group create a whole system giving rise to sophisticated 
emergent properties.  The little homunculi can be broken down into smaller and 
smaller subunits until each component is responsible for the simplest task.  This 
hierarchy becomes less intelligent at lower and lower levels in terms of function 
and physical composition; until it is possible to explain how subjective mental 
properties (subunits) can be transmitted via material action potentials, thus 
explaining how the mind and body relate without becoming trapped in an infinite 
regress (Rose, 2006).   
 This model not only facilitates the study of one subunit at a time, but also 
accommodates research into multiple levels of brain function further up the 
hierarchy (e.g. perception of valence and the amygdala, perception of valence and 
the limbic system, perception of valence and the PFC).  Homuncular functionalism 
is therefore an ideal model to discuss cerebral mechanisms (Rose, 2006).   
 
 
 208
 Of course there are criticisms of homuncular functionalism. It does not 
explain qualia, for instance, and it also assumes a rather neat hierarchy with each 
module defined in terms of function, but this top-down method, runs counter to 
scientific enquiry as traditionally understood, where often a system is investigated 
which generates hypotheses as to the functions of those systems (bottom-up).  
Equally, modules may be flexible and serve different functions; therefore 
attributing functional specificity is not possible (Rose, 2006).  In fact, a problem 
with homuncular functionalism is that homunculi are identified as components of 
neuroanatomical structures, independent of functional deliberation, which is not 
ideal from a neuroscientific point of view (Mundale and Bechtel, 1996).  It is also 
argued that the number of modules is limited and does not account for the infinite 
capacity of the mind (Fodor, 2000).  The difficulty in accepting homuncular 
functionalism as a complete account of conscious experience is that it does not 
answer the “why” question. What is this intricate hierarchy for? What is it about 
the system that makes its owner conscious, and why does he/she need to be 
conscious? Nor does it altogether answer the “how” question. How does the 
system generate conscious experience? Is the degree of consciousness a correlate 
of the internal connectivity state of the system (which could perhaps be defined 
mathematically), thus of any hypothetical system that has this kind of 
connectivity? Is it correct to think of consciousness as somehow residing in the 
system, or does it reside in the relationship or connectivity between the system and 
the world? 
  For the purposes of this thesis, although there are unsolved problems with 
the theory of homuncular functionalism, it is still a useful analogy to understand 
multilevel systems in the brain and how they relate to mental states.  In fact, it has 
been suggested that this potent metaphor may turn out to be an indication in how 
the brain is organised in general (Crick and Koch, 2004).   
 Both homuncular and teleological functionalism are compatible in terms of 
multi-level functions and modularity.  The difference between the two theories is 
that teleological functionalism postulates phenomenal experience as the same as 
biological functions.  Just as the biological function of the heart is to pump blood 
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and thus subserve the whole body, the biological function of the brain is to 
“subserve consciousness, or just to be conscious” (Rose, 2006, p 123).  This tenet 
eliminates the brain/mind distinction and provides a very good template to explain 
its origins and purposes.  As such, it provides an answer to a shortfall in 
homuncular functionalism in that brain mapping is bound in functional 
considerations and is therefore teleological (Mundale and Bechtel, 1996), which 
goes some way to explain how and why conscious experience has evolved.  It 
makes the reasonable assumption that consciousness must have a biological 
function.  
 Following evolutionary principles, a functional role or goal is adaptive to 
the environment for survival of the organism.  Historically, human evolution has 
undergone constant, if random, fluctuations in genetic recombinations.  Hence, 
systems can be inefficient due to forced premature abandoned development or 
rendered redundant (Millikan, 1993). Thus the visual system has been shaped by 
mutation and natural selection.  Accordingly, we should not be surprised that our 
visual systems are subject to visual illusions, since illusions are representative of 
individual visual mechanisms that have been adapted and ‘usually work’.  To take 
an example from the present study, when the input signal is weak in a masked 
presentation, we might expect the visual system to use context and expectancies to 
generate a plausible percept, leading to the misrepresentation of some of the IAPS 
stimuli (e.g. the negative image of flies on pie interpreted as positive valence 
because it looked like currants on a pie).  
 Both theories are useful for the neuroscientist.  Lots of little homunculi in a 
hierarchical modulatory series of increasingly more stupid levels the lower down 
the hierarchy one goes, which also generates new emergent properties as a whole, 
is a useful analogy in the pursuit of understanding the mechanisms of the brain.  
Teleological functionalism accommodates a frame of reference to integrate 
neuroscience, psychology and evolutionary biology, thus bringing into account the 
origins and purposes of cerebral mechanisms. 
 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to further elucidate on these two 
functionalist theories, but this does highlight the valuable relationship between 
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cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of mind.  These two disciplines are 
traditionally juxtaposed, but to integrate their ideas can be extremely beneficial 
and inspiring for future research.  
 In the present study a category effect on the ACC was evident in both the 
fMRI experiments.  Equally, a category x valence interaction was found in the 
STG, again in both exeriments.  Neither of these findings are supported in the 
literature, but as they are evident in two different fMRI paradigms, it warrants 
further investigation in future research.     
 Future studies should also further investigate natural images by using finer 
grain analysis such as a multi-modal neuroimaging technique where EEG and 
fMRI data are recorded simultaneously.  The advantages of the high spatial 
resolution of fMRI and the added benefits of the high temporal resolution of EEG 
are an excellent combination for studies investigating brain responses to rapidly 
presented natural images.  This simultaneous data acquisition enables a more 
comprehensive examination of when and where appetitive and defensive systems 
modulate cortical activity.   
 For greater ecological validity, future work could investigate cross 
modalities such as auditory stimuli corresponding with natural visual images, as 
we normally use more than one source of sensory input to evaluate perception of 
valence in our natural environment.  Multimodal perception is achieved 
simultaneously to external events.  Take for instance the image of fireworks used 
in this experiment.  Here we investigated only visual perception, but under normal 
circumstances, we would be exposed not only to the visual stimulation from light, 
but also olfactory stimulation from the smell of gunpowder and auditory 
stimulation from the whistling and repeated explosive sounds.  Research is already 
expanding in crossmodal integration by investigating several modalities and 
correlating neural mechanisms both in conscious and non-conscious processing 
(e.g. de Gelder and Bertelson, 2003).   
  
 
 
 211
6:5  Abstract Publication and Presentations Arising from this Thesis 
 
 6:5:1  Abstract Publication 
 
Shaw, L. J., Wright, M. J. and O’Brien J. (2006) Unconscious processing of high 
and low valence visual stimuli: an fMRI analysis.  Toward a Science of 
Consciousness VII, Tucson.  Journal of Consciousness Studies: Consciousness 
Research Abstracts 102 (2006). 
 
 6:5:2  Oral Presentations 
 
Presented at the First Annual Psychology Conference Brunel University: 
Shaw, L. J., Wright, M. J. and O’Brien, J. (2008), Can we research subliminal 
emotional processing using natural images? 
 
Presented at the Graduate Interdisciplinary Conference on Perceptual Experience, 
University of Glasgow: 
Shaw, L. J., Wright, M. J. and O’Brien, J. (2005), Attention effect of high and low 
valence visual stimuli: an fMRI analysis. 
 
 6:5:3  Poster Presentations 
 
Presented at the Applied Vision Association, Active and Passive Visions 
Conference, Bradford University: 
Shaw, L. J. and Wright, M. J., (2007), Identification of positive and negative 
emotional valence in four categories of pictures in a forward-backward masking 
paradigm. 
 
Presented at Royal Holloway University: 
Shaw, L. J., Wright, M. J. and O’Brien, J (2006) Unconscious processing of high 
and low valence visual stimuli: an fMRI analysis.   
 
Presented for the fMRI Experience Conference, Aston University, Birmingham: 
Shaw, L. J., Wright, M. J. and O’Brien, J. (2005), Attention effect of high and low 
valence visual stimuli: an fMRI analysis. 
 
Presented at the BPS Cognitive Psychology Section Annual Conference, Leeds 
University: 
Shaw, L. J. and Wright, M. J. (2005), Identification of positive and negative 
emotional valence in the absence of conscious perception.   
 
Winner of the Brunel University poster competition 2005: 
Shaw, L. J., (2005), Unconscious and conscious processing of emotion: a 
behavioural and fMRI study. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This document governs the use of the magnetic resonance (MR) scanner installed on the 
campus of Royal Holloway, University of London and jointly owned by Royal Holloway, the 
University of Reading, the University of Surrey and Brunel University. 
 
Although there are no known adverse effects to humans from the static or time-varying 
electromagnetic fields used in MR scanning, there is a need for caution for a number of 
reasons:  
  The static field can cause pacemakers or other implanted devices to 
malfunction and cause other metal implants or shards to move. 
  The static magnetic field can cause loose ferro-magnetic articles to become 
projectile causing injury or death to persons near or in the magnet bore. 
  The static field can cause damage to personal possessions such as analogue 
watches and credit cards. 
  The gradient field can cause peripheral nerve stimulation. 
  Radiofrequency (RF) exposure can heat tissue, particularly if any metallic 
implants or objects are present. 
 
The MRI scanner therefore can pose a dangerous environment unless operated according 
to strict safety protocols. 
 
This document outlines the rules that MR scanner users MUST adhere to, in order to 
ensure the safety of themselves, colleagues and participants. It has been drawn up by the 
Management Committee and approved by the Policy Committee as constituted by the 
Memorandum of Agreement among the four universities dated October 2002. ALL users 
of the scanner, whatever their affiliations, MUST adhere strictly to its provisions. 
 
This document is compiled from all the currently available safety literature, the main 
reference source being the GUIDELINES FOR MAGNETIC RESONANCE DIAGNOSTIC 
EQUIPMENT IN CLINICAL USE, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO SAFETY 
(MEDICAL DEVICES AGENCY).  
 
PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
As with all Health and Safety directives, all personnel have a responsibility to behave 
sensibly and ensure the well-being of themselves, their colleagues, participants in MRI 
examinations and any other visitors. Some personnel (THE AUTHORISED PERSONNEL) 
have additional responsibilities; these people are identified in Appendix 2. 
 
2. DESIGNATION OF THE CONTROLLED AREA 
 
2.1 A plan of the MRI unit is shown in Appendix 1. Within the unit there exists a 
Controlled Area which totally encloses the 0.5 mT (5 Gauss) magnetic field contour. The 
extent of the controlled area is shown in Appendix 1. 
2.2 Access to the controlled area is through the Preparation Room, which is entered via a 
door with a security-coded lock to prevent unauthorised access. 
2.3 All unauthorised personnel including unauthorised staff and visitors must be screened 
and must be supervised by an authorised person at all times whilst within the controlled 
area (see Sections 3 and 4). All objects and equipment must similarly be screened. 
 
3. WORKING PROCEDURES: GENERAL RULES 
 
3.1 No person or object must enter the controlled area without screening by an authorised 
person to ensure that entry is safe. 
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3.2 These rules are in addition to and can be seen as an extension of the Health and 
Safety at Work Act. This clearly lays down the mandatory responsibilities and statutory 
requirements of the employer, employees and visitors who have access to the place of 
work. All the terms of the Act must be adhered to, including that persons must behave in a 
responsible and considerate manner in order not to endanger themselves or others and to 
maintain a good working atmosphere. 
3.3 Equipment must only be used by trained and competent personnel. 
3.4 Equipment must be properly used, serviced and maintained in a good state of repair. If 
faults occur that prevent normal safe operation of the equipment, the equipment must be 
taken out of service until repaired and passed fit for use. ALL faults must be reported and 
a record kept.  The procedure for the reporting and documentation of faults must be 
followed (see Section 6). 
3.5 Working areas and exits should be kept clean, tidy and free from obstruction. 
3.6 Should the use of equipment produce an accident, near miss or hazardous situation, 
operation must cease immediately until the cause is investigated and the hazard is 
removed. 
3.7 An Accident/Incident Report Form must be completed without delay following any 
accident or hazardous situation. Copies of this form are kept in the Control Room. The 
incident should also be reported immediately to the MRI Safety Officer (see Appendix 2). 
3.8 In the event of an emergency such as fire, local procedures must be followed (see 
Section 5 and Appendix 6). All personnel should know the location of fire alarms and 
escape routes. 
 
4. WORKING PROCEDURES: MRI-SPECIFIC RULES 
 
4.1 Control of access 
4.1.1 Authorised Personnel (defined in Appendix 2), and other persons with the authority 
of the MRI Safety Officer (see Appendix 2), have free access to parts of the MRI Unit that 
are NOT WITHIN THE CONTROLLED AREA. Screening is not necessary in order to 
enter the outer rooms of the Unit. 
4.1.2 No person may enter the controlled area unless at least TWO able-bodied adults, 
both of whom have been screened in the previous 12 months and have removed all metal 
items from their clothing, and at least one of whom is an Authorised Person, are present in 
the MRI Unit. No person may be placed inside the scanner unless at least TWO 
AUTHORISED PERSONS, at least one of whom is an employee of one of the four 
universities and at least one of whom has full (as opposed to probationary; see Appendix 
2) status, are present in the MRI Unit. The boundaries of the MRI Unit are defined on the 
plan in Appendix 1. NO person, whatever their status, may enter the controlled area when 
alone in the MRI Unit.  
4.1.3 Authorised Personnel must be trained in MR safety to a level prescribed by the MRI 
Safety Officer. They must be screened at least on a yearly basis, with records of 
screening kept securely in the MRI unit. Any person who is not an Authorised Person but 
who assists an Authorised Person in order to permit entry to the Controlled Area (see 
4.1.2) must first receive basic training in safety as prescribed by the MRI Safety Officer. 
4.1.4 Unauthorised Personnel and objects DO NOT have free access to the controlled 
area. This includes domestic services; responsibility for cleaning the controlled 
area resides with the authorised personnel. 
4.1.5 All people and objects must be “screened” (see Section 4.2) by authorised 
personnel before access to the controlled area is permitted. Screening people requires the 
written questionnaires shown in Appendix 3 to be completed and to show no contra-
indications for access.  
4.1.6 The outer door to the MRI unit must be kept closed at all times – even when the 
area is being supervised by an authorised person. Admission is by security code only. 
Only authorised persons will have access to this code. The code must not be divulged to 
others and any inadvertent disclosure must be reported to the MRI Safety Officer, who will 
then change the code. 
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4.1.7 When the MRI unit is not in use, the following doors must be kept locked: 
Unit outer door  
Examination room door 
Preparation Room door 
Equipment room door 
These doors are identified in Appendix 1. 
 
4.2 Screening 
4.2.1 Only Authorised Personnel are permitted to “screen” participants and other visitors. 
The person must understand, complete and sign two written questionnaires (see 
Appendix 3). The authorised person must then decide if access is safe for the participant, 
using the rules and guidelines in Appendix 3. 
4.2.2 ALL persons must undergo primary screening before access to the controlled area is 
permitted. Primary screening must exclude the presence of the following from the 
controlled area: 
 
Any person fitted with a cardiac pacemaker. 
 
4.2.3 All persons and objects must undergo secondary screening before access to the 
controlled area is permitted. Secondary screening must exclude the following from the 
controlled area: 
Aneurysm clips of any type 
Occlusive clips or pins 
Heart valve replacements and cochlear implants 
Mechanical/Electrical/Magnetically operated devices 
People with metallic splinters in the eye or other remaining metal from injury 
Catheters and intra-venous devices 
Persons under 18 years of age 
Pregnant women 
Mechanical watches, credit cards, magnetic tapes, other magnetic recording 
media. 
All loose ferro-magnetic objects about a person such as dentures, hair grips, 
 hearing aids, jewellery (except wedding ring), keys, money, pens, 
 scissors, spectacles and tools 
All other ferro-magnetic objects including gas cylinders, trolleys and computer 
 equipment, but with the exception of certain small items of equipment 
 (e.g. photometers and other optical equipment) which may be taken into 
 the controlled area for specific purposes provided that express permission 
 is granted by the MRI Safety Officer, that the MRI Safety Officer is 
 present in the controlled area and that no persons other than authorised 
 personnel are present in the controlled area at the time 
 
4.2.4 Persons to be given an MRI examination must undergo additional screening, to 
identify the following: 
 
 People suffering from epilepsy, thermoregulatory problems or diabetes 
 People with intra-uterine contraceptive devices in place 
 People with implants or prostheses that are known to be made of non-ferro-
 magnetic materials and are not specifically excluded in 4.2.3 above 
 
Such people are not excluded from entering the controlled area without being scanned. 
They may only be scanned after appropriate medical consultation and approval. Any 
medical recommendations for supervision during scanning must be implemented if the 
scan proceeds. 
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4.3 MRI Examination 
4.3.1 Only participants who have been approved by an authorised person are permitted to 
be scanned. 
4.3.2 Only Authorised Personnel who are trained are permitted to operate the equipment. 
4.3.3 The person operating the equipment on any given occasion is personally 
responsible for ensuring that the participant has been properly screened, even if the 
examination has been arranged and approved by another authorised person. 
4.3.4 All participants must be fully consenting adults and must have given written informed 
consent, using the approved form (Appendix 4). The person operating the scanner is 
personally responsible for ensuring that this has been done. The participant must be free 
to withdraw such consent and to withdraw from the experiment at any time. 
4.3.5 The purpose and nature of the examination should be explained to the participant,  
who must be given the opportunity to ask questions. 
4.3.6 Contrast agents must not be administered and no other invasive procedure may be 
performed. 
4.3.7 A record must be maintained of all persons who are scanned (see Section 7). 
4.3.8 A record must be maintained of the screening forms for all persons entering the 
controlled area. These must be treated as confidential and held in a locked cabinet in the 
MRI Unit. 
4.3.9 An alarm buzzer must be available to participants during their examination. The 
operation of the alarm must be explained to participants before scanning commences and 
the alarm should be tested regularly. 
4.3.10 The Operator must check every few minutes (normally via the intercom) that the 
participant is comfortable. 
4.3.11 If a participant experiences undue discomfort or distress during scanning, the 
examination must stop. 
4.3.12 Suitable earplugs or sound-attenuating earphones must be provided to all 
participants. Where participants refuse to wear the hearing protection provided, they must 
not be scanned. Earplugs must be of disposable type and discarded after a single use. 
Where earphones are used these should be adequately maintained and inspected on a 
regular basis, and cleaned after each use. If fitted with disposable ear inserts, these must 
be discarded after a single use. Any damage to the earphones should be reported 
immediately to the MRI Safety Officer. 
4.3.13 Persons must not be examined during servicing or be in position in the scanner 
during switch on/off of the magnet (except in emergency). 
4.3.14 Only equipment that is safe and designed for the purpose may be connected to the 
MR scanner or used within the controlled area (see also Appendix 3). 
4.3.15 If a participant who is unable to position him/herself on the bed unaided is to be 
scanned, assistance should be given but only by prior arrangement with the MRI Safety 
Officer and only by staff who are trained in such procedures. 
 
4.4 Result of examination 
4.4.1 Scanning of human participants should be performed for research purposes only, 
using volunteers who are either healthy or have a known, previously documented 
neurological abnormality which does not present a contraindication for MRI. 
4.4.2 In the event that a scan reveals a suspected abnormality that was unknown to the 
authorised person in charge of the scan and which they suspect might require treatment, 
the following procedure must be adopted. 
 
(i) So as to avoid distress to participants arising from false alarms, staff must not 
disclose their concerns to the participant. 
(ii) The authorised person involved must, without delay, report his/her concerns to 
the MRI Safety Officer and supply a high-quality print displaying the suspected 
abnormality. 
(iii) The MRI Safety Officer should, as a matter of urgency, write to the 
participant’s General Practitioner (whose name must be supplied by the 
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participant prior to scanning; see Section 7 and Appendix 3), enclosing the print 
and describing the cause for concern. The letter should state whether or not the 
person expressing concern is medically qualified. It should also state that the 
participant concerned has not been informed and that the decision as to whether 
the participant should be informed, and the task of informing, are referred to the 
GP. 
(iv) In the interests of participant confidentiality, the authorised person concerned 
should not discuss the situation with colleagues or other participants. 
 
4.4.3 Assuming that there is no suspicion of abnormality, staff are encouraged, but not 
required, to offer to provide the participant with a sample image obtained during the 
examination, either electronically or in printed form as the participant prefers. 
 
4.5 Exposure limits 
4.5.1 The time spent in the magnet by any one person must not exceed 90 minutes in any 
24-hour period. Other than this, there is no restriction on the frequency with which a 
screened person may be scanned. 
4.5.2 The exposure of any one person to the static magnetic field must not exceed an 
average of 0.2 Tesla, averaged over any 24-hour period. In practice, this means that 
operators and others may work within the MR Unit but outside the controlled area for 
unlimited periods, provided that they enter the controlled area only occasionally and for 
short periods, to supervise volunteers. An operator standing by the bore opening will 
experience a field of the order of 0.5T. 
 
5. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES 
 
Current emergency procedures are described in Appendix 5 and Appendix 6. 
 
5.1 Should any part of the system fail that may endanger participants, staff or equipment, 
the examination must stop and the participant must be removed from the scanner. If there 
is a risk of damage to the equipment, an authorised person must then electrically isolate 
the equipment by pressing one of the red ‘stop’ buttons in the Control Room and 
Examination Room. No further scanning is permitted to take place until the fault has been 
corrected.  
5.2 Emergency shutdown of the magnet (quenching) must only be undertaken by 
authorised personnel, only after due consideration of the relative risks and only in one of 
the following circumstances (see also Appendix 5): 
 
(i) if a participant or other person is in a life-threatening situation resulting directly from the 
magnetic field. If the endangered person is in the scanner, the magnet should be 
quenched before the person is removed from the scanner. 
(ii) if the emergency services, e.g. fire service, require access to the controlled area with 
ferromagnetic equipment. In this event, the participant must be removed from the scanner 
before the magnet is quenched. 
 
NOTE: The magnet MUST be quenched before the emergency services may have access 
to the controlled area. 
 
5.3 In the event of a medical emergency occurring in the controlled area, medical help 
must be summoned immediately (see Appendix 5). If possible, the affected person should 
be removed from the controlled area before treatment commences. If this is difficult or 
unsafe, first aid may be administered within the controlled area, but only by a person who 
is qualified in first aid, has been screened within the past 12 months and has removed any 
loose metal objects from their person. If treatment by medical or paramedical staff who 
have not been screened is necessary, the affected person must be removed from the 
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controlled area before such treatment commences. An MR-safe patient trolley is kept in 
the examination room at all times. If the affected person is unable to walk, even with 
assistance, he/she should be moved onto the trolley and wheeled out of the controlled 
area. This must be done by authorised persons, all of whom have been trained in this 
procedure. 
5.4 In the event of a fire, the fire procedure (see Appendix 6) must be followed. If 
evacuation is required, all participants and visitors must be removed from the scanner 
area, taking due care of the magnetic field. All doors must be secured on leaving 
especially those that govern access to the controlled area. Note that the fire alarm does 
not automatically unlock doors to the controlled area. 
 
6 REPORTING OF FAULTS 
 
6.1 ALL faults must be (i) reported to the MRI Safety Officer (see Appendix 2) at the 
earliest opportunity and (ii) documented in the Faults Book, which is kept in the Control 
Room. 
6.2 If faults occur that prevent normal safe operation of the equipment, it must be taken 
out of service until repaired and passed fit for use. 
6.3 Should the use of equipment produce an accident, near miss or hazardous situation, 
operation must cease immediately until the cause is investigated and the hazard is 
removed. 
6.4 To minimize inconvenience, faults should also be reported to all other authorised 
users who may be intending to use the equipment in the following 48 hours. 
6.5 In the event of a fault that prevents normal safe operation: 
  The MRI Safety Officer must be informed 
  The fault must be recorded in the Incident Book 
  The room must be signed out of use 
  A “Do not use” sign must be fixed to the equipment 
  The equipment must be signed over to the engineer and then signed back by 
the engineer once repaired and tested. Only then may it be signed back into use 
for scanning. 
 
7. RECORD KEEPING 
 
For each person scanned the following information must be recorded and retained for 10 
years: 
  Name, sex and age 
  Date of scan 
  The name and address of the person’s general practitioner (GP) 
  Region of body scanned and type of coil used 
  Approximate time spent in the magnet 
  Scan data including sequence type, TR, TE, number and size of slices scanned. 
  SAR 
 
The two screening forms and the consent form must also be retained for 10 years. 
 
All information should initially be held in a locked filing cabinet in the control room. It may 
be removed after not less that one year for safe keeping elsewhere at the discretion of the 
MRI Safety Officer. 
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APPENDIX 1 – PLAN OF MRI UNIT INDICATING CONTROLLED AREA 
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APPENDIX 2 – PERSONNEL AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
 
MRI SAFETY OFFICER 
This person is responsible for ensuring that the rules and procedures set out in this 
document are adhered to at all times. He/she also carries responsibility for keeping 
abreast of any new legislation or external guidelines that may be relevant to internal 
procedures. 
 
The MRI Safety Officer is the Departmental Superintendent, Department of Psychology, 
Royal Holloway. In times of absence, he/she may appoint a deputy who must previously 
have been approved by the Management Committee. 
 
AUTHORISED PERSONNEL 
These are essential staff who are conversant with, and are able to put into practice all the 
rules and emergency practices outlined in this document. These personnel have access to 
the Controlled Area (subject to the rules in section 4.1). They are responsible for 
screening participants and other visitors to ensure that it is safe for them to enter the 
controlled area, and they must supervise all non-authorised people at all times when in 
the controlled area. Records of screening are kept by the MRI Safety Officer and held in 
the Control Room. 
 
Authorised person status is granted by the Management Committee. This Committee will 
maintain a list of current authorised users at all times and will immediately inform the MRI 
Safety Officer of any alterations to it. Before Authorised Person status can be conferred, a 
person must undergo the following training and testing: 
(i) Training in the operation of the scanner 
(ii) Training in First Aid (to the level of ‘appointed persons’) 
(iii) Basic fire training (internal programme; content to be determined by the Royal 
Holloway Safety Officer) 
(iv) Training in removing an unconscious participant from the controlled area 
(v) Viewing the current Siemens safety video 
(vi) Attendance at a safety lecture given by a suitably qualified person approved 
by the Management Committee (or viewing a video recording of such a lecture) 
(vii) Reading the Guidelines for Magnetic Resonance Equipment in Clinical Use 
(2nd edn. 2002) published by the Medical Devices Agency 
(viii) Studying all relevant risk assessment forms (provided by the MRI Safety 
Officer) 
(ix) Thoroughly reading the local Rules of Operation and successfully completing 
a written test, to be administered by the MRI Safety Officer, covering the rules and 
procedures covered in this document, 
 
These requirements apply to all persons, including members of the Management 
Committee. 
 
Persons who satisfy all the above requirements but have little or no practical experience 
will initially be given Probationary Authorised Person Status. Such persons will 
automatically become full Authorised Persons when they have been present at 10 scans 
and have operated the scanner on at least 5 of those occasions. 
 
Authorised persons must be screened at least yearly. They must also be trained in the 
use of any new equipment, software or procedures that may be introduced from time to 
time. 
 
The current list of authorised personnel, together with their qualifications, training and 
experience, will be made available on request to all relevant university ethics committees. 
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EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURERS 
Trained service personnel or representatives of the equipment manufacturers can operate 
the equipment for quality control testing, servicing and demonstration purposes. Such 
people may be admitted to the controlled area by authorised personnel on production of 
identification (and normally by arrangement with the MRI Safety Officer). 
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APPENDIX 3 – SCREENING FORMS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 
 
There are two screening forms and an information form. The purpose of the initial 
screening form is to identify and eliminate at-risk individuals without the need for them to 
go to the MR unit. The purpose of the second screening form is to ensure that scanning is 
safe at the time of the scan. The purpose of the information form is to provide volunteers 
with information about the procedure. 
 
The information form must be given to the participant at the time of, or prior to, initial 
screening. The participant should be encouraged to read it before deciding to participate 
or completing the initial screening form. Authorised persons carrying out screening may 
add project-specific information to the information form but must not remove any 
information. They may also add additional project-specific questions to the initial 
screening form, but may not remove any items. 
 
The initial screening form can be completed at any time prior to the scan, at any 
convenient location. Wherever possible it should be completed in the presence of an 
authorised person as defined in Appendix 2, who should ensure that the questions are 
fully understood and that considered answers are given, and should witness the 
participant's signature. Where it is not convenient to complete the form in the presence 
of an authorised person, the participant 's signature should be witnessed by another adult 
who should countersign and add his/her name and address. In this case an authorised 
person should subsequently establish by conversation with the participant that adequate 
attention to the questions has been paid. He/she should verbally go over the questions in 
the initial screening form taking particular care to check that the participant has no 
pacemaker, artificial heart valve, cochlear implant or any other ferromagnetic metal 
implant. 
 
The second screening form must be completed in the MR Unit immediately prior to 
scanning. The participant's completed initial screening form must be available for 
inspection by the participant when completing the second screening form. The authorised 
person who will operate the scanner must then certify, by signing the second screening 
form, that all necessary checks have been made. 
 
In addition, a consent form must be signed by all participants before scanning (see 
Appendix 4). This can be signed at any time after the initial screening has been 
completed. The signature must be witnessed by another adult, who should be either 
Authorised Person, or a scientific colleague informed about the details of the particular 
study, and should add his/her address if not an authorised person. As well as witnessing 
the signature, this person is responsible for ensuring that the participant fully understands 
the consent form and has had adequate opportunity to ask questions. 
 
All three forms must be lodged in the MR unit before scanning takes place. 
Exceptions: 
(i) If the person to be scanned is an authorised person who has been scanned on a 
previous occasion, the second screening form need not be completed. 
(ii) For persons who will enter the controlled area but will not be placed inside the magnet, 
the initial screening form must be completed in accordance with the rules; however the 
second screening form and consent form need not be completed. 
 
For participants who are scanned more than once, the answers to the questions on the 
two screening forms must be confirmed on each occasion, either be countersigning the 
original screening forms or by completing fresh forms. The consent form must be 
completed in relation to each scan. 
 
Copies of the information form and the two screening forms follow. 
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UNIT 
 
INFORMATION FORM 
 
These notes give some information about an fMRI study in which you are invited to take 
part. FMRI is a method for producing images of the activity in the brain as people carry out 
various mental tasks. It involves placing the participant inside a large, powerful magnet 
which forms part of the brain scanner. When particular regions of the brain are active, they 
require more oxygen, which comes from red corpuscles in the blood. As a result, the flow 
of blood increases. This can be detected as changes in the echoes from brief pulses of 
radio waves. These changes can then be converted by a computer into 3D images. This 
enables us to determine which parts of the brain are active during different tasks. 
 
As far as we know, this procedure poses no direct health risks. However, the Department 
of Health advises that certain people should NOT be scanned. Because the scanner 
magnet is very powerful, it can interfere with heart pacemakers and clips or other metal 
items which have been implanted into the body by a surgeon, or with body-piercing items. 
If you have had surgery which may have involved the use of metal items you should NOT 
take part. Note that only ferromagnetic materials (e.g. steel) are likely to cause significant 
problems. Thus normal dental amalgam fillings do not prohibit you from being scanned, 
though a dental plate which contained metal would do so, and you would be asked to 
remove it. You will be asked to remove metal from your pockets (coins, keys), remove 
articles of clothing which have metal fasteners (belts, bras, etc), as well as most jewellery. 
Alternative clothing will be provided as necessary. Watches and credit cards should not be 
taken into the scanner since it can interfere with their operation. You will be asked to 
complete a questionnaire (the Initial Screening Form) which asks about these and other 
matters to determine whether it is safe for you to be scanned. In addition, you are asked 
to give the name and address of your Family Doctor. This is because there is a very small 
chance that the scan could reveal something which required investigation by a doctor. If 
that happened, we would contact your doctor directly. By signing the consent form, you 
authorise us to do this. You will also be asked to complete a second, shorter, screening 
form immediately before the scan. 
 
To be scanned, you would lie on your back on a narrow bed on runners, on which you 
would be moved until your head was inside the magnet. This is rather like having your 
head put inside the drum of a very large front-loading washing machine. The scanning 
process itself creates intermittent loud noises, and you would wear ear-plugs or sound-
attenuating headphones. We would be able to talk to you while you are in the scanner 
through an intercom. If you are likely to become very uneasy in this relatively confined 
space (suffer from claustrophobia), you should NOT take part in the study. If you do take 
part and this happens, you will be able to alert the experimenters by activating an alarm 
and will then be removed from the scanner quickly. It is important that you keep your head 
as still as possible during the scan, and to help you with this, your head will be partially 
restrained with padded headrests. We shall ask you to relax your head and keep it still for 
a period that depends on the experiment but may be more than one hour, which may 
require some effort on your part. If this becomes unacceptably difficult or uncomfortable, 
you may demand to be removed from the scanner. 
 
You may be asked to look at a screen through a small mirror (or other optical device) 
placed just above your eyes and/or be asked to listen to sounds through headphones. 
You may be asked to make judgements about what you see or asked to perform some 
other kind of mental task. Details of the specific experiment in which you are invited to 
participate will either be appended to this sheet or else given to you verbally by the 
experimenter. Detailed instructions will be given just before the scan, and from time to 
time during it. 
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The whole procedure will typically take about 1 hour, plus another 15 minutes to discuss 
with you the purposes of the study and answer any questions about it which you may 
raise. You will be able to say that you wish to stop the testing and leave at any time, 
without giving a reason. This would not affect your relationship with the experimenters in 
any way. The study will not benefit you directly, and does not form part of any medical 
diagnosis or treatment. If you agree to participate you will be asked to sign the initial 
screening form that accompanies this information sheet, in the presence of the 
experimenter (or other witness, who should countersign the form giving their name and 
address, if this is not practical). It is perfectly in order for you to take time to consider 
whether to participate, or discuss the study with other people, before signing. After 
signing, you will still have the right to withdraw at any time before or during the 
experiment, without giving a reason. 
 
The images of your brain will be held securely and you will not be identified by name in 
any publications that might arise from the study. The information in the two screening 
forms will also be treated as strictly confidential and the forms will be held securely until 
eventually destroyed.  
 
Further information about the specific study in which you are invited to participate may 
have been appended overleaf, if the experimenter has felt that this would be helpful. 
Otherwise, he/she will already have told you about the study and will give full instructions 
prior to the scan. Please feel free to ask any questions about any aspect of the study or 
the scanning procedure before completing the initial screening form.
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INITIAL SCREENING FORM 
 
NAME OF PARTICIPANT ………………………………………………… Sex: M / F 
Date of birth……………………… Approximate weight in kg…………. (one stone is about 
6.3 kg) 
 
Please read the following questions CAREFULLY and provide answers. For a 
very small number of individuals, being scanned can endanger comfort, health or 
even life. The purpose of these questions is to make sure that you are not such a 
person.  
 
You have the right to withdraw from the screening and subsequent scanning if 
you find the questions unacceptably intrusive. The information you provide will be 
treated as strictly confidential and will be held in secure conditions. 
 
Delete as appropriate 
1. Have you been fitted with a pacemaker or artificial heart valve?  YES/NO 
2. Have you any aneurysm clips, shunts or stents in your body or a cochlear implant?  
         YES/NO 
3. Have you ever had any metal fragments in your eyes?   YES/NO 
4. Have you ever had any metal fragments, e.g. shrapnel in any other part of your body?  
         YES/NO 
5. Have you any surgically implanted metal in any part of your body, other than dental 
fillings and crowns (e.g. joint replacement or bone reconstruction)  YES/NO 
6. Have you ever had any surgery that might have involved metal implants of which you 
are not aware?         YES/NO 
7. Do you wear a denture plate or brace with metal in it?    YES/NO 
8. Do you wear a hearing aid?       YES/NO 
9. Have you ever suffered from any of: epilepsy, diabetes or thermoregulatory problems?  
         YES/NO 
10. Have you ever suffered from any heart disease?    YES/NO 
11. Is there any possibility that you might be pregnant?    YES/NO 
12. Have you been sterilised using clips?     YES/NO 
13. Do you have a contraceptive coil (IUD) installed?    YES/NO 
14. Are you currently breast-feeding an infant?     YES/NO 
 
 
I have read and understood the questions above and have answered them correctly. 
 
SIGNED…………………………………      DATE………………………… 
 
In the presence of ………………………… (name) ………………………..(signature) 
 
Address of witness, if not the experimenter: 
 
 
Please enter below the name and address of your doctor (general practitioner). 
(Not required for persons entering the controlled area but not being scanned.) 
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SECOND SCREENING FORM 
 
This form should be completed and signed immediately before your scan, after removal of 
any jewellery or other metal objects and (if required by the operator) changing your 
clothes. 
 
NAME OF PARTICIPANT ………………………………………………… 
 
Date of birth………………………………. Sex: M / F 
 
Please read the following questions CAREFULLY and provide answers. For a 
very small number of individuals, being scanned can endanger comfort, health or 
even life. The purpose of these questions is to make sure that you are not such a 
person. 
 
You have the right to withdraw from the screening and subsequent scanning if 
you find the questions unacceptably intrusive. The information you provide will be 
treated as strictly confidential and will he held in secure conditions. 
 
BEFORE YOU ARE TAKEN THROUGH FOR YOUR SCAN IT IS ESSENTIAL 
THAT YOU REMOVE ALL METAL OBJECTS INCLUDING:-WATCHES, PENS, 
LOOSE CHANGE, KEYS, HAIR CLIPS, ALL JEWELLERY, BRASSIERES WITH 
METAL FASTNERS, METALLIC COSMETICS, CHEQUE/CASH POINT CARDS. 
 
Delete as appropriate 
1. Are you wearing or carrying any metal items such as those listed above?  YES/NO 
2. Have your answers to any of the questions in the initial screening form changed? 
(The initial screening form must be shown to you before you answer this question.)  
          YES/NO 
Specifically, please confirm: 
3. Have you been fitted with a pacemaker, artificial heart valve or cochlear implant?  
          YES/NO 
4. Is there any possibility that you might be pregnant?     YES/NO 
 
I have read and understood the questions above and have answered them correctly. 
 
SIGNATURE………………………………… DATE………………………… 
 
FOR STAFF USE: 
I certify that the initial screening form and the consent form have been completed by the 
person named above and I have attached them to this form. The volunteer has been given 
the standard information sheet about MRI experiments, together with any necessary 
study-specific information, and has been given an opportunity to ask questions. I am 
satisfied that the volunteer is adequately informed and understands the content of the 
consent form. I have taken adequate steps to ensure that the volunteer has no ferro-
magnetic metal in or on his/her person and I am satisfied that the scan can proceed. 
 
SIGNATURE………………………………… NAME (print) ………………………………….. 
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APPENDIX 3 continued 
 
RULES FOR ADMINISTRATION OF SCREENING FORMS 
 
GENERAL 
 
1. All participants must complete both the initial and second screening forms before 
entering the controlled area. 
2. Completion of the screening forms must be supervised by an authorised person (see 
Appendix 2) who must be satisfied that the participant has read the questions carefully 
and understands their importance. 
3. The second screening form must be countersigned by an authorised person before the 
participant enters the controlled area. The form should only be signed if all questions have 
been answered satisfactorily (see below), the participant’s GP details have been added 
and the participant has signed both screening forms and the consent form. 
4. If the participant answers “no” to all questions on both screening forms and the 
authorised person is satisfied that the participant has given the questions due 
consideration, the participant may be permitted to enter the controlled area. 
 
INITIAL SCREENING FORM 
 
5. If the participant answers ‘yes’ to any of questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 14 then 
the participant MUST NOT be allowed into the controlled area. The person supervising the 
screening should explain the situation clearly, making clear that there is no cause for 
alarm, and cancel any MRI examination that has been arranged. They should also point 
out that rejection as a research participant does not necessarily mean that a future MR 
scan for medical purposes would be unsafe and that they should be guided by the 
medical personnel concerned if such a need should arise. 
6. If the participant answers ‘yes’ to any of questions 5, 6, 7, 9 and 13, the person must 
not be scanned unless medical advice is first taken and any medical supervision that may 
be recommended is implemented. In such cases, explicit permission to proceed must be 
obtained from the MR Safety Officer before scanning. The following specific rules apply in 
such cases: 
(Q.6) A person who has had surgery that clearly did not involve implantation of metal (e.g. 
tonsillectomy) may be scanned. Persons who have had any surgery where the use of 
metal implants cannot be ruled out must not enter the controlled area unless it is first 
established that the implant contains no ferromagnetic material. They must not be 
scanned unless medical advice has been taken and any medical supervision that has 
been recommended is provided. Scanning may proceed only if the answer to question 6 
has become “no” and the initial screening form has been re-administered and the answers 
reflect this. 
(Q.7) A person wearing a dental plate or brace may enter the controlled area but 
must remove the device before being scanned. If it is not readily removable, the 
person should not be asked to remove it and scanning must not proceed. 
(Q.9) A person suffering from thermo-regulatory problems, diabetes or epilepsy 
may enter the controlled area but must not be scanned without medical 
supervision. 
(Q.13) A woman with an intra-uterine contraceptive device may enter the 
controlled area but must not be scanned. 
 
If there is ANY DOUBT as to whether it is safe to proceed, the participant MUST NOT be 
allowed to enter the controlled area. 
 
7. If a participant has answered ‘yes’ to a question but is subsequently permitted to enter 
the controlled area, the facts and the basis of the decision must be documented and 
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attached to the filed screening forms. Any material statements made by the participant 
should be made in writing on the screening form. 
 
SECOND SCREENING FORM 
 
8. If the participant answers ‘yes’ to question 1 then he/should should be asked to remove 
the item(s) in question, if that is practical, and then amend the answer and initial the 
change, or complete a fresh second screening form. 
9. If the participant answers ‘yes’ to question 2, the initial screening form must be 
completed afresh and any affirmative answers acted upon in accordance with the rules 
above. 
10. If the participant answers 'yes' to question 3, they must not be allowed into the 
controlled area. 
11. A person answering ‘yes’ to question 4 must not be scanned, but may be allowed into 
the controlled area for other purposes (e.g. a pregnant authorised person may enter to 
supervise volunteers, but has the right to refuse to do so). 
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APPENDIX 4 – CONSENT FORM 
ROYAL HOLLOWAY, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON - MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 
UNIT 
CONSENT FORM 
 
NAME OF PARTICIPANT………………………………………………… 
 
Please read the following statement carefully and then add your signature. 
If you have any questions, please ask the person who gave you this form. 
You are under no pressure to give your consent and you are free to 
withdraw from the MRI examination at any time. 
 
I agree to participate in an MRI examination conducted for research 
purposes by …………………………………………..(name of operator) on 
………………………………………………………….(name of project). 
 
I understand that the examination is not part of any medical treatment. I 
have completed two screening forms and I have been given an opportunity 
to discuss any issues arising from them. The nature of the examination has 
been explained to me and I have had an opportunity to ask questions 
about it. I consent to my general practitioner being contacted in the unlikely 
event that the scan reveals any suspected abnormality. 
 
Signature ……………………………………… Date………………………… 
 
WITNESS: 
 
Statement by a witness, who must be either an authorised person or a 
scientific collaborator who is familiar with the experimental procedure and 
is able to answer questions about it. 
 
I certify that the above participant signed this form in my presence. I am 
satisfied that the participant fully understands the statement made and I 
certify that he/she had adequate opportunity to ask questions about the 
procedure before signing. 
 
Signature………………………………………. Date………………………… 
 
Name ……………………………….. 
 
Address of witness (if not an Authorised Person): 
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APPENDIX 5 – EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND QUENCH 
 
QUENCHING refers to the loss of absolute zero in the magnet coils. If the 
temperature rises, the coils cease to be superconducting and become resistive. 
Heat is then generated, resulting in boil-off of helium, and the field strength falls 
sharply. Quenching can be manually instigated in an emergency. Re-establishing 
the static field after quenching is an expensive, specialist procedure. In addition, 
the magnet may be permanently damaged. 
 
 
Procedure in the event of a person being in a life-threatening 
situation due to the magnetic field 
 
1. Manually quench the magnet by pressing one of the emergency buttons 
located in the control room and the examination room. The DOOR to the 
examination room should be OPEN during quenching. Manually quenching may 
be performed only by an Authorised Person who must first have given due 
consideration to the relative risks (see Note below). 
 
2. Dial 444 and call for an ambulance. 
 
3. Do not attempt to remove the participant from the scanner. 
 
 
Procedure in the event of a person being in a life-threatening 
situation that does not involve the magnetic field 
 
1. Dial 444 and call for an ambulance 
 
2. Unless there is an injury that requires the person to be kept still, remove the 
person from the Controlled Area 
 
 
NOTE: Quenching the magnet carries its own risks. Quenching involves the 
release of large amounts of energy, which can cause a significant rise in 
temperature in the magnet. Cryogens are vented to the outside air but there is a 
risk of release into the scanner room, which can cause changes in air pressure or 
even asphyxiation. A careful balancing of risks must be made as to whether 
quenching is appropriate. Quenching should only be performed if the situation is 
judged to be life-threatening AND it is judged that the presence of the magnetic 
field poses a bigger risk than the quenching procedure itself. Such situations are 
extremely rare and quenching should be regarded as a last resort. 
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APPENDIX 6 – FIRE PROCEDURES 
 
Procedures in the event of a fire involving the MRI unit 
If you discover a fire: 
 
1 Immediately operate the nearest fire alarm. This is located just inside the main 
entrance door to the MRI unit 
 
2 Implement the evacuation procedure (see below). 
 
DO NOT tackle the fire, unless you have received fire training to a level 
commensurate with the severity of the incident. 
 
DO NOT take fire-fighting equipment into the Controlled Area unless it is known to 
be MR-safe. 
 
 
Evacuation procedure: 
 
1. Stop all scanning. 
 
2 Remove participant from the scanner. 
 
3 Electrically isolate the scanner by pressing either of the two unprotected red 
buttons located on the walls of the control room and the examination room. DO 
NOT QUENCH the magnet. 
 
4 Do not stop to collect personal belongings. 
 
5 Leave the Unit and building by the nearest convenient exit. 
 
6 Secure all doors after leaving. 
 
7 Do not re-enter the building until instructed by the Fire Brigade or a responsible 
officer of the College. 
 
8 Proceed to the designated Assembly point (Car Park 5). 
 
9 The MRI Safety Officer or an Authorised Person must be available to liase with the Fire 
Brigade and College Safety Officer. They should jointly assess whether it is necessary to 
enter the Controlled Area with fire-fighting equipment. If this is deemed necessary, the 
magnet must first be quenched by the MRI Safety Officer or an Authorised Person. 
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Appendix II 
 
 
Self-report Questionnaire  
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Behavioural Experiment HA only - Questionnaire 
 
Name…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Today’s date…………………………………………………………….……… 
 
DOB……………………………………Age…………………………………... 
 
Gender.    Male       Female 
  
 
Are you left or right handed. Left       Right   
 
PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU CAN SEE THE SCREEN CLEARLY 
 
 
PRACTICE TRIAL  
 
  
TRIAL IMAGE 1 
 
Was your overall impression pleasant or unpleasant?  Please tick one of the 
following: 
          Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
On a scale of 1-9 how confident do you feel about your answer?  Please tick one of 
the following: 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
How many images did you see? 
   One   Two   Three 
                
 
On a scale of 1-9 how confident do you feel about your answer?  Please tick one of 
the following: 
Not at all   `      Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
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TRIAL IMAGE 2 
Was your overall impression pleasant or unpleasant?  Please tick one of the 
following: 
          Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
On a scale of 1-9 how confident do you feel about your answer?  Please tick one of 
the following: 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
How many images did you see? 
   One   Two   Three 
                
 
On a scale of 1-9 how confident do you feel about your answer?  Please tick one of the 
following: 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Now the experiment will begin.  Please make sure that you answer all four 
questions for EACH image – even if you need to ‘guess’. 
IMAGE 1 
Was your overall impression pleasant or unpleasant?  Please tick one of the following: 
          Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
On a scale of 1-9 how confident do you feel about your answer?  Please tick one of the 
following: 
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
How many images did you see? 
   One   Two   Three 
                
 
On a scale of 1-9 how confident do you feel about your answer?  Please tick one of the 
following: 
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
 
 270
IMAGE 2 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 3 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 4 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
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IMAGE 5 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 6 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 7 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
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IMAGE 8 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 9 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 10 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
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IMAGE 11 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 12 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 13 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
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IMAGE 14 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 15 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 16 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
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IMAGE 17 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 18 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 19 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
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IMAGE 20 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 21 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 22 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
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IMAGE 23 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 24 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 25 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
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IMAGE 26 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 27 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 28 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
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IMAGE 29 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 30 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 31 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
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IMAGE 32 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 33 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 34 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
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IMAGE 35 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
IMAGE 36 
Impression?         Pleasant              Unpleasant   
                  
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
   One   Two   Three 
How Many?               
 
Not at all         Very 
Confident        Confident 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
 
 
THANK YOU 
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Appendix III 
 
 
Informed Consent Form  
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INFORMED CONSENT SHEET: 
 CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSING OF EMOTIONAL 
VISUAL STIMULI   
 
 The Department of Human Sciences at Brunel University requires that all 
persons who participate in psychology studies give their written consent to do so.  
Please read the following and sign it if you agree with what it says. 
 I freely and voluntarily consent to be a participant in the research project 
entitled “Conscious and Unconscious Processing of Emotional Visual Stimuli” to 
be conducted at Brunel University, with Lynda Shaw as principal investigator.  
The broad goal of this research program is to explore the neuropsychology of 
emotion and the relationship between conscious and unconscious processing of 
emotion.  Specifically, I have been told that I will be asked to look at a series of 
images on a screen, which will involve both subliminal (below threshold) and 
normal (above threshold) presentations of pictures with strong emotional content 
(both pleasant and unpleasant).   The session should take no longer than thirty 
minutes to complete. 
 I have been told that my responses will be kept strictly confidential.  I also 
understand that if at any time during the session I feel unable or unwilling to 
continue, I am free to leave without negative consequences.  That is, my 
participation in this study is completely voluntary, and I may withdraw from this 
study at any time.  My withdrawal would not result in any penalty, academic or 
otherwise.  My name and my student identification number will not be linked with 
the research materials, as the researchers are interested in contributing to the 
investigations and implications on how emotions affect conscious processing in 
general -- not any particular individual's subjective experience of processing 
emotional visual stimuli.   
 I have been given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the procedure, 
and my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I have been informed 
that if I have any questions about this project, I should feel free to contact Lynda 
Shaw at lyndashaw22@hotmail.com.  If I have any comments or concerns about 
the study or the informed consent procedures, I can contact Prof. Michael Wright 
at Michael.Wright@brunel.ac.uk. 
 I have read and understand the above and consent to participate in this 
study.  My signature is not a waiver of any legal rights.  Furthermore, I understand 
that I will be able to keep a copy of the informed consent form for my records. 
           ____________________________________________________________ 
Participant’s Signature                                        Date  
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I have explained and defined in detail the research procedure in which the student 
has consented to participate.  Furthermore, I will retain one copy of the informed 
consent form for my records. 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Principal Investigator Signature                                    Date 
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Appendix IV 
 
 
Ratings Questionnaire 
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Ratings HA only - questionnaire  
 
“Street” Name…………………………………………………………………… 
 
Today’s date…………………………………………………………….……… 
 
DOB……………………………………Age…………………………………... 
 
Gender.    Male       Female 
  
 
Are you left or right handed.  Left       Right  
  
 
PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU CAN SEE THE SCREEN CLEARLY 
 
Please make sure that you answer all three questions for EACH image.  
 
TRIAL IMAGE 1  Umbrella    7150 
On a scale of 1-9 how pleasant or unpleasant did you find this image?  Please tick one of 
the following: 
 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
On a scale of 1-9 how arousing did you find this image?  Please tick one of the following: 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
TRIAL IMAGE 2   Native Boy  2730 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
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IMAGE 1   Skydivers  5621 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
IMAGE 2   AirCrash  9611 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
IMAGE 3   Chair   7235 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
 
 
IMAGE 4   Fireworks  5480 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
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IMAGE 5   Basket   7010 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
IMAGE 6   Jaguar  1650 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
IMAGE 7   BatteredFem  3180 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
 
 
IMAGE 8   Bomb   9630 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
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IMAGE 9   AttackDog  1525 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
IMAGE 10   FliesOnPie  7360 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
IMAGE 11   Money   8501 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
 
 
IMAGE 12   Stool   7025 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
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IMAGE 13   Shark   1932 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
IMAGE 14   Baby   2071 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
IMAGE 15   Iron   7030 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
 
 
IMAGE 16   Skier   8190 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
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IMAGE 17   Fork   7080 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
IMAGE 18   Athletes  8380 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
IMAGE 19   AngryFace  2120 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
 
 
IMAGE 20   Book   7090 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
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IMAGE 21   IceCream  7270 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
IMAGE 22   Waterfall  5260 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
IMAGE 23   Puppies  1710 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
 
 
IMAGE 24   CarCrash  9911 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
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IMAGE 25   ElectricChair  6020 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
IMAGE 26   AttractiveFem 4250 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
IMAGE 27   Monkies  1811 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
 
 
IMAGE 28   HairDyer  7050 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
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IMAGE 29   Snake   1050 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
IMAGE 30   BabyTumour  3170 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
IMAGE 31   Toilet   9301 
Very Unpleasant      Very Pleasant   
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
 
Not Arousing        Very Arousing 
          
   1   2    3   4   5   6   7   8   9 
Do you remember seeing this picture in the experiment? 
   Yes   No   Not sure 
                
 
 
THANK YOU 
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Debrief Form
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DEBRIEFING FORM: 
CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSING OF EMOTIONAL 
VISUAL STIMULI 
 
 The question of whether there can be unconscious processing of emotional 
stimuli has been an important theme in psychology for more than a century.  Some 
of the strongest claims for this position come from lesion studies.  We intend to 
expand on the knowledge gained so far by using behavioural studies, such as the 
one you have just completed, and fMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) 
experiments.       
 The type of questions we will be investigating include: there is a difference 
between valence visual stimuli for conscious and unconscious processing; there is 
a difference in processing faces, scenes, animals and inaanimate objects. 
 
The following studies might be of interest to you: 
 Dalgleish, T., Power, M.  (1999), Handbook of Cognition and Emotion.  
New York: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
  Damasio, A.  (1999), The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion 
and the Making of Consciousness.  London: Vintage. 
  Heilman, K.M.,  Satz, P (ed).  (1983), Neuropsychology of Human 
Emotion.  New York and London: The Guildford Press 
  Once again, we thank you for taking part in the present study.  Please feel 
free to contact Lynda Shaw if you have any questions or comments regarding this 
study.       
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Appendix VI 
 
 
Conclusions from ANOVA  
 
of Individual Slides. 
 
Summary of Results
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Appendix  VI Summary of results. 
 
 
Legend:  
Col 1: image/ trial number.  
Col 2: Overall impression: actual frequency of unpleasant (left cluster) 
and pleasant (right cluster) responses given to this trial. Blue = 2 
images seen (subliminal) green = 3 images seen (supraliminal). 
Col 3: Classifier: whether this trial is more frequently judged as high 
or low valence relative to control trials. 
Col 4: Significant between-subjects effects in UNIANOVA, e.g.  a 
significant effect of concordance (concordant vs discordant response) 
on valence impression confidence;  a significant effect of number of 
pictures seen (2=subliminal, 3=supraliminal) on valence impression 
confidence. 
Col 5: Marginal means for valence impression confidence (y axis) vs 
discordant (left) and concordant (right). Blue=2seen, green =3seen.
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Image Overall Valence Impression Classifier Unianova Confidence 
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Image Overall Valence Impression Classifier Unianova Confidence 
23  
High 
Valence 
Scene 
Water- 
fall 
pleasantunpleasant
100
80
60
40
20
0
C
o
u
n
t
3
2
how
many
seen
valence overall impression 
Higher Concordant 
discordant 
response / 
impression 
confidence 
F = 4.2 
df = 1, 212 
p < 0.05 
concordantdiscordant
concordance overall impression
6.9
6.8
6.7
6.6
6.5
6.4
6.3
6.2
6.1
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
M
e
a
n
s
3
2
how many seen
Estimated Marginal Means of impression confidence
1 not con - 9 very con
 
2  
Low 
Valence 
Scene 
Air-
crash  
pleasantunpleasant
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
C
o
u
n
t
3
2
how
many
seen
valence overall impression 
Higher Concordant 
discordant 
response / 
impression 
confidence 
F = 11.1 
df = 1, 210 
p < 0.001 
concordantdiscordant
concordance overall impression
7.5
7
6.5
6
5.5
5
4.5
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
M
e
a
n
s
3
2
how many seen
Estimated Marginal Means of impression confidence
1 not con - 9 very con
 
 
 
 
306 
Image Overall Valence Impression Classifier Unianova Confidence 
8  
Low 
Valence 
Scene 
Bomb 
pleasantunpleasant
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
C
o
u
n
t
3
2
how
many
seen
 
valence overall impression 
Lower n.s.  
concordantdiscordant
concordance overall impression
7
6.8
6.6
6.4
6.2
6
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
M
e
a
n
s
3
2
how many seen
Estimated Marginal Means of impression confidence
1 not con - 9 very con
 
25  
Low 
Valence 
Scene 
Car 
Crash 
pleasantunpleasant
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
C
o
u
n
t
3
2
how
many
seen
valence overall impression 
Higher Concordant 
discordant 
response / 
impression 
confidence 
F = 4.3 
df = 1, 213 
p < 0.05 
concordantdiscordant
concordance overall impression
7.4
7.2
7
6.8
6.6
6.4
6.2
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
M
e
a
n
s
3
2
how many seen
Estimated Marginal Means of impression confidence
1 not con - 9 very con
 
 
 
 
307 
Image Overall Valence Impression Classifier Unianova Confidence 
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22  
High 
Valence 
In-
animate 
Ice 
cream 
pleasantunpleasant
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
C
o
u
n
t
3
2
how
many
seen
 
valence overall impression 
Higher Concordant 
discordant 
response / 
impression 
confidence 
F = 5.9 
df = 1, 212 
p < 0.05 
concordantdiscordant
concordance overall impression
7.5
7
6.5
6
5.5
5
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
M
e
a
n
s
3
2
how many seen
Estimated Marginal Means of impression confidence
1 not con - 9 very con
 
11  
Low 
Valence 
In-
animate 
Flies on 
Pie 
pleasantunpleasant
125
100
75
50
25
0
C
o
u
n
t
3
2
how
many
seen
 
valence overall impression 
Higher n.s.  
concordantdiscordant
concordance overall impression
7.6
7.4
7.2
7
6.8
6.6
6.4
6.2
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
M
e
a
n
s
3
2
how many seen
Estimated Marginal Means of impression confidence
1 not con - 9 very con
 
 
 
 
309 
Image Overall Valence Impression Classifier Unianova Confidence 
26  
Low 
Valence 
In-
animate 
Elec 
chair 
pleasantunpleasant
80
60
40
20
0
C
o
u
n
t
3
2
how
many
seen
 
valence overall impression 
Lower Concordant 
discordant 
response / 
impression 
confidence 
F = 3.9 
df = 1, 213 
p < 0.05 
concordantdiscordant
concordance overall impression
7.2
7
6.8
6.6
6.4
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
M
e
a
n
s
3
2
how many seen
Estimated Marginal Means of impression confidence
1 not con - 9 very con
 
36  
Low 
Valence 
In-
animate 
Toilet 
pleasantunpleasant
100
80
60
40
20
0
C
o
u
n
t
3
2
how
many
seen
 
valence overall impression 
Lower Number of 
pictures seen  / 
impression 
confidence 
F = 10.8 
df = 1, 210 
p < 0.005 
 
Concordant 
discordant 
response * 
number seen / 
seen confidence 
F = 9.1 
df = 1, 210 
p < 0.005 concordantdiscordant
concordance overall impression
8
7.5
7
6.5
6
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
 
M
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
 
M
e
a
n
s
3
2
how many seen
Estimated Marginal Means of impression confidence
1 not con - 9 very con
 
 
 
 310
Appendix VII 
 
 
Initial Screening Form 
 
 
 311
 
 
 312
Appendix VIII 
 
 
Information Form 
 
 
 313
 ROYAL HOLLOWAY, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON - MAGNETIC RESONANCE 
IMAGING UNIT 
 
INFORMATION FORM 
 
These notes give some information about an fMRI study in which you are invited to take 
part. FMRI is a method for producing images of the activity in the brain as people carry out 
various mental tasks. It involves placing the participant inside a large, powerful magnet 
which forms part of the brain scanner. When particular regions of the brain are active, they 
require more oxygen, which comes from red corpuscles in the blood. As a result, the flow 
of blood increases. This can be detected as changes in the echoes from brief pulses of 
radio waves. These changes can then be converted by a computer into 3D images. This 
enables us to determine which parts of the brain are active during different tasks. 
 
As far as we know, this procedure poses no direct health risks. However, the Department 
of Health advises that certain people should NOT be scanned. Because the scanner 
magnet is very powerful, it can interfere with heart pacemakers and clips or other metal 
items which have been implanted into the body by a surgeon, or with body-piercing items. 
If you have had surgery which may have involved the use of metal items you should NOT 
take part. Note that only ferromagnetic materials (e.g. steel) are likely to cause significant 
problems. Thus normal dental amalgam fillings do not prohibit you from being scanned, 
though a dental plate which contained metal would do so, and you would be asked to 
remove it. You will be asked to remove metal from your pockets (coins, keys), remove 
articles of clothing which have metal fasteners (belts, bras, etc), as well as most jewellery. 
Alternative clothing will be provided as necessary. Watches and credit cards should not be 
taken into the scanner since it can interfere with their operation. You will be asked to 
complete a questionnaire (the Initial Screening Form) which asks about these and other 
matters to determine whether it is safe for you to be scanned. In addition, you are asked 
to give the name and address of your Family Doctor. This is because there is a very small 
chance that the scan could reveal something which required investigation by a doctor. If 
that happened, we would contact your doctor directly. By signing the consent form, you 
authorise us to do this. You will also be asked to complete a second, shorter, screening 
form immediately before the scan. 
 
To be scanned, you would lie on your back on a narrow bed on runners, on which you 
would be moved until your head was inside the magnet. This is rather like having your 
head put inside the drum of a very large front-loading washing machine. The scanning 
process itself creates intermittent loud noises, and you would wear ear-plugs or sound-
attenuating headphones. We would be able to talk to you while you are in the scanner 
through an intercom. If you are likely to become very uneasy in this relatively confined 
space (suffer from claustrophobia), you should NOT take part in the study. If you do take 
part and this happens, you will be able to alert the experimenters by activating an alarm 
and will then be removed from the scanner quickly. It is important that you keep your head 
as still as possible during the scan, and to help you with this, your head will be partially 
restrained with padded headrests. We shall ask you to relax your head and keep it still for 
a period that depends on the experiment but may be more than one hour, which may 
require some effort on your part. If this becomes unacceptably difficult or uncomfortable, 
you may demand to be removed from the scanner. 
 
You may be asked to look at a screen through a small mirror (or other optical device) 
placed just above your eyes and/or be asked to listen to sounds through headphones. 
You may be asked to make judgements about what you see or asked to perform some 
other kind of mental task. Details of the specific experiment in which you are invited to 
participate will either be appended to this sheet or else given to you verbally by the 
experimenter. Detailed instructions will be given just before the scan, and from time to 
time during it. 
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The whole procedure will typically take about 1 hour, plus another 15 minutes to discuss 
with you the purposes of the study and answer any questions about it which you may 
raise. You will be able to say that you wish to stop the testing and leave at any time, 
without giving a reason. This would not affect your relationship with the experimenters in 
any way. The study will not benefit you directly, and does not form part of any medical 
diagnosis or treatment. If you agree to participate you will be asked to sign the initial 
screening form that accompanies this information sheet, in the presence of the 
experimenter (or other witness, who should countersign the form giving their name and 
address, if this is not practical). It is perfectly in order for you to take time to consider 
whether to participate, or discuss the study with other people, before signing. After 
signing, you will still have the right to withdraw at any time before or during the 
experiment, without giving a reason. 
 
The images of your brain will be held securely and you will not be identified by name in 
any publications that might arise from the study. The information in the two screening 
forms will also be treated as strictly confidential and the forms will be held securely until 
eventually destroyed.  
 
Further information about the specific study in which you are invited to participate may 
have been appended overleaf, if the experimenter has felt that this would be helpful. 
Otherwise, he/she will already have told you about the study and will give full instructions 
prior to the scan. Please feel free to ask any questions about any aspect of the study or 
the scanning procedure before completing the initial screening form.
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Appendix IX 
 
 
Second Screening Form 
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Appendix X 
 
 
Consent Form
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Appendix XI 
 
 
Subjective Report Form 
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Appendix XI  Subjective Report Form 
 
 
Legend: 
 
HV = high valence 
LV = low valence 
B = big 
L = little 
F = foveal/peripheral dual image 
a= animal 
f = face 
s = scene 
i = inanimate object  
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Experiment fMRI foveal/peripheral – Subjective Report 
 
 
Name……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Today’s date…………………………………………………………………………. 
 
DOB…………………………………………Age………………………………….. 
 
Gender……………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Are you left or right handed……………………………………………………….. 
 
 
I SAY – “PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU CAN SEE THE SCREEN CLEARLY” 
 
I THEN SAY – “Each picture will appear quickly.  Please tell me whether the images 
are pleasant, unpleasant or neutral.  Some of the pictures are big.  Some are small.  
Some are big with a small picture in the centre – when these appear please attend to 
the small central picture only.” 
 
I fill in the questionnaire because the experiment goes so quickly. 
 
PRACTICE TRIAL 
    PLEASANT UNPLEASANT NEUTRAL 
TRIAL 1 Big neutral        
 
TRIAL 2 HVLf         
 
TRIAL 3 HVFa         
____________________________________________________________________
_ 
IMAGE 1 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 2 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 3 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 4 HVBa         
 
IMAGE 5 HVBa         
 
IMAGE 6 HVBa         
 
IMAGE 7 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 8 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 9 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 10 HVBf         
 
IMAGE 11 HVBf         
 
IMAGE 12 HVBf         
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PLEASANT UNPLEASANT NEUTRAL 
 
IMAGE 13 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 14 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 15 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 16 HVBs         
 
IMAGE 17 HVBs         
 
IMAGE 18 HVBs         
 
IMAGE 19 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 20 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 21 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 22 HVBi         
 
IMAGE 23 HVBi         
 
IMAGE 24 HVBi         
 
IMAGE 25 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 26 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 27 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 28 LVLa         
 
IMAGE 29 LVLa         
 
IMAGE 30 LVLa         
 
IMAGE 31 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 32 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 33 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 34 LVLf         
 
IMAGE 35 LVLf         
 
IMAGE 36 LVLf         
 
IMAGE 37 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 38 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 39 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 40 LVLs         
 
IMAGE 41 LVLs         
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PLEASANT UNPLEASANT NEUTRAL 
 
IMAGE 42 LVLs         
 
IMAGE 43 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 44 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 44 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 45 LVLi         
 
IMAGE 46 LVLi         
 
IMAGE 47 LVLi         
 
IMAGE 48 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 49 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 50 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 51 HVFa         
 
IMAGE 52 HVFa         
 
IMAGE 53 HVFa         
 
IMAGE 54 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 55 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 56 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 57 HVFf         
 
IMAGE 58 HVFf         
 
IMAGE 59 HVFf         
 
IMAGE 60 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 61 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 62 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 63 HVFs         
 
IMAGE 64 HVFs         
 
IMAGE 65 HVFs         
 
IMAGE 66 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 67 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 68 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 69 HVFi         
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PLEASANT UNPLEASANT NEUTRAL 
 
IMAGE 70 HVFi         
 
IMAGE 71 HVFi         
 
IMAGE 72 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 73 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 74 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 75 LVBa         
 
IMAGE 76 LVBa         
 
IMAGE 77 LVBa         
 
IMAGE 78 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 79 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 80 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 81 LVBf         
 
IMAGE 82 LVBf         
 
IMAGE 83 LVBf         
 
IMAGE 84 Big Neutral        
  
IMAGE 85 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 86 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 87 LVBs         
 
IMAGE 88 LVBs         
 
IMAGE 89 LVBs         
 
IMAGE 90 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 91 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 92 Big Neutral        
 
IMAGE 93 LVBi         
 
IMAGE 94 LVBi         
 
IMAGE 95 LVBi         
 
IMAGE 96 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 97 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 98 Little Neutral        
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PLEASANT UNPLEASANT NEUTRAL 
 
IMAGE 99 HVLa         
 
IMAGE 100 HVLa         
 
IMAGE 101 HVLa         
 
IMAGE 102 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 103 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 104 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 105 HVLf         
 
IMAGE 106 HVLf         
 
IMAGE 107 HVLf         
 
IMAGE 108 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 109 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 110 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 111 HVLs         
 
IMAGE 112 HVLs         
 
IMAGE 113 HVLs         
 
IMAGE 114 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 115 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 116 Little Neutral        
 
IMAGE 117 HVLi         
 
IMAGE 118 HVLi         
 
IMAGE 119 HVLi         
 
IMAGE 120 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 121 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 122 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 123 LVFa         
 
IMAGE 124 LVFa         
 
IMAGE 125 LVFa         
 
IMAGE 126 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 127 Foveal Neutral        
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PLEASANT UNPLEASANT NEUTRAL 
 
IMAGE 128 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 129 LVFf         
 
IMAGE 130 LVFf         
 
IMAGE 131 LVFf         
 
IMAGE 132 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 133 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 134 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 135 LVFs         
 
IMAGE 136 LVFs         
 
IMAGE 137 LVFs         
 
IMAGE 138 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 139 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 140 Foveal Neutral        
 
IMAGE 141 LVFi         
 
IMAGE 142 LVFi         
 
IMAGE 143 LVFi         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
